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ABSTRACT 
 
Demand Effects in Productivity and Efficiency Analysis. (May 2012) 
Chia-Yen Lee, B.S.; B.B.A., National Chengchi University; 
M.S., National Tsing Hua University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Andrew Johnson 
 
 Demand fluctuations will bias the measurement of productivity and efficiency. 
This dissertation described three ways to characterize the effect of demand fluctuations.  
 First, a two-dimensional efficiency decomposition (2DED) of profitability is 
proposed for manufacturing, service, or hybrid production systems to account for the 
demand effect. The first dimension identifies four components of efficiency: capacity 
design, demand generation, operations, and demand consumption, using Network Data 
Envelopment Analysis (Network DEA). The second dimension decomposes the 
efficiency measures and integrates them into a profitability efficiency framework. Thus, 
each component’s profitability change can be analyzed based on technical efficiency 
change, scale efficiency change and allocative efficiency change. 
 Second, this study proposes a proactive DEA model to account for demand 
fluctuations and proposes input or output adjustments to maximize effective production. 
Demand fluctuations lead to variations in the output levels affecting measures of 
technical efficiency. In the short-run, firms can adjust their variable resources to address 
the demand fluctuates and perform more efficiently. Proactive DEA is a short-run 
 iv 
capacity planning method, proposed to provide decision support to a firm interested in 
improving the effectiveness of a production system under demand uncertainty using a 
stochastic programming DEA (SPDEA) approach. This method improves the decision 
making related to short-run capacity expansion and estimates the expected value of 
effectiveness given demand.  
 In the third part of the dissertation, a Nash-Cournot equilibrium is identified for 
an oligopolistic market. The standard assumption in the efficiency literature that firms 
desire to produce on the production frontier may not hold in an oligopolistic market 
where the production decisions of all firms will determine the market price, i.e. an 
increase in a firm’s output level leads to a lower market clearing price and potentially-
lower profits. Models for both the production possibility set and the inverse demand 
function are used to identify a Nash-Cournot equilibrium and improvement targets which 
may not be on the strongly efficient production frontier. This behavior is referred to as 
rational inefficiency because the firm reduces its productivity levels in order to increase 
profits.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Productivity and efficiency analysis measures the performance of firms, which transform 
input resources into output products or services (Coelli et al., 2005). The efficient 
frontier (or production function) can be constructed to characterize a benchmark to 
measure how efficiently production processes use inputs to generate outputs; given the 
same level input resources, inefficiency is indicated by lower levels of system output. In 
a competitive market, if the firm is far from the production function and operates 
inefficiently, either productivity should increase to make the firm competitive or the 
firms would likely go out of business. In practice, a true production function is not 
observed and must be estimated. Production theory provides a useful framework to 
estimate the production function and efficiency levels using the parametric functional 
forms (e.g. Stochastic Frontier Analysis, SFA) (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van 
den Broeck, 1977) or nonparametric benchmarking technique (e.g. Data Envelopment 
Analysis, DEA) (Charnes et al., 1978; Banker et al., 1984). Using productivity and 
efficiency analysis the firm can identifies inefficient performance, then develop 
productivity improvement strategy and reallocate resources. 
 
 
   
This dissertation follows the style of European Journal of Operational Research. 
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 Due to rapid development in information technology, global logistics, and 
electronic commerce, business environments change swiftly and are increasingly 
uncertain. Environment uncertainty challenges business operations. In particular, 
demand uncertainty creates critical shocks to business environments. Short product life 
cycle, product customization, and price competition contribute to variability in demand 
and lead to changes in service requirements. Demand uncertainty will affect capacity 
installation, product pricing, product-mix, on-time delivery, vendor selection, and order 
allocation. Demand uncertainty pushes the firm to build a more flexible business model 
focusing on core competence using concepts such as flexible manufacturing system 
(Vokurka and O'Leary-Kelly, 2000), lean manufacturing (Shah and Ward, 2003), Just-
In-Time (JIT) and Kanban production system (Ohno, 1988a; 1988b), build-to-order 
(Holweg and Pil, 2001), assemble-to-order, etc. Other firms address demand uncertainty 
by developing common platforms of information transparency and sharing information 
across the supply chain using information technology (Simchi-Levi et al., 2007). 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and Point-of-Sale (PoS) systems significantly shorten 
the lead time of data collection and improve vertical integration (Monteverde and Teece, 
1982; Premkumar et al., 1994). In addition, firms develop strategic alliances and build 
relationships that alternate between competition and cooperation such as Vendor-
Managed Inventory (VMI) (Waller et al., 1999) and risk pooling which aggregates 
demand to reduce demand variation (Simchi-Levi et al., 2007). There is not doubt that 
demand fluctuations also change the rules of thumb for typical measures in productivity 
analysis.  
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 This study addresses three issues related to demand fluctuations when 
performing productivity and efficiency analysis. The first issue is that demand 
fluctuation bias the estimates of efficiency. The second issue is demand fluctuation 
create a gap between demand and output level as a surplus or shortage of capacity. The 
third issue is firms that increase output to become technically efficient may actually 
reduce overall profits because increasing the overall quantity in the market will lead to 
lower prices. 
 First, demand fluctuations lead to biased estimates of efficiency. A decrease in 
actual output can be the result of insufficient demand. If actual output is reduced by 
changes in demand, then the efficiency is underestimated relative to what the firm could 
have produced. Demand fluctuations can create bias in two ways: 1) if forecasted 
demand is underestimated, capital resources might be under used to avoid creating 
excess inventories.  In this case higher output could have been achieved, but due to 
forecasting error and production lead times, the firm achieves lower productivity. 2) if 
units sold is used as the output measure, insufficient realized demand will cause 
measured output to be lower. Similarly, in a panel data analyses, technical regress is 
often attributed to production issues, when in reality it may be a result of a reduction in 
demand. Thus, productivity analysis attributes changes in demand to production (Lee 
and Johnson, 2011; 2012). In chapter II, a network DEA model to decompose the 
efficiency of production system is described. This method separates the demand and 
production process in efficiency analysis. 
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 Second, demand fluctuations cause a surplus or shortage of capacity. Capacity 
surplus occurs when the demand realized is less than the supply that can be produced by 
the facility; or alternatively, capacity shortage occurs where the demand for a product 
exceeds the capacity of the facility. In this study, "effective" output is defined as the 
output products or services produced and consumed. Over or under production causes 
profit loss. Even though demand fluctuations make demand forecasting and capacity 
installation decisions challenging, in the short run, firms can change variable input 
resources to adjust output levels and partly address demand uncertainty. This sort of 
capacity flexibility is critical to achieving cost savings in demand downturns or to 
increase profits when demand is unexpectedly high (Alp and Tan, 2008). In chapter III 
the proactive DEA model is described to recommend adjustments in variable input levels 
to match demand and maximize the effectiveness ( i.e., the difference between demand 
and production output level). 
 Third, typically productivity analysts do not consider demand and assume all 
firms want to be as productive as possible. However, microeconomic theory tells us 
firms in less than perfectly competitive markets can reduce production levels and 
increase the market price for a product, in some cases increasing the firm’s profits.  In 
oligopoly markets a particular firm's output level along with the output level of all other 
firms jointly determine the price, whereas in a monopoly market a firm has absolute 
control over price by selecting its output level. In these situations, a firm that changes the 
quantity supplied will affect the clearing price. From a revenue efficiency perspective, 
an inefficient firm that increases output to become technically efficient may actually 
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reduce overall profits by increasing the market quantity and causing the market price to 
fall (Johnson and Ruggiero, 2011). Thus in this case a firm is said to be rationally 
inefficient in the sense that a firm is maximizing its profit by intentionally operating at 
lower productivity levels. In chapter IV this study, an inverse demand function is used to 
identify a Nash-Cournot equilibrium and the profit maximizing output level. 
 
1.2 Research Aims and Methodologies 
This dissertation describes the integration demand effects into a productivity analysis 
framework. Figure 1.1 proposes the functional position of productivity and efficiency 
analysis (PEA) within the production planning framework. Currently there is not a link 
between PEA and the demand management function, thus this dissertation develops this 
link shown with the dashed arrow. PEA is a tactical-level decision and part of mid-term 
production planning. There are two services which PEA provides - performance 
benchmarking and production guidance. The former, PEA can provide an ex-post 
analysis estimating efficiency from the dataset of multiple inputs and multiple outputs; 
alternatively, PEA can be used in an ex ante analysis to suggest guidelines of resource 
allocation. However, currently PEA is used on production data and ignores demand 
information which may bias efficiency measures intended to characterize operational 
performance. 
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Figure 1.1 Research position in production planning and control (revised from Lin, 
2006) 
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1.3 Significance and Objectives 
The objectives of the research is to develop mathematical models to account for demand 
effects and the related uncertainty in productivity and efficiency analysis. The current 
productivity and efficiency analysis literature introduces a series of methodologies to 
assess production performance. However, in practice demand fluctuations will affect the 
production output level and bias the efficiency estimates. Output levels are partially 
decided based on expected demand. Thus, efficiency measures may capture not only 
production performance but also demand effects and customer relationships. If the 
production function is strictly defined as the relationship between input resource and 
output level and will be used to measure production performance, demand must be 
modeled. Insufficient demand levels cause overproduction and excess inventory; a 
higher demand level leads to underproduction and limited profits. The typical efficiency 
analysis does not model demand. Characterizing the effects of demand is critical to 
improving benchmarking techniques in a variety of applications. 
 Three tasks are executed to accomplishing the objective 
1. Develop a Network DEA model to decompose the production system and decompose 
profitability efficiency change. The results of this model are used to identify 
improvement strategies. This model separates the production process from the 
demand process to allow efficiency estimates of both processes. 
2. Develop a Proactive DEA model to identify ex ante operational strategies and 
maximize effectiveness. The firm adjusts variable inputs to change the output level and 
match demand levels. 
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3. Develop a Nash equilibrium model to identify the firms' profit maximizing production 
strategy. This is important in an oligopolistic market in which price is a function of 
the output level of all firms. 
 
1.4 Overview of This Study 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter I provides a background, significance 
and motivation of the demand effect in productivity and efficiency analysis, and 
describes the research aims. Chapter II describes a Network DEA model characterizing a 
manufacturing system or service system or hybrid of the two. This model addresses the 
issue of biased efficiency estimates caused by ignoring the effects of demand. An 
empirical study of the U.S. airlines industry is presented to demonstrate the proposed 
model. To deal with demand fluctuations in the short run, chapter III proposes a 
Proactive DEA model to measure "effectiveness". An application to Japanese 
Convenience Stores (CVS) is presented. Chapter IV demonstrates a Mix Complementary 
Problem (MCP) to find the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in an oligopoly market. Chapter V 
concludes with remarks and further research directions for considering demand issues in 
productivity analysis. 
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Figure 1.2 Overview of this study 
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CHAPTER II 
EFFICIENCY DECOMPOSITION BY NETWORK DEA* 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Analysts of production systems use a variety of techniques to assess performance and 
search for improvement alternatives. Singh et al. (2000) claim three main categories of 
performance measurement techniques: index measurement, linear programming, and 
econometric models. The first includes the concept of total factor productivity or 
financial ratio, while the latter two categories are based on production function. The 
production economics approach, Hackman (2008), can be used to estimate the frontier 
production function and characterize how efficient production processes use inputs to 
generate outputs. Consequently, given the same input resource, a system is termed 
inefficient when its outputs levels are lower than other potential production processes. 
However, the reduced actual output can be caused by insufficient demand, i.e. demand 
fluctuations can bias productivity measures and lead to a decrease in measured 
efficiency. Similarly, in panel data analysis, the Malmquist productivity index quantifies 
efficiency change and technology change over time. Technical regress is often attributed 
to production issues when in actuality it may result from lack of demand. This study 
incorporates demand into the analysis and attributes some changes in production to 
demand. 
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The literature on the demand effect in productivity analysis divides into two 
streams. One stream uses parametric equilibrium models to measure total factor 
productivity (TFP) change. Nakiri and Schankerman (1981) discuss the reasons for 
productivity slowdown observed between 1965 and 1978. The authors propose a model 
for decomposing changes in TFP that identifies the contributions of factor-price effect, 
demand effect, R&D effect, and technical change. They conclude the productivity 
slowdown of American manufacturing was mainly due to the deceleration in demand 
growth. Appelbaum and Berechman (1991) provide a market equilibrium model that 
considers supply (cost), demand, and government regulatory conditions. The model 
builds an output demand function to represent the relationship between the supply-side 
provision of firms and the demand-side consumption of customers, calculates the cost 
growth rate, and decomposes it into changes in outputs scale, factor prices and technical 
efficiency. It also calculates the growth rate of cost efficiency to clarify the effects on 
demand and regulatory conditions. Good et al. (1999) further describe static and 
dynamic factor demand models to measure TFP growth and its decomposition. 
 The second literature stream models demand generation or consumption as a 
component of a production system. In other words, a firm uses its marketing or sales 
departments to change its demand level. Studying the performance evaluation of a 
transportation system, Fielding et al. (1985) distinguish between the production process 
and the consumption process, arguing that output consumption is substantially different 
from output production since transportation services cannot be stored. They propose 
three performance indicators for a transit system: cost efficiency, service effectiveness, 
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and cost effectiveness. More specifically, they define service effectiveness as service 
consumption normalized by the service output. However, their study only considers a 
single factor productivity ratio which assumes that other resources are unlimited and 
other outputs are unrelated. Chen and McGinnis (2007) discuss the limitations of 
focusing on a single productivity indicator rather than attempting to model all important 
factors in a production system. Lan and Lin (2005) and Yu and Lin (2008) study similar 
transportation systems and use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Network DEA 
models to characterize a consumption process. Ertay and Ruan (2005) present a 
methodology with one efficiency measure to identify the most efficient number of 
operators and the efficient assignment of labor in a cellular manufacturing system. DEA 
is used to measure efficiency and a simulation model is used to model capacity design 
and demand generation. Ertay et al. (2006) present a DEA approach to evaluate a facility 
layout with both quantitative and qualitative metrics. They apply an analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) to aggregate the qualitative data such as flexibility in volume and variety 
and quality, and quantitative criteria such as material handling cost, adjacency score, 
shape ratio, and material handling vehicle utilization. Although these and similar studies 
integrate demand factors and the variable levels of demand, they do not considered the 
network structure of production or a dynamic productivity analysis. 
 Noting that the demand and the production system characterized in service 
production systems typically differ from those in manufacturing due to the types of 
demand described below, this study models the demand generation process (i.e. a 
marketing department) explicitly as a component of the production system. Figure 2.1 
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describes a manufacturing production system in terms of a serial model where the input 
resource is transformed into actual output product (Lee and Johnson, 2011). The first 
component, capacity design process, identifies the maximal output level as the peak 
output or the historical best performance. The demand generation process attempts to 
generate sufficient demand to support maximal output without idle capacity. The 
operations process transforms raw material into final product. Finally, the demand 
consumption process measures realized demand – the amount of final product consumed 
by customers. Manufacturers tend to receive demand based on the contractual 
agreements made between a manufacturer and a customer with defined sales quantities 
and prices prior to production. Thus, the manufacturer commonly develops an internal 
demand-generating process due to long production lead times (unlike service production 
systems which tend to rely mainly on non-contract demand requested informally by 
customers after production). The result is an external demand consumption process. 
Since services are typically non-storable commodities which must be immediately 
consumed by customers once transformed from inputs, i.e. demand consumption can be 
inefficient in that many service opportunities go unused. 
 
Figure 2.1 Manufacturing vs. service production systems 
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In addition, changes in demand can also have an effect on the measurement of 
productivity or profitability changes over time as estimated through frontier shifts 
indicating either technical progress or regress. Nishimizu and Page (1982) decompose 
total factor productivity into technology progress and change in efficiency. Färe et al. 
(1992, 1994) develop the explicit measurement of productivity change based on the 
Malmquist productivity index (MPI) proposed by Cave et al. (1982), which uses 
Shephard’s input distance function (Shephard, 1953) to estimate inefficiency 
nonparametrically. The productivity change estimated via MPI can also be decomposed 
into two components: change in technology and change in efficiency. Färe et al. (1994) 
develop an additional component, change in scale. Alternatively, Ray and Mukherjee 
(1996) use the Fisher productivity index and propose a decomposition into efficiency 
change, technical change described by the cost function index, change in scale efficiency 
captured by the average cost index, change in allocative efficiency, and an adjustment 
index which captures the pure effect of a change in the attributes on the measured 
productivity index. However, their decomposition is restricted to the single-output 
technology and mixed-period measures, making interpretation difficult. Zofio and Prieto 
(2006) present a decomposition of the Fisher index into the MPI and an economic 
component consisting of allocative efficiency and a residual allocative term based on a 
generalized distance function which employs a relative weight of the input- and output-
oriented projection paths to the frontier. Their decomposition also has some limitations, 
because the residual terms with mixed-period measures are difficult to interpret and 
weighting the projections is debatable. Recently, Kuosmanen and Sipiläinen (2009) 
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propose an exact decomposition of the Fisher productivity index into five components: 
change in efficiency, technical change, change in scale efficiency, change in allocative 
efficiency, and price effect. Their decomposition reveals that the change in profitability 
efficiency is the product of only three components (change in efficiency, change in scale 
efficiency, and change in allocative efficiency) and is invariant to both technical change 
and price effect. Note that the price effect begins to integrate demand-side effects into 
the productivity analysis. This study extends Kuosmanen and Sipiläinen work to make 
the effects of demand more explicit. 
 
2.2 Literature Review of Productivity in the Airline Industry 
An airline’s production system is a hybrid of the manufacturing and service systems 
described above. Any individual airline’s production process is characterized by 
transforming capital, labor, energy, and materials into passenger and cargo services. The 
sources of uncertainty are capital utilization rates, changing technology, labor-intensive 
services, and demand diversity. Obviously, an airline operates under enormous pressure 
to maintain the high service rates that give it a competitive edge. The existing academic 
literature discusses the productivity change in the global airline industry in light of price 
changes in crude oil and jet fuel, the introduction of ecommerce, rising interest rates, 
deregulation, etc. 
 Sickles et al. (1986) consider the passage of the US federal Air Deregulation Act 
of 1978 (ADA) in improving the ability of price adjustment and competition capability 
and identify the effect of a rapid increase in the price of jet fuel. The result of analyzing 
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allocative inefficiency from 1970 to 1981 supports the common perception that 
deregulation reduces inefficiency and the total cost of distortions from cost-minimizing 
allocation. However, Sickles et al. attribute the largest benefits to administrative reforms 
in the early 1970s, including multiple route authorizations and show-cause proceedings 
to reduce cost and time in obtaining certificates, rather than ADA itself. Good et al. 
(1993a) investigate differences in productivity growth between European and US 
carriers during the period 1976–1986. Using a Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontier 
production model, potential efficiency gains of European liberalization are identified; 
however, while Great Britain favors liberalization, France and Italy oppose it since their 
airlines benefit from high levels of subsidies to cover operating losses. Ray and 
Mukherjee (1996) employ an efficiency decomposition of the Fisher productivity index 
in the US airline industry in 1983–1984 and quantify the productivity growth in each 
component. The comprehensive decomposition provides more detailed benchmarking 
information for productivity improvement. 
 Semenick Alam and Sickles (2000) use DEA and MPI to estimate the 
productivity growth of US airlines between 1970 and 1990 and employ second-stage 
regression with contextual variables to capture the efficiency difference caused by firm-
specific characteristics. They use cointegration analysis to examine the existence of a 
stationary relationship between non-stationary variables over time and indicate that 
efficiency estimates of firms within the industry should be co-integrated since one firm’s 
efficiency-enhancing technology should be adopted by other firms, else all will be driven 
out of the industry. Semenick Alam and Sickles identify a narrowing of the differences 
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in efficiency over time between the top performers and the other firms. Färe et al. (2007) 
employ MPI to estimate productivity growth after deregulation from 1979 to 1992 and 
show that service quality, such as direct routings and arriving on time indeed affects 
industry productivity. Nevertheless, slow productivity growth indicates a decline in the 
quality of service post-deregulation. The additional research regarding dynamic 
efficiency or deregulation issue in airline industry, see Good et al. (1993b, 1995), 
Sickles (1985), Sickles et al. (2002). 
 The method proposed in this study provides an integrated decomposition of a 
production system and decomposes profitability change. The decomposition of a 
production system can characterize a typical manufacturing system where demand is 
realized and products are built-to-order, a typical service production system with spot 
demand, or a hybrid of the two. 
 Some previous studies neglect demand fluctuations which can have a significant 
impact on productivity. To address this omission, we apply 2DED to an empirical study 
of the US airline industry from 2006 to 2008. We decompose the production system into 
capacity design, demand generation, operations, and demand consumption, while 
characterizing potential frontier shifts over time by decomposing profitability efficiency 
change into technical efficiency change, scale efficiency change, and allocative 
efficiency change. 
 This section is organized as follows. Section 2.3 describes the modeling 
framework, illustrates the decomposition of the production system, and explicitly 
quantifies the role of demand in efficiency analysis. The 2DED model is presented for 
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the purpose of productivity diagnosis and improvement. Section 2.4 describes a method 
to estimate production capacity via a sequential model, and then introduces a Network 
DEA model for efficiency decomposition of the production system. Section 2.5 focuses 
on profitability change and reviews both Shephard’s distance function and the 
Malmquist productivity index, while integrating demand into a decomposition of change 
in profitability efficiency. Section 2.6 discusses the results of the case study and Section 
2.7 concludes. 
 
2.3 Model Description 
2.3.1 Production System Decomposition 
Our goal is to help a firm allocate its resources and efforts more effectively to improve 
system performance. Figure 2.2 illustrates an integrated production model of a hybrid of 
a manufacturing and a service production system. In order to identify the sources of 
inefficiency, we decompose the system efficiency into four components: capacity 
design, demand generation, operations, and demand consumption. In general, we note 
that a typical firm’s industrial engineering division is responsible for capacity design 
(capacity planning). The marketing division is responsible for pricing and demand 
generation. The manufacturing and general maintenance divisions are responsible for 
operations. The sales, marketing and public relation divisions are responsible for demand 
consumption. Thus, depending on the source of inefficiency management is likely to 
have to work with different departments. To describe the decomposition 
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comprehensively, we develop a Network DEA model and define the linking variables 
below. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Process decomposition of a hybrid production system 
 
2.3.1.1 Capacity Design 
The first component is the capacity design process which defines the physical capacity 
of the production system and represents a limitation on long-term system performance. 
Poor capacity design would include purchasing capital that is incompatible with existing 
or other purchased capital, selecting outdated technologies, etc. The inputs to this phase, 
Fixed input, are the resources used to generate the infrastructure of the production 
system and support the operations of the production process. Peak output is the maximal 
output level the firm can achieve; it characterizes the production system’s physical 
capability. Section 2.4.1 explains how to estimate peak output. 
 The efficiency of the capacity design component is defined as the ratio of the 
fixed input resources used to the production capacity. A critical assumption at this stage 
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is sufficient demand exists to use the firm’s current inputs completely. The design phase 
has a long-term impact on production performance. 
 
2.3.1.2 Demand Generation 
The second component is the demand generation process in which the sales group 
attempts to generate enough demand to completely utilize the built-in production 
capacity. The output of this stage is Expected demand, which is the sum of contracted 
demand and expected spot demand. The firm might generate more actual output as a 
buffer to capitalize on potential spot demand. For the purposes of simplification the 
expected spot demand is characterized as a proportional expansion of the contract 
demand or an expected value calculated from a historical distribution. Section 2.6.1 
explains expected demand and Scheduled demand as they apply to the US airline 
industry. Typically contract demand is tractable and fulfilled more easily than spot 
demand. It is based on an agreement between the firm and a customer and has a specific 
sales quantity and price associated with it. However, in some situation such as the airline 
industry, the number of passengers flown is highly stochastic. Passengers might change 
their flight routes or cancel the itineraries just before the flight takes off. This uncertainty 
leads to differences between the contracted demand and the realized demand. This issue 
will be discussed in Section 2.6.3 in terms of contextual variables. 
 The efficiency of the demand generation component is defined as the ratio of 
expected demand to peak output. Typical productivity analysis assumes all deviations 
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from the efficient frontier are attributed to inefficiency in the production system. Under 
these standard assumptions, insufficient demand may bias productivity measures. 
 
2.3.1.3. Operations 
The third component is the operational process in which raw materials are transformed 
into final goods or services. Thus, Actual output is the number of final products 
generated from the production process. In the airline industry it is characterized by 
Available output, the number of passenger-miles and freight-ton-miles generated. 
 The efficiency of this component is defined as the ratio of actual output to a 
weighted aggregation of expected output and variable input. In general, observed output 
may be reduced by scheduling inefficiencies, machine breakdown, inconsistent 
operational performance, etc. 
 
2.3.1.4. Demand Consumption 
The fourth component is the demand consumption process in which the sales group tries 
to sell any production beyond the contracted demand to maximize profit. Realized 
demand is the realized quantity of product or output customers actually consume at the 
market price after production. It is the sum of contract demand and realized spot 
demand. Our empirical study of the airline industry considers contract demand and spot 
demand as scheduled demand and non-scheduled demand, respectively. 
 The efficiency of this component is defined as the ratio of realized demand to 
actual output. This study focuses on the scenario in which realized demand (contract 
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demand plus spot demand) is less than actual output. If the realized demand exceeds 
actual output, some customer requests will be off-loaded to other providers, substituted 
with a similar but different product, filled from inventories, produced using overtime, 
renegotiated for delivery to a subset of customers, etc. For the empirical study the 
linkage between the four components of efficiency and airlines service context is shown 
in Appendix A, where table A1 indicates the subcomponent and its corresponding 
factors mapping to flight factors in application. 
 
2.3.2 Two-dimensional Efficiency Decomposition (2DED) 
As mentioned, our 2DED model is a tool for productivity diagnosis and improvement. 
The two-dimensions for decomposition are the network structure of the firm in each 
cross-section of time (described in detail in Section 2.4) and profit efficiency change 
between periods over time (described in detail in Section 2.5). In the empirical study we 
collect panel data with the necessary variables to analyze the four components of the 
hybrid production systems defined above (see Section 2.6.1 and Appendix A for an 
explicit definition). The panel data will be analyzed as a series of cross-sectional 
analyses and then an index number approach will be used to investigate the change in 
profitability efficiency and its components. An index number is a metric to quantify 
productivity growth. If the index number is larger than 1, there is productivity growth, 
otherwise, productivity is constant or regresses; the details are described in Section 
2.5.1. Decomposing an index number identifies the components of profitability change 
and can aid in identifying strategies a firm may use to improve. 
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 Detail components of profitability allow us to scrutinize each airline firm’s 
technical innovation, scale of production, and resource allocation. Figure 2.3 shows that 
we initially collect the crosssectional data in period    and add the new data collected in 
period    to the data set. In this way we use Diewert’s sequential reference set method 
(Diewert, 1992) to estimate efficiency. Using Fisher’s index (Kuosmanen and Sipiläinen, 
2009) allows us to estimate the profitability change between the two periods. In other 
words, for one dimension, the components of the production system are identified in a 
cross-section; in the second dimension, panel data provides a dynamic efficiency 
analysis of profitability change. Table 2.1 illustrates that efficiency change can be 
decomposed into 12 components to help managers further identify improvement 
strategies. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Two-dimensional efficiency decomposition (2DED) 
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Table 2.1 2DED illustration 
 Hybrid production system 
Capacity 
design 
Demand 
generation 
Operations Demand 
consumption 
Profitability 
Technical 
Efficiency change estimates Scale 
Allocative 
 
 
2.4 Efficiency Decomposition of Production Process 
2.4.1 Capacity Estimation 
To construct our Network DEA model, we first need to estimate the capacity level if no 
capacity data can be collected directly. For the purposes of this study we use Johansen’s 
(1968) definition of physical capacity, which is the maximum amount that can be 
produced with existing plant and equipment (fixed inputs) given an unlimited 
availability of variable factors. Eilon and Soesan (1976) extend the concept from a single 
output to a multiple output case and propose a measure involving the radial expansion of 
the output vector given current technology and a fixed input vector. Based on Eilon and 
Soesan’s definition, Färe et al. (1989) employ a nonparametric approach to obtain the 
capacity measure with a cross-sectional dataset. 
 The capacity is not directly observable, thus we will estimate the peak observed 
output as a proxy for capacity. In order to estimate the peak observed output, we need to 
identify a reference set to which we compare each observation in each period of time. 
Diewert (1980, 1992) describes a sequential method which constructs the production 
reference set by adding new observations to augment each previous period’s reference 
set. The method assumes that a production process can be compared to any previously 
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observed production process. Therefore, our empirical study uses Diewert’s sequential 
method to estimate the firm specific capacity via output-oriented variable returns to scale 
(VRS) data envelopment analysis (DEA) and the reference set constructed from all 
previous period’s observations of the firm’s production.     
  is the  th fixed input 
resource of  th firm in tth period,       is the amount of actual output for the  th product 
of  th firm in  th period, and     is the DEA envelopment multiplier variable of the  th 
firm in  th period.     is the efficiency estimate of firm   in the current period  . For 
firm  , the linear programming formulation is: 
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If the efficiency is equal to 1, the physical capacity is equal to the number of actual 
outputs in period s , otherwise, the physical capacity is equal to the actual output 
multiplied by the efficiency estimate rs , that is, rs
a
qrs
c
qrs YY  . Then, the time shifts to 
the next period and the new observation is added into the reference set, and the process 
repeats. 
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2.4.2 Efficiency Measurement by Network DEA 
We use Kao’s (2009) Network DEA model1 for efficiency decomposition because it 
accounts for the interrelationship of the components of the production system rather than 
estimating efficiencies independently. Kao’s model was developed under the constant 
return to scale (CRS) assumption. However, we relax this assumption and estimate the 
model assuming VRS. Let fiktX  and 
v
jktX  be the 
thi  fixed and thj  variable input 
resource, and cqktY , 
e
qktD , 
a
qktY , and 
r
qktD  be the capacity, expected demand, actual output, 
and realized demand of the thq  product of the thk  firm in tht  period respectively. fiv , 
v
jv
, cqz , 
e
qu , 
a
qz and 
r
qu  are the associated multiplier variables respectively. 
cz 0 , 
eu 0 , 
az 0 and 
ru 0  are the intercept variables. We estimate the input-oriented efficiency 
P
rsE  of the 
production system of firm r  in period s  with a sequential reference set using the 
following formulation. 
The proposed VRS model estimates technical efficiency and provides scale 
efficiency estimation by means of Kao’s CRS model. The formulation (2.2) adds the 
variables cz 0 , 
eu 0 , 
az 0 and 
ru 0 . These variables characterize the intercept and relax the 
condition that the production function must pass through the origin. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 An important property of Kao’s network DEA model is that the whole system is efficient only 
when all components are efficient in contrast to the traditional network DEA (Färe and Grosskopf, 2000). 
  
27 
MaxE Prs   r
Qq
r
qrs
r
q uDu 0

 
..ts  1
 Jj
v
jrs
v
j
Ii
f
irs
f
i XvXv  
00 

c
Ii
f
ikt
f
i
Qq
c
qkt
c
q zXvYz , k , },...,1{ st                   (2.2) 
0)( 00  

ec
Qq
c
qkt
c
q
Qq
e
qkt
e
q uzYzDu , k , },...,1{ st  
000 







 

a
Jj
v
jkt
v
j
e
Qq
e
qkt
e
q
Qq
a
qkt
a
q zXvuDuYz , k , },...,1{ st  
0)( 00  

ra
Qq
a
qkt
a
q
Qq
r
qkt
r
q uzYzDu , k , },...,1{ st  
            0,,,,, rq
a
q
e
q
c
q
v
j
f
i uzuzvv , qji  ,,  
 
 By solving this optimization model, the optimal multipliers, *fiv , 
*v
jv , 
*c
qz , 
*e
qu , 
*a
qz and 
*r
qu  are obtained and efficiency can be decomposed. Recall that estimating the 
efficiency of each component allows the firm to identify which component will give the 
largest system productivity gain if improved. Let DrsE , 
S
rsE , 
O
rsE  and 
C
rsE  denote 
efficiency of production design, efficiency of demand generation, efficiency of 
operations and efficiency of demand consumption respectively: 
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2.5 Efficiency Decomposition of Profitability Change 
As mentioned, Kuosmanen and Sipiläinen (2009) propose to decompose the change in 
profitability efficiency into change in technical efficiency, change in scale efficiency, 
and change in allocative efficiency. More interestingly, change in profitability efficiency 
is invariant to technical change and change in price effect, i.e. competition and price 
fluctuation would not affect the change in profitability efficiency in their decomposition. 
Kuosmanen and Sipiläinen also assume that demand is beyond a firm’s influence, 
however this assumption may not hold in many industries. 
 
2.5.1 Decomposition of Profitability Efficiency Change 
Now, we describe how the network decomposition of the production process can 
provide additional information for a decomposition of profitability efficiency 
characterizing a broader set of production processes and including firms that influence 
their demand levels through sales, advertising, etc. Let jit Rx   denote an input factor 
of the production system in period t , and qt Ry   denote an output factor of the 
production system in period t .     (   )                              is the 
technology defining the production possibility set at period t  by a piece-wise linear 
convex function enveloping all observations. Model (2.7) has a dual formulation with 
dual multipliers, kt , kt , kt  and kt , and illustrates the feasible region of production 
possibility set tT  and the multipliers associated with the four components of the 
production system decomposition: 
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Note that VRS is allowed through this characterization of the production possibility set. 
Defining ),( yxD tx  generated directly from the above model as the inverse of Shephard’s 
input-oriented distance function allows us to measure the production efficiency of an 
observation at period t  relative to the production possibility set at period t . In other 
words, the input-oriented technical efficiency (ITE) is defined as 
}
~
),(|inf{),( ttx TyxyxD   .
2  Similarly, the output-oriented technical efficiency 
(OTE) is defined as }~)/,(|inf{),( tty TyxyxD   .  
                                                 
2 We set ),( yxD tx  as the inverse of Shephard’s input-oriented distance function allowing ),( yxD
t
x  to 
be obtained directly from the proposed model. This change allows a more natural intuition regarding 
productivity change, i.e. 1),(/),(1  yxDyxD tx
t
x  represents technical progress between periods t  and 
1t , vice versa 1),(/),(1  yxDyxD tx
t
x  shows technical regress. 
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 Now, we obtain the cost function and revenue function as 
}
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y
t TyxyppxR   , given input 
price w  and output price p  respectively. Then, the profitability function 
}
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,
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

  presents the maximal return to Dollars achievable 
with the given input and output price. We define the profitability efficiency (ρE) as the 
ratio of the profitability of an observation and the maximum profitability given the 
specific input and output price 
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 While such envelopment models allow us to easily calculate the efficiency of the 
component, the use of dual multiplier models facilitates the analysis of the cost, revenue, 
and profitability functions. For example given a firm r  in period s , we can calculate the 
profitability function of production system by the following formulation, where rqrsp , 
f
irsw  and 
v
jrsw  are the unit prices for the 
thq  product with realized demand rqrsD , the 
thi  
fixed input firsX , and the 
thj  variable input vjrsX  respectively. The formulation below is 
similar for the cost and revenue function except that we replace the objective function by 
minimizing  
i j
v
jrs
v
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f
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f
irs XwXw  and maximizing 
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qrsDp  respectively: 
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Note that we can augment or replace the constraints in the dual model (2.8.1)-(2.8.12) 
with different equations and can adjust the objective function to estimate the profitability 
function of each component. Equations (2.8.13)-(2.8.18) for the profitability function of 
capacity design, (2.8.19)-(2.8.27) for the demand generation, (2.8.28)-(2.8.35) for 
operations, and (2.8.36)-(2.8.40) for the demand consumption appear in Appendix A.  
 As mentioned, Kuosmanen and Sipiläinen (2009) also propose an exact 
decomposition of the Fisher ideal TFP index. The Fisher ideal TFP is the product of the 
change in the components of technical efficiency ( TE ), technical change ( Tech ), 
change in scale efficiency ( SE ), change in allocative efficiency ( AE ), and change in 
price effect ( PE ). Interestingly, Kuosmanen and Sipiläinen show that the change in 
profitability efficiency ( E ) is invariant to Tech  and PE , i.e. E  has three parts: 
TE , SE , and AE . E  already captures technical change and price change 
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through the target point and the price change is characterized through the identification 
of the allocatively efficient benchmark. The formulation of change in profitability 
efficiency is shown in appendix A.  
 
2.5.2 Profitability Efficiency and Financial Performance Index 
This section identifies a connection between profitability efficiency and financial 
performance indices in order to motivate the relevance of the less widely used metric 
profitability efficiency. Return on investment (ROI) is considered a crucial indicator of a 
firm’s financial performance. The Dupont ROI formula (Brown, 1927) decomposes this 
index into two ratios. The first is the ratio of return on sales (ROS) which measures a 
firm’s ability to generate profit related to its sales revenue. The second is the ratio of 
investment turnover which measures how effectively a firm can generate revenue using 
investments. The Dupont ROI formula is: 
Turnover Investment  ROS        
investment
revenue
revenue
profits
  investment / profits  ROI

                          (2.9) 
The ROS component reveals the profitability ratio which measures the revenue to cost 
(Banker et al., 1993; 1996):  
ityprofitabil
1
1
revenue
cost  revenue
  
revenue
profits
  ROS 

                (2.10) 
Under a fixed investment turnover rate the higher the profitability the higher the ROI. 
This illustrates a strong relationship between profitability and ROI. 
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 There are three reasons for employing a profitability efficiency index to assess a 
firm’s productivity performance. First, profitability is a more reasonable index to assess 
productivity than a profit index, because the profitability function is homogenous of 
degree zero in prices. Namely, while the price doubles, the profit doubles, but the 
profitability does not change. This unscaled nature of profitability is similar to 
productivity and represents the input-to-output performance. Second, profitability 
efficiency is a benchmarking technique that builds on the concept of the production 
possibility set and clearly identifies the frontier and facilitates for comparisons, in 
contrast to profitability or profit indices. Third, simple output-input ratios do not reflect 
all of the critical factors in performance evaluation (Chen and McGinnis, 2007), because 
partial productivity ratios relating a single output to a single input postulate that all other 
resources are always adequate and the production of any other outputs are irrelevant. 
Therefore, we select profitability efficiency and change in profitability efficiency as our 
indices. 
 
2.6 Empirical Study 
Our empirical case study analyzes the US airline industry from 2006 to 2008 using a 
data set of 15 firms. The data was gathered from Air Carrier Financial Statistics and Air 
Carrier Traffic Statistics published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics within the 
Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA, 2009). Each observation is 
one airline firm in a given year. The data definitions of input and output factors for the 
productivity analysis are described in Section 2.6.1. Section 2.6.2 gives a detailed 
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analysis of each firm’s production process employing a Network DEA model for process 
decomposition. Further profitability efficiency change is quantified for each component 
and the production system as a whole. Section 2.6.3 summarizes the efficiency 
differences between civil airlines and cargo airlines using a contextual variable 
approach. 
 
2.6.1 Data Description 
We characterize the resources used in the production system as: aircraft fleet size as a 
fixed input, fuel and employees as variable inputs, and capacity, scheduled demand, and 
available output as intermediate factors with the two dimensions, passenger and freight; 
realized demand is the final output (see Appendix A for the raw data). We estimate 
capacity peak output by fixed input and scheduled demand data via the sequential 
method in Section 2.4.1. The following describes the resources. 
 
2.6.1.1 Inputs 
Aircraft fleet size (FS) is the average number of aircraft employed in a firm over a 
particular year. However, a firm may own different models of airplanes purchased in 
different years, giving rise to a vintage issue, Johansen (1968). To address the 
heterogeneity of capital issue, we transform the data based on number of seats per model 
type so that each fleet is measured in Boeing-737 equivalent units. In general, since a 
firm’s fleet is the most significant component of capital and is difficult to change in the 
short-term, we model the capital as a fixed input. We obtain firm-specific prices by 
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dividing the flight equipment capital reported in the firms’ balance sheets by the average 
number of equivalent Boeing- 737 aircraft. 
 Fuel (FU) is the number of gallons consumed annually, estimated by fuel 
expenses over the average jet fuel cost per gallon. Note that FU is a variable input 
because its usage can be controlled on a day-to-day basis. 
 Employee (EP) is defined as the number of employees during the year, which 
includes flight shipping staff, pilots, flight attendants, and managers but not ground 
shipping drivers. Average prices are calculated by salaries and benefits expenses over 
number of employees. EP is modeled as a variable input since firms can partially adjust 
this variable in the short-term. 
 
2.6.1.2 Demand and Output Levels 
Scheduled passenger demand (SPD) is the scheduled revenue passenger-miles for a 
particular year. We measure passenger service using revenue passenger-miles, the 
number of revenue-paying passengers aboard the airplane multiplied by the distance 
traveled measured in miles. The average price per passenger mile for SPD is calculated 
as the scheduled passenger revenue divided by passenger-miles. 
 Scheduled freight demand (SFD) is defined as the demand of scheduled revenue 
freight-ton-miles for a particular year. We measure freight service using revenue freight-
ton-miles, the weight of freight and mail measured in tons multiplied by the distance 
flown measured in miles. The average price for SFD is calculated as the scheduled 
freight and mail revenue divided by ton-miles.  
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 Available passenger output (APO) is the actual output of available seat-miles 
during the year. Available seat-miles is calculated as the number of seats including first 
class and economy on an airplane multiplied by the distance traveled measured in miles. 
The average price for APO is equivalent to the price used in scheduled passenger 
demand. 
 Available freight output (AFO) is the actual output of available freight-ton-miles 
during the year. Available freight-ton-miles is calculated as the number of available tons 
of freight and mail multiplied by the distance flown measured in miles. Note that it is 
calculated by subtracting revenue passenger-ton-miles from total available ton-miles. 
The average price for AFO is equivalent to the price employed in scheduled freight 
demand. 
 Realized passenger demand (RPD) is the realized demand of scheduled and 
nonscheduled revenue passenger-miles during the year. The realized demand is 
calculated as the sum of scheduled and nonscheduled revenue passenger-miles. The 
average price for RPD is calculated by total passenger revenue over scheduled and 
nonscheduled passenger-miles. 
 Realized freight demand (RFD) is the realized demand of scheduled and 
nonscheduled revenue freight-ton-miles during the year. The realized demand is 
calculated as the sum of scheduled and nonscheduled revenue freight-ton-miles. The 
average price for RFD is calculated by total freight and mail revenue over scheduled and 
nonscheduled ton-miles. 
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2.6.1.3 Capacity Estimation 
Peak passenger output (PPO) is the maximal output level of revenue passenger-miles 
during the year. We estimate it using the sequential frontier method described in Section 
2.4.1 with aircraft fleet size as fixed input and available passengers as the output. The 
average price for PPO is equivalent to the price in scheduled passenger demand. 
 Peak freight output (FPO) is defined as the maximal output level of revenue 
freight-ton-miles during the year. We estimate it using the sequential frontier method 
with aircraft fleet size as fixed input and available freight as the output. The average 
price for FPO is equivalent to the price employed in scheduled freight demand. 
 The flight data is ordered according to capacity design, demand generation, 
operations, and demand consumption. Table 2.2 shows the factor mapping table of the 
production process and the data set. 
 
Table 2.2 Factor mapping table of production process and airline data set 
Components Factor (ref. Figure 2) Flight Factor 
Capacity Design Fixed Input FS 
Peak Output PPO, PFO 
Demand Generation Peak Output PPO, PFO 
Expected Demand SPD, SFD 
Operations Variable Input FU, EP 
Expected Demand SPD, SFD 
Actual Output APO, AFO 
Demand 
Consumption 
Actual Output APO, AFO 
Realized Demand RPD, RFD 
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2.6.2 Productivity Change Analysis 
Table 2.3 presents the results of our efficiency decomposition analysis based on network 
structure for a partial set of the firms in 2006 (the entire table appears in Table A2 of 
Appendix A). Note that the efficiency estimates and thus the decomposition are based on 
the production possibility set of all previous periods because Diewert’s sequential 
method is used.  
 Consider Alaska Airlines with an input-oriented technical efficiency (ITEff) of 
0.89. Further investigation of the components of efficiency reveals that it is not an issue 
of poor capacity design or operational inefficiency, but rather that the system 
inefficiency is mainly caused by insufficient demand generation and consumption (both 
efficiencies are 0.94). We conclude that management should focus on raising demand 
rather than making operational changes, perhaps by asking sales and marketing to 
address the productivity concerns. In contrast, Continental Airlines’ system efficiency of 
0.81 is largely due to poor capacity design and unfavorable operation process (both 
efficiencies are 0.90). We conclude that management should engage in capacity redesign 
and investigate operation behavior to improve overall productivity. 
 Table 2.4 and table 2.5 show how 2DED provides process and dynamic 
efficiency analysis. Recall that we separate the efficiency decomposition of profitability 
change into changes in technical efficiency, change in scale efficiency, and change in 
allocative efficiency and decompose them into our four components. Note that TE , 
SE , and AE  are not mutually independent, but have different strategic 
interpretations. TE  characterizes the firm’s change in efficiency and productivity, 
  
39 
which is largely driven by process improvement. SE  measures a firm’s ability to adjust 
scale size in the long-term. AE  indicates a firm’s ability to allocate input and output 
resource to achieve maximal profitability with respect to a specific price. 
 Table 2.4 shows the weighted average profitability efficiency change for the 
production system and for each component. Within each component performance is 
decomposed into technical, scale, and allocative effect for the 15 airlines. The average is 
weighted by the dollar measure of peak output. Observe the overall progress in the 
average profitability change from 2006 to 2008, where the average profitability change 
of production system is 1.015. The capacity design component is 1.02, demand 
generation is 0.99, operational component is 1.00, and demand consumption is 0.99. 
Considering each component individually, the 2% improvement on average of capacity 
design efficiency over the time horizon indicates that the airlines have been proactive in 
improving their capacity installation. Note also that the profitability efficiency changes 
in demand generation and consumption components (around 0.99) indicate that some 
airlines are failing to generate sufficient demand and to stimulate product consumption.3 
The operations component represents no significant average change in profitability. 
Further investigating the yearly effect, profitability regresses in 2007–2008 and nine 
firms experience profitability decline (67% regress in the design component, 89% in 
demand generation, 33% in operation, and 78% in demand consumption). These results 
indicate that most firms could improve productivity through stimulating demand and 
improved marketing. Table 2.4 also shows that the variation of capacity design is larger 
                                                 
3 The demand-related components have statistically significant differences from the design component by 
t-test with α value equal to 0.1. 
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than the other three components in 2006–2008. We conclude that the design process is a 
significant component and will influence profitability. 
 
Table 2.3 Technical, scale, allocative, and profitability efficiency decomposition 
Firm Production System Design Generation Operations Consumption ITE ISE IAE ρE ITE ISE IAE ρE ITE ISE IAE ρE ITE ISE IAE ρE ITE ISE IAE ρE 
AirTran 
Airways 0.97 0.71 0.79 0.55 0.94 0.73 1.00 0.68 0.90 0.91 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.91 0.95 0.86 0.90 0.91 1.00 0.82 
Alaska 
Airlines 0.89 0.65 0.96 0.55 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.74 0.94 0.86 0.92 0.74 1.00 0.90 0.94 0.84 0.94 0.86 0.92 0.74 
American 
Airlines 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.89 
American 
Eagle  0.92 0.42 0.84 0.32 0.92 0.51 1.00 0.46 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.74 0.86 0.64 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.80 
Continental 0.81 0.96 0.94 0.73 0.90 0.89 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
 
Table 2.4 2DED of US airline industry 
Overall 
Components 
2006-2007 2007-2008 2006-2008 (GeoMean) 
E  TE  SE  AE  E  TE  SE  AE  E  TE  SE  AE  
Production 1.035 0.999 1.024 1.012 0.996 1.015 0.994 0.987 1.015 1.007 1.009 0.999 
Design 1.052 1.039 1.014 0.998 0.989 0.990 0.999 1.001 1.020 1.014 1.007 0.999 
Generation 0.995 0.998 1.003 0.994 0.985 0.992 0.998 0.994 0.990 0.995 1.000 0.994 
Operations 0.990 0.993 0.999 0.999 1.009 0.998 1.014 0.997 1.000 0.995 1.007 0.998 
Consumption 0.996 0.999 1.003 0.994 0.988 0.993 0.998 0.997 0.992 0.996 1.001 0.995 
 
 Table 2.5 shows the detailed 2DED for a partial set of the airlines in 2006-2008; 
the full table which includes the average (Geometric Mean, GM) change of production 
system is summarized in appendix A. The figure shown in appendix A maps the average 
TE  and AE  of the production system by each airline on a two-dimensional 
coordinate (Figure A1), and figure A2 uses SE  and AE  to construct a similar figure. 
Thus, the four quadrants reveal the strategy of productivity improvement. Using 
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SkyWest Airlines (point K) as an example, observe a high performance in profitability 
change E  of 1.091, an above-average TE  of 1.023 and an SE  of 1.071, and a 
relatively poor AE  of 0.996. Further drilling down into AE  via efficiency 
decomposition reveals an AE  value of capacity design of 1.00, demand generation of 
0.98, operations of 1.00, and demand consumption of 0.98. Thus, SkyWest Airlines 
should strive to improve its resource allocation in demand generation and consumption 
process to catch up with its competitors.  
 
Table 2.5 2DED of US airline firms 
      Production Design Generation Operations Consumption 
Firm # Year                                                             
AirTran 
Airways A 
06->07 1.12 0.97 1.10 1.04 1.08 1.00 1.07 1.01 1.06 1.05 1.01 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.97 0.99 1.06 1.05 1.01 1.00 
07->08 1.07 1.07 1.03 0.97 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.05 0.99 1.01 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.05 1.05 0.99 1.01 
GM 1.09 1.02 1.06 1.00 1.05 1.01 1.04 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.05 1.05 1.00 1.00 
Alaska 
Airlines B 
06->07 0.99 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.98 
07->08 0.92 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.98 1.01 0.99 0.98 
GM 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.98 
American 
Airlines C 
06->07 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.97 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 
07->08 0.99 0.98 1.02 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.02 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 
GM 0.99 0.99 1.01 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00 
  
Appendix A includes airlines that are largely cargo service carriers as indicated 
by triangle points N and H. Observation H is below the average of productivity growth. 
However, this result may seem counter-intuitive because it performs well in terms of the 
profitability efficiency levels shown in Table A2. Note that firms with high levels of 
efficiency initial tend to have small productivity changes in the future. In general, this 
phenomenon is the result of the public good nature of technology that leads to spillover 
effects from leaders to followers as the laggards learn from the innovators and play 
catch-up (Semenick Alam and Sickles, 2000). Here, the distinct nature of civil and cargo 
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service may weaken the catch-up effect between these two types of providers. We 
discuss the efficiency differences below. 
 
2.6.3 Contextual Variables 
Service type plays an important role and significantly affects the earning structure of 
airline firms. As previously mentioned, there are two business strategies, one of which 
focuses primarily on civil and the other on cargo services. A hypothesis test (Banker, 
1993) is commonly used to assess which group is more efficient. 
 We use three hypothesis tests: two F-tests assume inefficiency follows 
exponential distribution and half-normal distribution respectively; the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test imposes no assumption on the distribution of inefficiency. All three tests 
have p-values less than 0.05, indicating that the distribution of profitability inefficiency 
differs significantly between civil and cargo carriers. 
 We also use the two-stage approach proposed by Ray (1988, 1991) to evaluate 
how the business models affect the profitability efficiency of the production systems. 
This model has received considerable attention in the recent literature (Banker and 
Natarajan, 2008; Simar and Wilson, 2012). See Johnson and Kuosmanen (2009, 2012) 
for alternative models and an insightful discussion to this debate. In the two-stage 
approach, a dummy variable equal to 1 represents a cargo airline service, while 0 
represents a civil airline service. Table 2.6 shows the results of a second stage least 
square regression model, in which efficiency is regressed against the dummy variable. 
Note that the profitability efficiency of the overall production system in cargo service is 
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21% more efficient than civil service, and that efficiency is significantly affected by the 
capacity design component. Two main reasons support these results: the distinct nature 
of the passenger shipping network structure, and the more consistent demand of the 
cargo shipping structure. 
 Most passengers prefer direct flights and are generally unwilling to endure long 
travel times. In contrast packages may use a variety of routes to arrive at their final 
destination. Thus, fewer routing constraints and the possibility of consolidation at hub 
locations benefit cargo-shipping airlines. Often, passengers are flexible, choosing which 
airline to fly with, and even substituting driving or postponing travel by air. Thus, 
traveler’s uncertainty can significantly reduce civil carriers’ profitability. In contrast, the 
package delivery industry has fewer firms and substitutes for their services. 
Nevertheless, the slopes of the other three components show a less significant difference 
between civil and cargo services because both airline types rely on the performance of 
marketing forecasts, operations control, and sales effort rather than capacity design with 
respect to earning structure. 
 
Table 2.6 Profitability efficiency difference shown by second stage regression 
Regression Production Design Generation Operations Consumption 
Intercept 0.59 0.68 0.85 0.81 0.85 
Slope 0.21 0.31 0.10 0.02 0.10 
 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
This study has proposed a two-dimensional efficiency decomposition (2DED) model as 
a diagnostic tool for identifying the sources of production system and profitability 
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efficiency change. A typical production system consists of four components: capacity 
design, demand generation, operations, and demand consumption. Efficiency was 
decomposed via a rational Network DEA model, and the profitability efficiency change 
was decomposed into technical efficiency change, scale efficiency change, and 
allocative efficiency change. An empirical study of profitability change in the US airline 
industry from 2006 to 2008 illustrated and validated the proposed method. 
 We found that the regress of productivity was mainly caused by demand 
fluctuation in 2007–2008 rather than technical regression in production capabilities. 
Furthermore, our contextual variable analysis suggests that the profitability efficiency of 
the overall production system in cargo service was 21% more efficient than civil service 
and that the capacity design component significantly affected efficiency. 
 We believe that the proposed model can be generalized and applied to other 
production systems for which a network structure can be identified and decomposed. For 
example, a supply chain system is usually defined by its materials suppliers, 
manufacturers, distribution centers, and retailers, hence, Network DEA efficiencies 
could properly estimate these entities. We suggest that the use of such decomposition 
enhances the rapid identification of sources of inefficiency as well as providing support 
for managerial troubleshooting. 
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CHAPTER III 
EFFECTIVE PRODUCTION BY PROACTIVE DEA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a deterministic mathematical programming 
approach to productive efficiency analysis. Given the same input resources, a production 
unit is called efficient if its outputs levels are higher than other production processes. 
However, in practice, efficiency measure may be affected by demand fluctuations rather 
than the capability of production system. Reduced actual output can be caused by 
insufficient demand. In other words, demand fluctuations can bias productivity 
measures. A typical DEA study cannot model these demand effects. Thus, this research 
develops a productivity and “effectiveness” analysis to distinguish demand effects from 
productive efficiency using stochastic programming techniques in the short-run capacity 
expansion problem. The literature regarding the demand effect in productivity and 
efficiency analysis is limited. Recently, Lee and Johnson (2011) decompose a production 
process into capacity design, demand generation and operations components, and 
measure the productivity change of each component. They distinguish the production 
process from the demand generation/consumption process. The results indicate technical 
regress can be caused by demand fluctuations rather than production capabilities. Further 
the capacity design component generally has a significant effect on long-term 
productivity. To measure the demand effect in the short-run capacity planning problem, 
this study proposes the “truncated production function” and estimates “effectiveness” so 
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as to distinguish from efficient production where the output levels are not limited by the 
customers’ demands. 
 Lots of studies investigate the capacity expansion problem but limited literature 
on the short-run capacity expansion problem. Short-run capacity expansion addresses 
different issues from typical capacity expansion problem. The typical capacity expansion 
is a well-known economic and optimization problem (Manne, 1961; Luss, 1982). To 
define it rigorously, let decision variable tx  be number of working hour of machine 
needed at period t , ty  be the number of products generated, tD  be the demand quantity, 
A  be the required machine hour per unit, C  be the cost per machine hour and P  be the 
selling price of product. The firm would like to maximize profit and finally solution 
shows the requirement of working hour. The optimization model can be formulated as 
equation (3.1). 
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The primary issues in the capacity expansion problem are determining the expansion 
sizes, expansion times, and expansion locations (or capacity types) and the objective 
function is to minimize the discounted costs with respect to expansion process (Luss, 
1982). In general, all the factors of production can be adjusted without limits of time 
period. The capacity expansion problem is a component of long-run production analyses. 
However, in the short-run, the stocks of appliances capital of production are practically 
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fixed, but employment varies with demand (Marshall, 1920). In other words, the plant 
size and location might be fixed but variable factors such as material could be adjusted 
to control the production output level and satisfy the demand. Moreover, since the 
quantities of fixed factors are held constant in the short run, Stigler (1939) argues that 
the quantitative variations of output can be described in terms of the law of diminishing 
returns and marginal productivity theory while all but one of productive factors keep 
constant in quantity, remaining one adjusting in quantity. Wilson and Eckstein (1964) 
claim long run and short run economic analysis represents different productivity 
behaviors. They focus on the long-run tend and short-run cyclical behavior of 
productivity, and provide an interpretation of cyclical changes to an analysis of unit 
labor costs and price movements. They conclude the long-run cost curve forms an 
envelope of short-run cost curve when plant capital is fixed in short run but variable in 
long run. Thus, after distinguishing the characteristics of long run and short run, this 
study measures the marginal product of variables inputs through a DEA frontier and 
allows the adjustment of resource to influence output levels to handle demand 
fluctuations in short-run. 
 The capacity expansion problem with demand fluctuation is popularly discussed 
in the late 1990s. The internet shock and commodity customization caused the 
manufacturing industry to transition from a traditional manufacturing model to a service-
oriented business model, emphasizing customer satisfaction, decreasing lead-times and 
characterized by a more uncertain environment. New issues such as product diversity, 
larger demand fluctuations, and shorter product life cycles came to the forefront. 
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Considering the stochastic nature of demand, the typical capacity expansion problem can 
be extended to uncertain demand and formulated as (3.2) (Birge and Louveaux, 1997). 
Let tD~  be a random variable of demand and the firm would like to maximize expected 
profit. 
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Robust optimization (RO) is proposed in Mulvey et al. (1995) to handle noisy and 
uncertain demand with respect to large number of scenarios in the capacity expansion 
problem. RO is a general stochastic programming (SP) formulation which identifies a 
solution as robust if the solution remains “close” to optimal for any realization of 
scenarios and identifies a model as robust if solution is “almost” feasible for all 
scenarios by introducing error variables to measure infeasibility. Thus, the objective 
function can represent a tradeoff between solution and model robustness. Zhang et al. 
(2004) considers a capacity expansion problem involving multi-product, multi-machine 
and nonstationary stochastic demand, and solves efficiently an equivalent minimum-cut 
problem via a network structure. In addition, flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) 
have become well-known and popular to allow manufacturers to quickly respond to 
variability in both the items and the quantity demanded (Fine and Freund, 1990). Fine 
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and Freund (1990) propose a cost-flexibility model formulated as two-stage stochastic 
programming with recourse to support product-flexible manufacturing capacity 
investment. The first stage determines the investment level in either dedicated capacity 
or the more costly flexible capacity, and then after demand is realized, a second stage 
analysis specifies the production levels given the first-stage investments. 
This chapter discusses the convenience stores. The high uncertainty of customer 
demand and logistics environment is like the nature in semiconductor manufacturing. In 
additions, high-tech industries are characterized by capital intensity, high costs related to 
capital expansion, complicated processes and long production lead times. In these 
industries, short-run capacity adjustments are critical to profit margins and long-run 
financial well-being. Benavides et al. (1999) discussed the long-run optimal scale and 
timing of wafer fab construction using a Brownian motion model of demand and 
suggests a conservative deployment policy. Namely better late than early deployment of 
capacity, rather than a sequential deployment of capacity, is suggested to avoid idle 
resources and to maximize profit. Hood et al. (2003) considers the network flow 
associated with multiple products, operations, and tool groups, and develops a multi-
period stochastic programming model with discrete demand scenarios to determine the 
allocation of tool sets that is robust to demand uncertainty and change in product mix. 
Karabuk and Wu (2003) introduce strategic capacity planning under demand and 
capacity uncertainty, while considering the distinct perspectives of marketing and 
manufacturing where product managers in marketing would like to pursue order 
fulfillment but manufacturing managers prefer to pursue minimizing operating costs. 
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The authors formulate a multi-stage stochastic program and compare centralized and 
decentralized planning strategies. 
  This chapter’s contribution is distinguished from previous capacity expansion 
studies. First, we employ DEA to estimate production performance allowing for short-
run capacity expansion decisions developing a proactive DEA model. The objective of 
the traditional capacity expansion problem attempts to minimize operational costs, 
maximize revenues or fulfill orders focusing on a specific firm. Thus, these models are 
normative and highly dependent on the abstraction of the production process. Applying 
traditional capacity expansion models, the decisions are completely dependent on the 
accuracy of the normative model. However, using a production function estimated from 
observed production processes assures the feasibility of the recommended short-run 
capacity adjustment. Second, effective production, defined as the product generated from 
production system to be consumed by realized demand, complements the typical 
efficiency analysis. The demand effect biasing productivity analyses can be identified 
via efficiency and effectiveness estimates to clarify the source of poor performance. 
Third, this study considers diminishing marginal benefits of inputs and estimates the 
marginal product which is typical ignored in the short-run capacity expansion problem. 
By ignoring the diminishing marginal rate of return when estimating responses to 
growing demand, typical capacity expansion methods assume a constant marginal 
product and expand resource to meet demand. However, by considering diminishing 
marginal return, capacity expansion decisions to increase resources may severally 
underestimate the resources necessary to be able to produce the demand required and 
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result in cost ineffective outcomes. In other words, in some cases, it may not be cost 
effective to fill demand, thus reducing resources to decrease output levels and obtain 
better effectiveness may be preferred. 
Mulvey et al. (1995) validates the benefits of the proactive approach and the 
benefits of SP which allows for resource adjustments after forecasting demand. For this 
reason, the present study introduces a proactive DEA model using stochastic 
programming (SP) techniques to estimate effectiveness under demand uncertainty. The 
definition and properties of the truncated production function are discussed from 
viewpoint of production economics. Then, we illustrate the relationship between 
efficiency and effectiveness. The marginal product estimation and SP model are 
developed to support short-run capacity expansion decision in a stochastic environment 
focusing on the quantity analysis without price information. Finally the numerical 
example and application to Japanese convenience store (CVS) data illustrates the 
interesting interpretation and insights regarding the proposed model.  
 This study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 defines a truncated production 
function and illustrates the relationship between efficiency and effectiveness. Section 3.3 
describes capacity adjustment in terms of the marginal product of inputs, and shows 
single-output marginal products can be estimated via differential characteristics of DEA 
frontier. Stochastic programming models introduced in section 3.4 involve scenario-
based approach and two-stage recourse approach. Criteria for assessing quality of 
solution in light of expected value of perfect information (EVPI) and value of stochastic 
solution (VSS) are described and developed. The model is formulated as geometric 
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programming problem; section 3.5 introduces a technique to convexify the problem 
providing a solvable formulation which approximates global optimum solution. Then, 
section 3.6 gives a numerical example without capacity adjustment and section 3.7 
illustrates the method with an empirical study of Japanese convenience store to validate 
the SPDEA model. Finally, section 3.8 concludes the section. 
 
3.2 Effective Production 
3.2.1 Truncated Production Function 
The production function defines the maximum output that can be produced given the 
quantities of input resources. Let FX  be the fixed input resources, VX  be the variable 
input resources, and Y  be the single-output level generated from production system. A 
standard production function with a single output can be shown as equation (3.3) and 
satisfies the properties of nonegativity, weak essentiality, monotonicity, and concavity 
(Coelli et al., 2005). 
),( VF XXfY   (3.3) 
In this study, effective output is defined as the output product or service generated by the 
production system to be consumed via customer demand. Furthermore, we can define 
the truncated production function as the maximum demand for a product or service that 
can be fulfilled given the quantities of the input resources. A firm is achieving effective 
production if the effective output level is generated by the truncated production function. 
 The truncated production functions are defined based on the demand level. To 
maintain generality, the demand is firm-specific, each firm can have the different 
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demand levels, and the truncated production function is defined as production function 
truncated by the demand of the specific firm. Let D  be the potential realized demand 
and EY  be the effective output which is the smaller of the two variables: actual output Y  
and realized demand D . The truncated production function with output level EY  is 
formulated as equation (3.4). 
)),,(min(),min( DXXfDYY VFE   (3.4) 
In a short-run analysis, the fixed input levels cannot be adjusted, so the production 
function is a function of variable input. Figure 3.1 illustrates the short-run truncated 
production function and its properties. The point A presents a supply-demand 
equilibrium where ),( VA
F
AA
E
A XXfYYD  . That is, a firm can produce the optimal 
output level without unfulfilled demand or excessive inventory. In addition, it is straight-
forward to validate the properties- nonegativity, weak essentiality, monotonicity, and 
concavity of truncated production function since the minimum function of a production 
function and constant, demand, is a convex polyhedral.  
 
Figure 3.1 Truncated production function with firm-fixed demand 
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Proposition 3.1: The truncated production function with firm-specific demand defined 
as )),,(min( DXXfY VFE  satisfies the underlying properties of nonegativity, weak 
essentiality, monotonicity, and concavity. 
 
 The definition of truncated production function implies some notable issues. 
Given this definition, if actual output exceeds demand, then inventories are built and the 
inventory created characterize an ineffective gap; vice versa, if demand exceeds 
production capacity, the shortage products become an ineffective gap with respect to the 
demand level. Thus, the truncated production function is suitable for characterizing push 
production system with perishable goods, make-to-order production systems (pull 
systems), or service systems where services or inventories cannot be stored. The 
proposed model is applied to Japanese convenience store, in section 3.7. The 
convenience store industry is a business with high turn-over commodities and high 
product substitution. Each shop typically has a limited space for storing inventory. The 
portion of daily-supplied foods is over 30% (Japan Franchise Association, 2010). The 
high ratio of perishable goods and inability to hold significant inventories justify the use 
of the truncated production function. The detail will be discussed in section 3.7. 
 
3.2.2 Efficiency vs. Effectiveness 
Let JIRx   denote the inputs and 
QRy   denote outputs of the production system. The 
production possibility set is defined as  } producecan  :),{( yxyxT   and is estimated 
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by a piece-wise linear convex function enveloping all observations shown in (3.5). FikX  
is the thi  fixed input resource, VjkX  is the 
thj  variable input resource, qkY  is the amount 
of the thq  production output, and k  is the multiplier of 
thk  firm. The equations defines 
the feasible region of the production possibility set T~ . Then, the efficiency   can be 
measured using the DEA estimator. The input-oriented technical efficiency (ITE) can be 
defined as distance function }~),(|inf{),( TyxyxDx    and the output-oriented 
technical efficiency (OTE) is defined as }~),(|sup{),( 1 TyxyxDy 
  respectively. 
:),{(
~
yxT    q
k
qkk YY  , q  
F
i
k
F
ikk XX  , i  
V
j
k
V
jkk XX  , j  (3.5) 
1
k
k  
                   0k , k }.  
 
Similarly, let QE Ry   denote an output vector produced and consumed. The 
    (    )                                                             is 
called effective production possibility set which can be estimated by piece-wise linear 
convex function envelopment truncated by demand level shown as model (3.6). EqkY  is 
the amount of the thq  output produced and consumed with respect to demand qD . The 
model illustrates the feasible region of the effective production possibility set ET . Then, 
we can measure effectiveness E  using DEA estimator. If qq DY  , then set q
E
q YY  ; 
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otherwise ),min( qqqq
E
q DDYDY   while qq DY   and capacity surplus qq DY   
represents a penalty. The output-oriented production effectiveness (OPE), E , is defined 
as }~),(|sup{),( EEEEEy TyxyxD    and 
EE  /1 . 
:),{(
~ EE yxT    Eq
k
E
qkk YY  , q  
F
i
k
F
ikk XX  , i  
V
j
k
V
jkk XX  , j  (3.6) 
1
k
k  
                0k , k }.  
 
Since the number of discrete observations of k  firms is finite, model (3.6) causes a bias 
of effectiveness measure due to a lack of firms in the shaded area in figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 Bias of effectiveness measure 
 
 
To correct this issue, model (3.7) and theorem 3.1 is proposed. 
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:),{(
~ EE yxT    Eq
k
qkk YY  , q  
E
qq YD  , q  
F
i
k
F
ikk XX  , i  
V
j
k
V
jkk XX  , j  (3.7) 
1
k
k  
              0k , k }.  
 
 
Theorem 3.1: The truncated production possibility set described in model (3.7) is 
consistent to model (3.6) constructed with infinite observations. That is, 
EE
k
k
 

][lim , 
where Ek ][  is effectiveness measure with k -observations truncated production function. 
 
 Efficiency and effectiveness complement each other and are not mutually 
independent, but have different strategic interpretations. Efficiency measures the relative 
return on inputs used while effectiveness indicates the ability to match demand given an 
existing production technology. High effectiveness generates revenues by providing 
products and services to customers; low effectiveness implies insufficient or shortage 
demand generation and consumption. Figure 3.3 illustrates a two-dimensional strategic 
position between efficiency and effectiveness. If both efficiency and effectiveness are 
low, the firm is labeled a “Follower” who adopts other’s superior strategy and attempts 
to catch-up before they will be driven out of the industry. If a firm performs well in 
terms of efficiency and bad in terms of effectiveness, the firm is labeled “Superior 
Technology”, indicating the firm is leading the industry in terms of making the best use 
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of their input resources and technology. If a firm is performs poorly in terms of 
efficiency and well in terms of effectiveness, the firm is labeled “Superior Market” 
indicating a market-oriented strategy focuses on generating demand and maintaining or 
expanding market share. Finally, if the firm is both efficient and effective, the firm is 
labeled “Leader” indicating it is developing new markets while also innovating to keep a 
competitive advantage.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Strategic position 
 
 
As technologies and markets evolve over time, new paradigms of competition can 
emerge. Product design, machinery development and demand diversity can shock an 
industry and push firms to enhance core competence. “Paradigm shift” is a term to 
describe a hybrid of progress in marketing and in technology leading to a new 
competitive setting as shown in figure 3.4. The Malmquist productivity index is a 
popular tool to measure the productivity change (Cave et al., 1982; Färe et al., 1992; 
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1994). Similarly, it can be used to measure market evolution, technical change, and 
identify paradigm shifts. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Paradigm Shift 
 
3.3 Capacity Expansion 
3.3.1 Variable Input Adjustment and Marginal Product 
Capacity can be defined as the maximal output level of a production process. The output 
is a result of the total productive capability of all the resources including workforce, 
machinery, and utilities; while capacity adjustment is the ability to adjust output levels to 
deal with uncertainty by controlling variable resources in the short run (Alp and Tan, 
2008). Note that production resources can be separated into fixed and variable inputs. 
The fixed inputs such as building and facilities are not easily changed in a short period 
of time due to high costs and long lead-times of installation; while variable inputs such 
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as labor and material can be adjusted and released into production. In particular, 
Johansen’s (1968) defines the capacity as maximum amount that can be produced with 
existing plant and equipment given an unlimited availability of variable factors. Eilon 
and Soesan (1976) extend the concept from single output to multiple output case and 
Färe et al. (1989) employ a nonparametric approach to obtain a capacity measure. In 
addition, in the short run, capacity expansion is a way to adjust variable inputs to control 
output levels while pursuing maximal profit and efficient production in an uncertain 
environment. In production theory, capacity adjustment can be interpreted as the 
marginal product (MP) of production function. That is, the extra output generated by one 
more unit of an input. Figure 3.5 shows the marginal product and production frontier. Y , 
FX  and VX  denotes output, fixed input and variable input respectively. The production 
function can be formulated as ),Xf(XY VF  and marginal product of point B is 
V
BX
V
VF
X
),Xf(X


BMP .  
 
Figure 3.5 Marginal product of production function 
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 Changing the input level is a natural way to cope with demand fluctuations. 
Maximal capacity is defined by the fixed resource level and is thus unchanged in the 
short-run; demand requirements can be met by adjusting variable inputs. For example 
temporary workers can be hired to raise outputs when demand increases or workers can 
be laid off when demand decreases. However, the adjusted range of variable input is 
restricted due to the difficulty in hiring qualified workers and training them for the job or 
firing too many workers in a short period of time may hurt morale or put the company at 
risk of not being able to meet future demand. In this situation, firm-specific marginal 
rates of output expansion and of output contraction are assumed to be limited to a small 
adjusted range. Note that in general overtime production might be feasible to create 
additional capacity rather than temporary workers because of skill requirements. In fact 
in some cases overtime may be preferred to hiring temporary workers because of the 
learning curve associated with new workers. Nevertheless, in the empirical study of 
convenience store, the service-oriented and high-turnover nature leads to a higher ratio 
of part-time employees. In order to reduce employee cost, stores prefer to hire part-time 
employees because of lower skill requirement and interchangeability. For these reasons, 
adjusting employees to increase capacity in convenience store industry is feasible and 
encouraged. 
 
3.3.2 Marginal Product Estimation 
The marginal effect on output of an increase or decrease in variable input can play an 
important role in operations. In practice, these effects can be estimated via the marginal 
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product in a set of data. There are two typical ways to estimate marginal product. One is 
to use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to estimate the production function with a given 
functional form. Take a simple case of a linear function estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS), the coefficients associated with the independent factors provide estimates 
of the marginal product. When employing DEA to construct piece-wise linear 
production function approximate to a true production function, the shadow prices of 
input and output characterize the relationship between inputs and outputs, i.e., marginal 
product. However, there are drawbacks to estimating marginal products using these 
methods. SFA requires defining a functional form and risks potential misspecification. 
While observations on the production frontier in DEA do not have unique shadow prices 
and shadow price values of zero are common. 
 Podinovski and Førsund (2010) proposed using directional derivative technique 
to assess the marginal rate of a nondifferential efficient frontier constructed by DEA 
estimator. Their approach can characterize without additional simplifying conditions the 
polyhedral production sets such as measures of the scale elasticity and marginal rates of 
substitution between factors. The concept of directional derivative is described in 
Shapiro (1979). Let FikX  be the 
thi  fixed input resource, VjkX  be the 
thj  variable input 
resource, qkY  be the 
thq  output level of thk  firm. Let Fiv , 
V
jv  and qu  be the multipliers 
of factors respectively. Since marginal rate is a characteristic of the frontier, for one 
specific efficient firm r , the following revised formulation is proposed to calculate the 
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marginal rate V rqj **  approaching from the right side with respect to one particular 
variable input *j  to one output *q .  
free is    ,0,,       
1        
0        
0    ..
Min  
0
*
0
0
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*
*
uuvv
u
uYuXvXv
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
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 (3.8) 
 
For measuring the marginal rate approaching from the left side, the objective function is 
replaced by following equations. 
V
j
V
rjqV
rj
rq
v
X
Y
***
*
*
Max  




  (3.9) 
 
That is,   V kqj
V
k **  and 
  V kqj
V
k **  denote the simplified notations of marginal 
products of short-run capacity expansion and contraction due to single variable input and 
single output discussed in this study. Figure 3.6 illustrates the marginal product Vk  or 
V
k  in terms of expansion or contraction in the short run. Note for inefficient firms 
operating inside of the production frontier, the marginal product is not defined. 
However, to estimate how the consumed output expands with an increase of variable 
input, we assume the marginal increase in output is the same as the marginal products of 
the reference firm on frontier via output-oriented expansion.  
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Figure 3.6 Marginal product regarding to short-run capacity expansion or contraction 
 
3.4 Stochastic Programming Model 
The fundamental stochastic programming (SP) models are described in Birge and 
Louveaux (1997). This section proposes a stochastic programming DEA (SPDEA) 
model which characterizes flexibility in the capacity level through changes to single 
variable input levels to adjust for uncertain demand. A specific firm can adjust variable 
input to change output levels when facing demand fluctuations. In section 3.4.1 a 
scenario-based approach provides solutions to individual scenario and expected scenario. 
A two-stage recourse stochastic programming model described in section 3.4.2 provides 
robust solutions to a variety of scenarios using a probabilistic characterization. Finally, 
section 3.4.3 describes how the solution varies based on the criteria (i.e. expected value 
of perfect information (EVPI) and value of the stochastic solution (VSS)). 
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3.4.1 Scenario-based Approach 
 A scenario-based approach (SB) is a deterministic programming model solved 
once for each scenario. A scenario is defined by a realization of the demand level. Given 
different scenarios, the model suggests the suitable decision regarding short-run capacity 
expansion or contraction via adjustments in variable input to maximize efficiency under 
demand fluctuations. Specifically, additional output produced and sold is estimated as 
the marginal product multiplied by the increment of variable input, or vice versa reduced 
output produced and sold via reducing the input level. By limiting the range of 
adjustment, a constant marginal rate of change in the output level is a reasonable 
approximation. Accounting for the effects of demand, the effective output level is 
determined considering the current production level, short-run capacity adjustments, and 
realized demand. Thus, for perishable goods, effective output is the minimum of actual 
output and realized demand. The production possibility set is estimate using the 
observed production data and is unchanged regardless of the assumptions made about 
short-run capacity expansion. 
Assuming fixed inputs cannot be adjusted in the short-run, the output-oriented 
variable returns to scale (VRS) DEA formulation with single output is developed as a 
revised dual form of model (3.7). Let EksY  be the effective output and ksD  be the realized 
demand of thk  firm in ths  scenario, Vjrβ  be the marginal product characterized by 
V
jrβ  
and Vjrβ  with respect to 
thj  variable input of firm r , and jrR  be the parameter of 
adjustable range of thj  variable input of firm r . Then the decision variables su , sw , 
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F
isv , 
V
jsv , sv0  are the associated multipliers, jrsd  is the additional adjustment of variable 
input characterized by jrsd  and 

jrsd . rsy  and 
E
rsy  are actual and effective output 
respectively, and Ers
E
rs  /1  measures production effectiveness. Note that in order to 
fix an identical production possibility set after capacity expansion or contraction of firm 
r , index k  include the dummy firm 'r  which is firm r  before capacity expansion. 
  
j
jrsjrs
E
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The objective function equation (3.10.1) maximizes the product of the estimated 
effectiveness Ers
E
rs  /1  and a large number M  with a secondary objective of 
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minimizing the variation in input adjustment. Equations (3.10.2)-(3.10.5) are the 
envelope constraints to build the production possibility set.   is a small number to 
maintain feasibility when 0Ersy . Constraints (3.10.6)-(3.10.8) calculate the effective 
output level for two cases rsr DY   or rsr DY  . Equation (3.10.9) determines the actual 
output level of firm r through capacity expansion. Constraints (3.10.10)-(3.10.12) 
calculates the marginal output for short-run capacity expansion, i.e., 0jrsd , then 
 Vjr
V
jr  ; otherwise 
 Vjr
V
jr  . Constraint (3.10.13) shows adjustment of variable 
input via goal programming, 0jrsd  if and only if capacity expansion with 0

jrsd ; 
otherwise capacity contracts with 0jrsd  if and only if 0

jrsd . The adjustment range 
is restricted in equation (3.10.14). Then equation (3.10.15) defines rsz1  and jrsz2  as 
binary variables and nonnegative constraints are including with equation (3.10.16). Note 
that for the case with multiple variable inputs, when two or more variable inputs are 
expanded simultaneously, the estimation of the increase in output is conservative.  The 
marginal production of each variable input is estimated separately and then the dot 
product of the marginal product vector and the vector of change in variable input is 
taken. If there is a synergistic effect between the different variable inputs, this is not 
captured. However, because the production frontier limits the output level, the benefits 
of increasing multiple variables inputs leads to a resulting production vector within the 
production possibility set. 
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 In order to maintain feasibility which means a firm remains in original 
production possibility set after taking action, the effectiveness and resource adjustments 
are calculated using proposed algorithm shown as follows. 
Proposed Algorithm 
1. Start from specific firm 1r  
2. For 1r  to number of DMU 
 2.1 Set step 0t , Vjr
V
jrt XX   and rrt YY   
 2.2 Calculate marginal product Vjrt  and 
V
jrt  
 2.3 Run scenario-based approach to calculate jdXX jrt
V
jrt
VT
jrt    ,  and  
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 2.4 Run output-oriented DEA estimator to calculate efficiency DEArt  
 2.5 If 1DEArt , then get 
E
rt , jdd
t
jrtjr    ,  and Trtr Yy  . Go to step 3 
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Else run the model (3.12) 
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End 
 2.6 Set jdXX jrt
V
jrt
V
jrt    ,  and 
j
jrt
V
jrtrtrt dYY   
 2.7 Set 1 tt , then go to Step 2.1 
3. Set 1 rr  and go to step 2 
 
Proposition 3.2: A firm that expands or contracts short-run capacity via proposed 
algorithm with marginal products Vjk  or 
V
jk  remain feasible in the original 
production possibility set. 
 
 In addition, if demand is low, a significant gap between efficiency and 
effectiveness exists; however, if demand is high, efficiency and effectiveness are 
identical measures. This result shows the measure of effectiveness is particularly 
important during economic down-turns. 
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Proposition 3.3: The effectiveness estimate converges to an efficiency estimate as 
demand increases. 
 
The advantage of this approach is simple and leads itself to scenario analysis. It is 
useful to suggest a solution to “If…Then…” situation, that is, what’s the best capacity 
adjustment if some demand scenario is realized. There are two kinds of solutions 
suggested: scenario analysis and an expected value (EV) solution. Given a demand level 
defines an event, scenario analysis provides solutions, an adjustment to variable input, to 
each event respectively; however, the expected value solution is obtained by solving 
model with the expected value of variables representing uncertain events. In this study 
demand is the uncertain variables, thus 
s
rssr DpD  where sp  represents the 
probability of ths scenario occurring. However, the scenario-based approach does not 
consider a robust solution for all of scenarios; this is introduced in section 3.4.2. 
 
3.4.2 Two-stage Recourse Approach 
The two-stage recourse approach is a typical stochastic programming model and 
provides robust solution to all scenarios. The two-stage recourse model shows a two-
stage decision process including “here-and-now” and “wait-and-see” decisions by 
considering the expected recourse function. The two-stage decision process is shown as 
figure 3.7. The first-stage decision is referred to as the here-and-now decision, and we 
make an ex-ante decision based on forecasts of the uncertain event. After the event 
occurs, the ex-post decision made in second stage adjusts to account for the new 
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information. If the event does not occur, no decision is made and we just wait and see 
what happens. That second-stage decision is referred to as the wait-and-see decision. For 
example, in a make-to-order production model, the firm needs to make a decision to 
determine the amount of material to order, but demand is realized in the future due to 
lead times. The material order is the here-and-now decision. Then, a firm realizes 
demand, and accordingly decides how many products to produce to maximize profit. 
However, until the customer order is realized, the second-stage decision is pending. 
Similarly, for maximizing effectiveness, firm r  needs to decide the short-run capacity 
expansion or contraction strategy before realizing demand. Then, the firm measures the 
technical effectiveness after demand is observed. Figure 3.7 illustrates this two-stage 
decision process. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Two-stage decision process 
 
 
The two-stage recourse approach introduces an expected recourse function using a 
divide-and-conquer strategy. The expected recourse function characterizes the 
performance of second-stage decision, namely the expected utility is estimated based on 
the individual decision for each specific scenario respectively. This divide-and-conquer 
strategy generates robust solutions for the first-stage decision in all scenarios. The two-
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stage recourse model of DEA with capacity adjustment and uncertain demand is shown 
in the following formulation. 
  





 j
jrjrE
rss
s ddpM )(
1
Max    

 (3.13.1) 
svDwdXvXvts srss
i j
jr
V
jr
V
js
F
ir
F
is
E
rs     ,)(     .. 0  (3.13.2) 
sywyu Erss
E
rss    ,1)()(          (3.13.3) 
srkvYuXvXv skss
j
V
jk
V
js
i
F
ik
F
is  ,\  ,0        0  (3.13.4) 
svyudXvXv s
E
rss
j
jr
V
jr
V
js
i
F
ir
F
is    ,0)()(        0  (3.13.5) 
  szDDyDzyy rsrsrsrrsrsr
E
rs    ,1),min()11(         (3.13.6) 
sMzDy rsrsr    ,1         (3.13.7) 
szMDy rsrsr    ),11(         (3.13.8) 

j
jr
V
jrrr dYy          (3.13.9) 
jzz jr
V
jrjr
V
jr
V
jr 
   ,)21(2          (3.13.10) 
jMzd jrjr    ,2         (3.13.11) 
jzMd jrjr    ,)21(         (3.13.12) 
jddd jrjrjr 
   ,         (3.13.13) 
jXRdXR Vjrjrjr
V
jrjr    ,         (3.13.14) 
  jz jr    ,1,02         (3.13.15) 
  sz rs    ,1,01         (3.13.16) 
sjivvwuddyy Vjs
F
isssjrjrr
E
rs 
 ,,  ,0,,,,,,,         (3.13.17) 
 
The term objective function (3.13.1) indicates the expected recourse function of 
effectiveness estimate Ers  of firm r  with probability measures sp  for the 
ths  scenario. 
The two-stage recourse problem (RP) provides an adjustment to the variable input level 
jrd  in first-stage and attempts to maximize expected effectiveness by adjusting the 
variables su , 
F
isv , 
V
jsv , and sv0  in second-stage after the demand is realized. A recourse 
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function is defined as  )17.13.3()16.13.3(),8.13.3()2.13.3(|max),(
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substituting first-stage decision jrd  and realized outcome ksD  of random variable ksD
~  
into the formulation. The expected recourse function can be formulated as 
  
s
rssksjr pDdgE )
~
,(  under discrete scenarios. However, an excess of scenarios will 
result in a large number of decision variables and constraints and increase the 
computational burden. Thus, confidence interval for the effectiveness estimate by means 
of simulation approach described in Birge and Louveaux (1997) provides insight into the 
level of certainty of the estimates. 
 
3.4.3 Value of Information and Stochastic Solution 
Given the solutions generated from SP models, it is interesting to investigate the quality 
of the solutions. There are two approaches commonly adopted: the expected value of 
perfect information (EVPI) and the value of the stochastic solution (VSS) (Birge and 
Louveaux, 1997). The expected value of perfect information (EVPI) measures the 
maximum amount a decision maker is willing to pay in return for complete information 
about the future. Define the effectiveness measures from the wait-and-see (WS) problem 
and the recourse problem (RP) as  )~,(Max WS ~ DdgE
D
  and  )~,(Max RP ~ DdgE
D
 , 
then EVPI is the difference between WS and RP described in equation (3.14). 
   )~,(Max -)~,(Max RP-WSEVPI ~~ DdgEDdgE
DD
  (3.14) 
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The value of the stochastic solution (VSS) is a measure of the quality of the 
expected value (EV) decision in terms of the recourse problem. Namely, it gives the cost 
of ignoring uncertainty. Let )(Dd  be a EV solution and define the expected result of 
using the EV solution (EEV) as  )~),((EEV ~ DDdgE
D
 . The VSS is defined as the 
difference between EEV and RP described in equation (3.15). 
   )~),(()~,(Max EEVVSS ~~ DDdgEDdgERP
DD
  (3.15) 
 
3.5 Model Convexification 
The above model, in particular, equations (3.10.1)-(3.10.17) is a nonlinear programming 
with a concave feasible region. A global optimum cannot be guaranteed. This section 
provides an equivalent geometric programming formulated with difference of two 
exponential-based convex functions through variable alteration and additional variables 
and constraints (Maranas and Floudas, 1997). For a minimization problem, this 
decomposition identifies a lower bound by solving a convex relaxation programming 
problem. To linearize some geometric terms, the equivalent formulation requires 
additional binary variables and continuous variables. Using this model an approximate 
solution can be obtained through a branch-and-bound algorithm (Li and Tsai, 2005). 
 First, constraint (3.10.15) can be replaced by constraint (3.16.1) and (3.16.2). 
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V
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The minimum function ),min( rsrsrs
c
rs DDyy   in constraint (3.10.6) can be 
transformed into (3.16.3)-(3.16.6). 
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Finally, the model (3.10.1)-(3.10.16) can be reformulated as an equivalent geometric 
programming with exponential-based convex functions in appendix B. A convex 
relaxation of this equivalent model can be solved to approximate optimal solution 
(Maranas and Floudas, 1997). Similar adjustments can be made to the two-stage 
recourse approach with a fractional objective function released by Charnes and Cooper 
(1962). 
 
3.6 Example Illustration 
This section gives a numerical example without capacity expansion to illustrate the 
proposed model. Table 3.1 shows the data for 12 decision-making units (DMUs). The 
data includes a fixed input, variable input, actual output, and three demand forecasts- 
pessimistic (PE), most-likely (ML), and optimistic (OP) situations. This numerical study 
postulates the probability of realizing each of the demand scenarios as 1/6 for the PE, 4/6 
for the ML and 1/6 for the OP case. Then the efficiency and effectiveness measures are 
shown in table 3.2. Note that PE, ML, OP, and EV are deterministic (and use the 
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scenario-based approach) while SP is stochastic. Specifically, the difference between the 
expected value (EV) solution and the stochastic programming (SP) solution is that 
former calculates effectiveness using expected demand kD , while the latter estimates 
the expected value of effectiveness of the three demand scenarios.  
 
Table 3.1 Data of numerical example 
DMU Fix Input Var. Input Actual Output 
Pessimistic 
Demand 
Most-likely 
Demand 
Optimistic 
Demand 
A 9 5 10 6 9 12 
B 4 7 8 5 6 9 
C 4 9 11 6 8 13 
D 5 9 9 7 8 10 
E 7 7 10 7 9 13 
F 6 7 7 4 6 9 
G 10 8 10 7 8 11 
H 8 6 7 7 8 9 
I 5 6 11 6 7 12 
J 4.5 10 10 8 10 12 
K 4 8 12 7 8 12 
L 10 7 5 3 5 8 
 
Table 3.2 Efficiency, effectiveness and EVPI 
DMU Efficiency Effectiveness PE ML OP EV SP (RP) WS EVPI 
A 1.000  0.333  0.889  1.000  0.889  0.815  0.815  0.000  
B 1.000  0.400  0.667  1.000  0.737  0.678  0.678  0.000  
C 0.917  0.167  0.625  0.917  0.706  0.597  0.597  0.000  
D 0.750  0.714  0.875  0.900  0.898  0.852  0.852  0.000  
E 0.870  0.571  0.889  0.870  0.929  0.833  0.833  0.000  
F 0.609  0.250  0.833  0.778  0.865  0.727  0.727  0.000  
G 0.833  0.571  0.750  0.909  0.800  0.747  0.747  0.000  
H 0.636  1.000  0.875  0.778  0.875  0.880  0.880  0.000  
I 1.000  0.167  0.429  1.000  0.565  0.480  0.480  0.000  
J 0.833  0.750  1.000  0.833  1.000  0.931  0.931  0.000  
K 1.000  0.286  0.500  1.000  0.588  0.548  0.548  0.000  
L 0.435  0.333  1.000  0.625  0.968  0.826  0.826  0.000  
Avg. 0.855  0.449  0.755  0.903  0.802  0.729  0.729    
 
Figure 3.8 maps the efficiency and the effectiveness level with different demand 
scenarios on a two-dimensional coordinate graph, and the four quadrants indicate the 
  
77 
strategic position. The intersection of two axes describes the performance of industry 
level which is the average of 12 DMUs weighted by actual output. For the PE-demand 
case, DMU F and L are the followers (using the terminology introduced in figure 3.3), 
DMU D, G, H and J belong to superior market, DMU A, B, C, I and K are attributed to 
superior technology, and DMU E is the leader. This strategic position provides 
guidelines of productivity improvement. Second, when demand is high, effectiveness is 
closely correlated with efficiency and they tend to a diagonal line. This is because 
demand does not limit the production possibility set. This result is consistent with 
proposition 3.3. Figure 3.8 shows a convergence process from pessimistic to optimistic 
demand situation. That is, effectiveness provides additional information beyond an 
efficiency measure during economic down-turns. Third, the result shows firms will 
prefer to underproduce rather than overproduce since inventory implies ineffective 
product. For example DMU C indicates totally ineffective in PE and ML cases but 
production function forms a demand-supporting limitation in OP case. It concludes 
DMU C would like to reduce output level to achieve the goal of effective production. 
Finally, the results using EV and SP are very similar as shown in figure 3.9, however the 
interpretation is different. The expected demand situation (EV) can not be realized in the 
future, but expected effectiveness (SP) can be estimated to justify the decision making. 
Table 3.2 demonstrates that SP identifies the infeasible DMU with effectiveness score 
0.929, that is DMU E, since in three scenarios DMU E never shows scores higher than 
0.929. In additions, all EVPI equal to zero point out no need to pay for perfect 
information. This is because capacity adjustment is not considered in this example and 
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effectiveness identical under a WS (wait-and-see) model and a SP excluding short-run 
capacity expansion decision. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Efficiency vs. effectiveness 
 
  
Figure 3.9 Expected value solution vs. stochastic programming 
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3.7 Empirical Study 
An empirical study of Japanese convenience stores (CVS) over the first half of 2003 is 
presented. The first convenience store in Japan opened in 1969. These stores have 
become very popular over the past three decades. Now there are around 42,889 
convenience stores (CVS) in Japan with 1.1 billions customers per year (Japan Franchise 
Association, 2010). Most CVSs are built with a floor area of 100 square meters and 
about 3000 types of product. Even though prices in a convenience store are typically 
higher than at a supermarket, they remain popular because of new service such as 24hr 
operating, courier and postal service, touch screen monitor for finding job and ordering 
ticket, telephone and utility bills payment, automated teller machine (ATM), online 
shopping, etc and of course convenience (Nipponia, 2001). Thus, CVS plays an 
important role and affects the lives of many Japanese people. This study evaluates the 
performance of 25 convenience store chains under demand uncertainty in the short run. 
Section 3.7.1 provides a description of the data. The effectiveness is estimated using 
scenario-based approach and the two-stage recourse approach in section 3.7.2. 
 
3.7.1 Data Description 
In the convenience store industry, the production process can be characterized by three 
input resources- capital, branch size (fixed inputs), and employee (variable input); 
forecasted demand and actual output are measured as goods. Efficiency is estimated 
using actual output. While effectiveness is estimated using truncated production 
function. The data primarily comes from Sueyoshi (2003) and this study adds additional 
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data regarding to capacity adjustment shown in descriptive statistics of table 3.3. The 
following describes the details of data set. 
 Capital is defined as the net worth of equipment used to create goods or service 
in a production system. Branch size and employee are defined as the number of branches 
and manpower headcount the convenience store chain had during the first half year of 
2003. Actual output is estimated by realized revenue divided by the average price per 
item4. Demand is firm-specific and defined as the estimated number of goods sold and 
characterized by a pessimistic, most-likely, and optimistic estimate which were provided 
by managers and chief executive officers, see Sueyoshi (2003) for more details. 
Similarly, demand is calculated by estimating revenue divided by average price per item. 
The marginal product is defined in section 3.3 and estimated by Podinovski and Førsund 
model (2010). Note that, in the short run, the variable input (employee) can be adjusted 
to change the capacity level while the fix inputs (capital and branch) remain unchanged. 
In other words, convenience store can adjust the stores capacity over some limited range 
by hiring or laying off employees. This study limits the positive and negative adjustment 
in manpower resources to 15%. This parameter is arbitrary and other recommended 
values were tested however then lead to similar results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Data from the Japan Franchise Association (2010). 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics of raw data 
Stat. 
Fixed Input Var. Input Output Demand 
Capital Branch Employee Goods Pessimistic Most-likely Optimistic 
Yen (106) Unit Headcount Unit (106) 
Average 3452.5 1421.4  683.5  794.4  795.5  857.9  920.4  
Std. Dev. 7465.8  2291.5  1068.3  1330.2  1492.9  1558.6  1625.9  
Max 30876.0  7780.0  4126.0  6191.3  6358.8  6586.6  6814.4  
Min 3.0 22.0  8.0  12.1  11.7  13.1  14.7  
 
3.7.2 Efficiency and Effectiveness Analysis 
 This section illustrates efficiency and effectiveness estimation in a demand-
dependent context. A demand-dependent context means all firms consistently realize the 
same single demand state (such as pessimistic (PE), most-likely (ML), or optimistic 
(OP)). This empirical study postulates demand 
kD
~  follows beta distribution. The 
expected value can be estimated as 6/)4( kkkk OPMLPED  . The mean of beta 
distribution is widely used in project management with PERT (Program Evaluation and 
Review Technique) and CPM (Critical Path Method) to plan activity times and 
scheduling (Hillier and Lieberman, 2002). Table 3.4 presents the efficiency, 
effectiveness, EVPI and VSS estimations. “N” means estimation without short-run 
capacity expansion are allowed. Similarly, “Y” indicates results where capacity 
adjustment and manpower expansion decision. “Exp.” column indicates the change in 
variable input where positive values indicate short-run capacity expansion and negative 
values indicate contraction. 
 The empirical study is consistent with the numerical study, in that higher demand 
increases the correlation between effectiveness and efficiency. The correlation 
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coefficients are 0.26 and 0.76 in the pessimistic and the optimistic demand cases without 
capacity expansion, respectively. In addition, EVPI and VSS in most of CVS chains are 
close to or equal to zero. This leads to an inconspicuous performance difference between 
the two-stage recourse approach (RP) and expected value of demand solution (EV). This 
result is driven by the limited demand fluctuations in the CVS industry during the first-
half of 2003. However, we suggest RP solution to DMUs which represent VSS value 
larger than 0.  
 Considering ex-ante and ex-post analysis of short-run capacity expansion, figure 
3.10 and 3.11 map the efficiency and effectiveness under pessimistic demand on a two-
dimensional coordinate, and the four quadrants map to the strategies for productivity 
improvement (similar to figure 3.3). The intersection of two coordinate axes indicates 
the industry performance weighted average. Nevertheless, in an ex-post analysis, the 
efficiency is calculated after applying the expansion of variable input recommended by 
the effectiveness maximization problem (3.10). This might leads an efficiency loss to 
achieve higher effectiveness. Thus, there exists a tradeoff between efficiency and 
effectiveness in the capacity expansion decision. 
 
  
 
Table 3.4 Efficiency, effectiveness, EVPI and VSS 
CVS DMU 
Efficiency 
Effectiveness 
PE ML OP EV RP 
WS EVPI EEV VSS 
N Y Exp. N Y Exp. N Y Exp. N Y Exp. N Y Exp. N Y Exp. 
am/pm A 0.905  0.905  0.0  0.968  0.968  0.0  0.905  0.905  0.0  0.905  0.905  0.0  0.905  0.905  0.0  0.916  0.916  0.0  0.916  0.000  0.916  0.000  
Heart in B 0.821  0.821  0.0  0.970  0.970  0.0  0.951  0.951  0.0  0.883  0.883  0.0  0.951  0.951  0.0  0.943  0.943  0.0  0.943  0.000  0.943  0.000  
HOTSPAR C 0.541  0.552  -48.3  0.805  0.805  0.0  0.958  0.958  0.0  0.800  0.800  0.0  0.958  0.958  0.0  0.906  0.906  0.0  0.906  0.000  0.906  0.000  
Apple Mart D 1.000  1.000  0.0  0.891  0.891  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  0.982  0.982  0.0  0.982  0.000  0.982  0.000  
Everyone E 0.851  0.851  0.0  0.816  0.816  0.0  0.851  0.851  0.0  0.851  0.851  0.0  0.851  0.851  0.0  0.845  0.845  0.0  0.845  0.000  0.845  0.000  
Caramel Mart F 0.718  0.718  0.0  0.707  0.707  0.0  0.893  0.893  0.0  0.718  0.718  0.0  0.893  0.893  0.0  0.833  0.833  0.0  0.833  0.000  0.833  0.000  
Coco Store G 1.000  1.000  0.0  0.950  1.000  -12.8  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  0.992  1.000  -12.8  1.000  0.000  0.992  0.008  
Community Store H 1.000  1.000  0.0  0.866  0.920  -23.3  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  0.978  0.987  -23.3  0.987  0.000  0.978  0.009  
Circle K I 0.774  0.832  133.7  0.959  1.000  32.7  0.900  1.000  84.0  0.848  0.998  133.7  0.900  1.000  84.0  0.901  0.980  84.0  1.000  0.020  0.899  0.081  
Sunkus J 0.759  0.777  -141.3  0.956  1.000  66.9  0.924  1.000  120.6  0.893  0.980  141.3  0.924  1.000  120.5  0.924  0.989  120.6  0.997  0.008  0.923  0.065  
Shop and Life K 0.613  0.645  4.9  0.858  0.858  0.0  0.975  1.000  -1.5  0.938  1.000  4.0  0.973  1.000  -1.6  0.949  0.967  -1.5  0.976  0.009  0.949  0.018  
Spar L 0.905  0.905  0.0  0.868  0.868  0.0  0.923  0.923  0.0  0.905  0.905  0.0  0.921  0.921  0.0  0.911  0.911  0.0  0.911  0.000  0.911  0.000  
Three F M 0.760  0.760  0.0  0.954  0.954  0.0  0.914  0.914  0.0  0.878  0.878  0.0  0.914  0.914  0.0  0.915  0.915  0.0  0.915  0.000  0.915  0.000  
Seikatsu Train N 0.938  0.942  0.0  0.984  0.984  0.0  0.938  0.938  0.0  0.938  0.938  0.0  0.938  0.938  0.0  0.946  0.946  0.0  0.946  0.000  0.946  0.000  
Seicomart O 1.000  1.000  0.0  0.849  0.922  -40.4  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  0.975  0.987  -40.4  0.987  0.000  0.975  0.012  
Seven Eleven P 1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  0.000  1.000  0.000  
Daily Yamazaki Q 1.000  1.000  0.0  0.863  0.997  -152.4  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  0.977  1.000  -152.4  1.000  0.000  0.977  0.022  
Hiromaru Chain R 0.470  0.470  0.0  0.787  0.787  0.0  0.996  0.996  0.0  0.844  0.844  0.0  0.996  0.996  0.0  0.936  0.936  0.0  0.936  0.000  0.936  0.000  
Family Mart S 0.757  0.757  0.0  0.970  1.000  43.5  0.903  1.000  151.5  0.845  1.000  259.5  0.903  1.000  151.5  0.904  0.977  151.5  1.000  0.023  0.901  0.076  
My Shop Chain T 1.000  1.000  0.0  0.696  0.696  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  0.949  0.949  0.0  0.949  0.000  0.949  0.000  
Monpellie U 1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  0.000  1.000  0.000  
Mon Mart V 1.000  1.000  0.0  0.912  0.912  0.0  0.984  0.984  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  0.984  0.984  0.0  0.974  0.974  0.0  0.974  0.000  0.974  0.000  
Lics W 1.000  1.000  0.0  0.971  0.971  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  1.000  1.000  0.0  0.995  0.995  0.0  0.995  0.000  0.995  0.000  
Little Star X 0.743  0.743  0.0  0.825  0.825  0.0  0.893  0.893  0.0  0.743  0.743  0.0  0.893  0.893  0.0  0.857  0.857  0.0  0.857  0.000  0.857  0.000  
Lawson Y 0.694  0.694  0.0  0.980  0.980  0.0  0.924  0.924  0.0  0.874  0.874  0.0  0.924  0.924  0.0  0.925  0.925  0.0  0.925  0.000  0.925  0.000  
Avg. 0.857  0.863    0.960  0.983    0.955  0.980    0.927  0.965    0.955  0.980    0.951  0.972            
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Figure 3.10 Efficiency vs. effectiveness with pessimistic demand before expansion 
 
 
Figure 3.11 Efficiency vs. effectiveness with pessimistic demand after expansion 
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3.8 Concluding Remarks 
This study proposes an original model for the short-run capacity expansion decision with 
uncertain demand. Proactive DEA embedded with stochastic programming enhances the 
decision making tools to consider performance benchmarking in short-run capacity 
planning. This study improves previous studies by considering varying marginal product 
rates for expansion and contraction and includes limitations due to diminishing returns. 
In addition, efficiency and effectiveness estimates identify the influence of demand on 
productivity analysis. An empirical study of Japanese convenience store illustrates the 
SPDEA model. In future studies, the development of multi-output model with price 
information would be a valuable contribution. Moreover, the panel data and a dynamic 
analysis will be valuable to support a sequential control of resource. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RATIONAL INEFFICIENCY BY NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Standard productivity and efficiency analysis assumes perfectly competitive markets and 
exogenous prices (Cherchye et al., 2002). Basic microeconomic theory states that firms 
operating in less than perfectly competitive markets can reduce production levels and 
increase a product’s market price when they face a downward sloping demand curve. 
Considering an oligopolistic market, Hicks (1935) proposes "the quiet life hypothesis 
(QLH)" and argues that, due to management's subjective cost of reaching optimal profits, 
firms use their market power to allow inefficient allocation of resources. Johnson and 
Ruggiero (2011) demonstrate from a revenue efficiency perspective that a firm that 
increases output to become technically efficient may actually reduce its overall profits 
by increasing the market quantity, which in turn reduces the market price. Figures 4.1 
and 4.2 illustrate the endogenous prices of an oligopolistic market for a single product 
produced using a single input. The production frontier in figure 4.1 represents 
technically efficient production. Firms A and B would like to expand their output levels5 
to increase their productivity, yet increasing the output levels will lead to a change in the 
market output quantity from Y to Y' (shown in figure 4.2) and the market price will fall 
from P to P'. This change in price may reduce the profits of both firms. Thus, the 
                                                 
5Firms will either expand their outputs, contract their inputs, or both, depending on the cost/price structure 
of inputs/outputs and adjustment costs associated with changing input levels. For now we will assume 
input adjustment costs are very large and consider only output adjustment consistent with an output 
oriented efficiency analysis in the efficiency literature, (Fare and Primont, 1995). This assumption is 
relaxed in section 4.4. 
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standard assumption in the efficiency literature that all firms desire to produce on the 
production frontier may not hold in an oligopolistic market (Cherchye et al., 2002; 
Johnson and Ruggiero, 2011). A firm is said to be rationally inefficient when it tries to 
maximize revenues or profits, or alternatively, minimize costs by intentionally operating 
at lower productivity levels. This study considers an oligopolistic market to estimate a 
firm’s target production plans that may not be on the production frontier, but that 
maximize revenues or profits, or alternatively, minimize costs. The set of all firms’ 
benchmark production plans is a Nash-Cournot oligopolistic market equilibrium. 
Most of the efficiency and productivity literature adapts the work developed by 
Farrell (1957) and articulated by Leibenstein (1966) as concepts X-efficiency which 
assumes that deviations from a production frontier are due to managerial inefficiency, 
lack of motivation, and lack of knowledge (Leibenstein and Maital, 1994). However, 
Stigler (1976) argues that firms and individuals are rational, meaning that what is 
observed as inefficiency is actually the difference between individual employees of the 
firm maximizing their individual value functions and the firm’s value function. 
Following Stigler, Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) suggest that if the inefficiency is due 
to lack of motivation, performance may be improved by redesigning the incentive 
structure to stimulate employees to save inputs and expand outputs.  
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Figure 4.1 Economic efficiency and production frontier 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Change in supply and equilibrium price 
 
 In the case that these incentives or enforcement cost are higher than the cost of 
the inefficiency, it is rational for the firm to allow inefficient operations. Modeling the 
firm’s intention as maximizing profits and the employees’ intention as maximizing 
slack, the authors show the trade-offs between the consumption of different types of 
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slack. Alternatively, Wibe (2008) considers a firm that does not scrap older equipment as 
new models become available. His dynamic production model demonstrates that a 
considerable proportion of cross-sectional technical inefficiency can be rational 
economic behavior in terms of capital acquisition, i.e. he shows the role of capital (fixed 
inputs) in rational inefficiency. 
In this chapter we propose that rational inefficiency may in fact be a result of 
endogenous prices and the effect of output production on price – and profits. Cournot 
(1838), the first to consider endogenous prices, assumes a homogeneous product with an 
inverse demand function known to all firms which then independently select output 
levels; in this market characterized by imperfect competition, price is treated as an 
endogenous parameter. Nash (1950a, 1950b, 1951, 1953) considers more general non-
cooperative games and defines a self-countering n-tuple as an equilibrium point in n-
person games, i.e. for an equilibrium point, no firm can increase its objective function by 
unilaterally changing the quantity or price to any other feasible point. These games are 
consistent with the oligopolies described by Cournot where each firm maximizes its own 
profits and the output decisions affect the price faced by all of the firms. Rosen (1965) 
proves that a finite non-cooperative game always has at least one equilibrium point when 
the strategy space of each player is restricted to a simplex and the payoff functions are a 
bilinear function of the strategies. Further, for a constrained n-person game, he proves 
the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium point with a strictly concave payoff 
function. A systematic discussion applying equilibrium concepts to economic systems is 
developed in Arrow and Debreu (1954). Discussing different classes of non-cooperative 
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games, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) argue that all have identical bounds on the 
rationalizable strategies. In this study we consider production strategies bounded by the 
production possibility set. 
 Murphy et al. (1982) introduce a mathematical programming approach for 
finding Nash equilibria in oligopolistic markets. They show that if the revenue function 
is concave and the cost function is convex and continuously differentiable, and the 
inverse demand function is strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable, then a 
Nash equilibrium solution exists if and only if a solution to the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker 
(KKT) conditions exist. Based on their study, Harker (1984) presents a variational 
inequality (VI) approach to find a Nash equilibrium using an iterative procedure called 
the diagonalization algorithm. Bonanno (1990) gives a comprehensive survey on 
equilibrium theory with imperfect competition.  
We use a variational inequality approach to identify Nash equilibria when 
production is limited by a production frontier. We focus on an oligopolistic market with 
endogenous prices and firms maximizing profits. We identify a Nash equilibrium in 
which each firm cannot improve its profit by changing production levels within the 
production possibility set. We find that, contrary to previous productivity and efficiency 
studies, under certain conditions some firms choose not to produce on the production 
frontier, and we interpret the behavior as rational inefficiency (choosing to be less 
productive in order to increase profits).  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 shows the 
equivalence between a Nash equilibrium and the two approaches, variational inequalities 
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and the complementarity problem, when production is restricted to the production 
possibility set. Section 4.3 examines revenue maximization with fixed input levels.  Both 
a single output case and a multiple output case are presented. Section 4.4 introduces a 
generalized profit model in which a firm maximizes profits by adjusting both input and 
output levels. The existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium identified through the 
complementarity problem is proven, and the relationship between the benchmark frontier 
and scale properties is discussed. Based on moving towards allocative efficient 
production, the direction for improvement used in the directional distance function is 
identified using the results of the Nash equilibrium analysis. Section 4.5 presents our 
conclusions.   
 
4.2 Identify a Nash Equilibrium  in Production Possibility Set 
This section considers a general profit function and a production function with multiple 
inputs and multiple outputs, describes the conditions under which a Nash equilibrium 
solution exists, and how to identify it. We discuss the equivalence between the general 
concept of a Nash equilibrium and a set of variational inequalities and the 
complementary problem (CP) when production is limited to the production possibility 
set.  
Let       denote the inputs and     
  denote the outputs of a production 
system.     in the single output case. The production possibility set defined as  
   (   )                  is estimated by a piece-wise linear convex function 
enveloping all observations (Farrell, 1957; Boles, 1967; Afriat, 1972; Charnes et al., 
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1978). For firm  ,      is the     input resource,     is the amount of the     production 
output, and    is the multiplier for the convex combination. Equation (4.1) uses a dataset 
characterizing firms to estimate the smallest set that imposes monotonicity and 
convexity on the production function, the boundary of the production possibility set  ̃.  
 ̃  
{
 
 
(   )||
∑                 
∑                 
∑       
           }
 
 
 (4.1) 
 To identify a Nash equilibrium, the generalized profit function should be 
concave, the inverse demand function should be nonincreasing and continuously 
differentiable, and the inverse supply function should be nondecreasing and continuously 
differentiable. The variational inequality approach and mixed complementary problem 
(MCP) are proven to be alternative methods to calculating a Nash equilibrium in 
production possibility set in section 4.4. 
To discuss the equilibria in oligopolistic markets characterized by imperfect 
competition, we define a Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) with respect to production 
possibility set as:  
 
Definition 4.1: Let   be a finite number of players,    a utility (profit) function,    a 
strategy set (production possibility set) for player        , and (     )  
(                   )     an observed production vector; then a vector (     )  
((  
    
 ) (  
    
 )   (  
    
 ))               is called a Nash equilibrium 
and is a solution to the NEP if 
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 (     )   (    (  )
      (  )
 ),  (     )    , 
where  (  )
  (  
        
      
      
 )  and  (  )
  (  
        
      
      
 )  holds 
for all        . 
 Considering an NEP, Facchinei and Pang (2003) build a rigorous relationship 
among Nash equilibria, a set of variational inequalities (VI), and the complementarity 
problem (CP). We restate their results for the scenario in which a production function 
bounds the production possibility set, and consider a profit function as a specific utility 
function. 
  
Lemma 4.1: Let output levels be decision variables denoted by     as output   of firm   
and      ; further, let input levels be decision variables denoted by     as input   of 
firm         , and (       )   ̃. Then define    (   )    as a concave function of     
and assume that either the inverse demand function    (   ) is a non-increasing or a 
convex function of    . Thus, for each  (  )   , where   (  )  ∑       ,     (    
 (  ) )    is a concave function of     for      . Similarly, let    (     (  ) )    be 
a convex function of     for      , where   (  )  ∑        and    (   ) is an inverse 
supply function. Further, if either    (   ) is strictly decreasing or is strictly convex, 
then    (     (  ) )    is a strictly concave function on the nonnegative       and 
∑   
 (     (  ) )     ∑   
 (     (  ) )     is a concave function on (       )  
 ̃. 
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 Lemma 4.1 is important because it attests that a global Nash equilibrium solution 
exists when the profit function ∑    (     (  ) )     ∑    (     (  ) )     is 
concave and production is limited to a convex production possibility set. Generally, 
input markets are assumed to be competitive, in which case    (     (  ) )  is a 
constant, but in this case the lemma and the related results shown in theorems 4.1 and 
4.2 and proven in section 4.4 still hold.  
 Gabay and Moulin (1980) propose that a Nash equilibrium will satisfy a set of 
VI. We reformulate the VI set with respect to the production possibility set: 
 
Theorem 4.1: If the profit function of firm  ,   (       )  ∑    (  )     
∑   
 (  )     is concave with respect to (       ) and continuously differentiable, where 
   ∑      and    ∑     , then (     )   ̃ is a Nash-Cournot oligopolistic market 
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the set of VI 〈 ((     )) (   )  (     )〉    
 (   )   ̃ . That is, 
∑   (( 
    ))((     )  (  
    
 ))        (     )   ̃, 
where  
  ((   ))  (      (   )       (   )),       (   )  (
   (   )
    
   
   (   )
    
) and 
     (   )  (
   (   )
    
   
   (   )
    
). 
 
 Karamardian (1971) proves that each generalized complementary problem, i.e. 
KKT condition, corresponds to a set of VI. We extend this result and give the 
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relationship between the complementary problem and the set of VI for the case when 
production is limited by the production possibility set as: 
 
Theorem 4.2: Consider an oligopoly with   firms, an inverse demand function   ( )  
that is strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable in  , and an inverse supply 
function   ( )  that is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable in  . Since 
lemma 1 shows that the profit function   (     )  is concave and        , then 
(     )  ((  
    
 ) (  
    
 )   (  
    
 )) is a Nash equilibrium solution if and only if 
     ( 
    )    and      ( 
    )         ; 
  
 [     ( 
    )]    and    [     ( 
    )]         , 
where (       )   ̃. 
 
Note that theorem 4.2 develops a relationship between a Nash equilibrium solution and 
the KKT conditions. Having established the relationship, we use the results to estimate 
revenue or profit maximizing benchmark frontiers as described below. 
 
4.3 Revenue Maximization Model 
Consider a firm with fixed input levels wanting to maximize revenues by adjusting its 
output level.6 We employ a production process with a vector of inputs to generate a 
single output and then generalize it to the multiple-output production process. We 
illustrate both cases with an example from the productivity literature. 
                                                 
6 This is consistent with an output-oriented efficiency analysis in the productivity literature. 
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4.3.1 Single-output Model  
We estimate a production function with a single output and identify a Nash equilibrium 
solution using the MCP. Each firm adjusts its output level    to maximize the revenue 
function   .
7  Formulation (4.2) represents the revenue maximization model. To 
endogenously determine the price level, we define the inverse demand function as  ( ). 
In general this demand function need only be strictly decreasing in  . Since the market 
price in our model is affected by the total supply quantity   ∑         , we obtain 
the optimal output level as             
 . The model is feasible while  ( )    and 
     (Farahat and Perakis, 2010) and can be estimated as follows: 
        
{
 
 
∑  ( )   ||
∑                 
∑                     
∑              
              }
 
 
  (4.2) 
Defining    as a random variable of quantity supplied in the market, we need a 
generalized form for the price function,  (  ), to estimate the inverse demand function. 
If the inverse demand function is strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable, 
then the revenue function is concave and continuously differentiable, and a Nash 
equilibrium solution exists (Murphy et al., 1982). For illustrative purposes, we assume a 
linear inverse demand function which satisfies these properties, i.e.   ( )       , 
where    is a positive intercept and   indicates the nonnegative price sensitivity with 
respect to  . (See appendix C for a detailed discussion of the inverse demand function 
and the use of instrumental variables.) If    , then the price is constant regardless of 
                                                 
7 This is consistent with a profit maximization model, given fixed input prices and levels. 
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the output level consistent with the standard analysis of allocative efficiency in the 
productivity and efficiency literature (Fried et al., 2008), i.e. the price is exogenous as in 
the case of perfect competition. 
 In the single-output revenue model (4.2) with a linear inverse demand function, 
we use the CP to find the Nash equilibrium solution. We define the Lagrangian function 
as: 
  (                   )  
∑  ( )    ∑    (   ∑       )  ∑ ∑      (∑             )  
∑    (∑       ) .  
The MCP is:  
  
   
   
 ( ( )         )             
  
   
    
 (      ∑             )                  
  (   ∑       )              (4.3) 
  (∑            )                  
  (∑       )        
 
If the MCP gives the solutions  ( )     or      , i.e. the inverse demand function 
returns a negative value, or the production output level is less than zero, this Nash 
equilibrium solution is inconsistent with production theory. Clearly, the sales price of a 
product cannot be negative. Similarly, if production will cause a profit loss, a firm’s best 
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strategy is to shut down, i.e. the output level will be zero. Thus, we show that a Nash 
solutions satisfy these two properties. 
 
Lemma 4.2: A Nash solution to MCP problem (4.3) will satisfy      and  ( )   .  
 
 Given      and      a small   means that a change in quantity of output 
will not affect the price significantly, but a large α will greatly affect the price. If the 
industry output level changes, the price will drop significantly and the revenues for all 
firms will likely decrease. Therefore, the firms have an incentive to restrict production to 
keep the price – and revenues – high. The same output level chosen by all firms is 
characterized by a common output level  ̅ . The revenue maximizing benchmarks 
constitute a Nash equilibrium. Figure 4.3 illustrates the relationship between a Nash 
equilibrium and single-input-single-output production function, given parameter α. 
 
Theorem 4.3: If  ( )          and α is a small enough positive parameter, the 
Nash equilibrium solution is for all firms to produce on the production frontier. 
 
Theorem 4.4: If  ( )          and α is a large enough positive parameter, the 
MCP will lead to a benchmark output level with      ̅ close to zero, where   ̅ defines 
a truncated output level. 
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Figure 4.3 Nash equilibrium and α parameter adjustment 
 
 We select a dataset from Dyson et al. (1990) describing a set of distribution 
centers for a large supermarket organization to illustrate the single-output NEP. The two 
inputs are stocks and wages. The outputs correspond to the activities of the distribution 
center (DC). The three output variables available are: 1) number of issues representing 
deliveries to supermarkets, 2) number of receipts in bulk from suppliers, and 3) number 
of requisitions to suppliers. In this illustrative example, we only use the number of issues 
as a single output variable and assume a simple inverse demand function  ( )      
  . Table 4.1 shows the best strategy for output expansion or contraction, given 
different price sensitivity values,  . As discussed, a firm’s best strategy is to produce on 
the production frontier if the   value is small; alternatively, as   increases the 
benchmark function becomes truncated. Note that regardless of the value of  , the price 
and output quantity are always larger than zero as stated in lemma 4.2. 
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Table 4.1 Nash equilibrium in single-output production 
Firms 
Price sensitivity parameter   
0 0.05 0.1 0.3 0.5 1 10 100 
DC 1 53.33 53.33 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 2 49.17 49.17 49.17 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 3 61.67 61.67 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 4 70.00 70.00 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 5 32.50 32.50 32.50 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 6 61.67 61.67 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 7 80.00 80.00 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 8 65.00 65.00 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 9 53.33 53.33 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 10 70.00 70.00 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 11 70.00 70.00 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 12 45.00 45.00 45.00 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 13 70.00 70.00 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 14 45.00 45.00 45.00 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 15 20.00 20.00 20.00 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 16 53.33 53.33 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 17 80.00 80.00 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 18 61.67 61.67 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 19 45.00 45.00 45.00 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
DC 20 61.67 61.67 50.89 15.87 9.52 4.76 0.48 0.048 
SUM 1148.33 1148.33 949.11 317.46 190.48 95.24 9.52 0.96 
PRICE 100.00 42.58 5.09 4.76 4.76 4.76 4.80 4.00 
 
4.3.2 Multiple-output Model 
To build a demand function for multiple differentiated substitutable products, we use the 
affine demand function proposed by Farahat and Perakis (2010) and define it as 
  (    (  ))    
        ∑          for all  , where      and  (  )  
(                   ) . For our purposes we define an inverse affine demand 
function,   ( )  , which exists if the condition of diagonal dominance of   matrix is 
satisfied (Bernstein and Federgruen, 2004), i.e.     ∑       . Specifically, we 
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consider a linear inverse (indirect) affine demand function as   (    (  ))      
      ∑          for all  , where     ,    ∑     , 
 (  )  (                   ), and     is the diagonal element of output   in the 
price sensitivity matrix  . In particular,       is not a prerequisite constraint in the 
revenue maximization problem and can be relaxed. Below we define a set of properties 
and the conditions for relaxing       . 
Four important properties of the price sensitivity matrix   are:8  
1) Weak diagonal dominance (WDD): if matrix   satisfies diagonal dominance then 
the revenue function is strictly concave as discussed above.   
2) Moderate diagonal dominance (MDD): if matrix   satisfies     ∑        for 
all   . This property holds for product   if the main effect     caused by the 
same product is more intense than the minor effect     created by another 
substitute product.  
3) Symmetric matrix: a symmetric matrix   implies an equivalent bidirectional effect 
between any two substitute products.  
4) Strong diagonal dominance (SDD):        ( )    ( )  for all   , where 
   ( ) denotes the sum of all elements in matrix   and   ( ) denotes the trace 
which represents the sum of the elements on the diagonal of matrix  . SDD 
means that each product’s quantity level generates a powerful main effect on the 
product’s price.9 
                                                 
8 Note that all output variables need to be normalized in data pre-processing to eliminate unit dependence. 
9  For a discussion of the relationship among these properties see the weak, moderate, and strong 
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 The WDD property is likely to be true because, in general, the price of product A 
is more likely to be affected by the quantity produced of A than by the quantity produced 
of the substitute product B. We use the following formulation (4.4) to identify the 
optimal output levels: 
         
{
 
 
∑ ∑   (    (  ))     ||
∑                     
∑                     
∑              
              }
 
 
.  (4.4) 
Note that to identify a Nash equilibrium, the objective function has to be a 
strictly concave function in all arguments. Let   ∑ ∑   (    (  ))     , giving 
  
    
   (    (  ))         ∑             , and 
   
        
              . 
A negative definite Hessian matrix will imply a strictly concave revenue function. Thus, 
the necessary and sufficient conditions are       and the price sensitivity matrix   
satisfies the WDD property, namely,     ∑        for all   .  
 
 To solve the Nash equilibrium of formulation (4.4), we construct the 
complementary problem and define the Lagrangian function as: 
  (                     )  ∑ ∑   (    (  ))      ∑ ∑      (     
∑        )  ∑ ∑      (∑             )  ∑    (∑       ) .  
The MCP is:  
 
                                                                                                                                                
dominance section in the appendix. 
  
103 
  
   
    
 (  (    (  ))         ∑               )               
  
   
    
 (∑          ∑             )                 
  (    ∑        )                  (4.5)
10 
  (∑            )                  
  (∑       )        
Similar results can now be developed for the multiple output case in theorem 4.5. 
 
Theorem 4.5: If the price sensitivity matrix   satisfies WDD but is not necessarily 
symmetric, then the MCP (4.6) generates (       )   ̃  where     will approach the 
efficient frontier for small enough values of    ;      ̅   is the truncated benchmark 
output level that approaches zero as     approaches infinity. 
 
Corollary 4.1: If the price sensitivity matrix   satisfies the MDD property and     
       , then the solution to the MCP (4.6) will satisfy              . 
 
                                                 
10 If matrix   does not satisfy the SDD property, the resulting Nash equilibrium solution may include 
     . In this case MCP (4.5) is changed in the first inequality to state   
   
    
 , and       :  
  
   
    
 (  (    (  ))         ∑               )                 
  
   
    
 (∑          ∑             )                 
  (    ∑        )                       (4.6) 
  (∑            )                  
  (∑       )        
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Theorem 4.5 is important because the relationship between price sensitivity matrix   and 
the Nash equilibrium solution that can be identified from the characteristic of matrix   
gives insights into the Nash equilibrium regarding the elements in matrix  . The more 
price sensitive the product the more likely a firm will hold back production in order to 
increase its revenue. 
 Even if a large     results in a truncated benchmark production level, it does not 
necessarily result in a common output value for all firms, because some firms may be 
limited by the production frontier. Referring to figure 4.3,    is the smallest input value 
to generate the truncated benchmark output level. Note that the production processes 
using an input quantity between 0 and    will identify a benchmark on the production 
frontier. Without loss of generality and        from MCP (4.6), we have 
  (    (  ))         ∑            ; therefore: 
       
  
     ∑        ∑          ∑          
    
 (4.7) 
If for product   of firm   the efficient output level     is lower than the truncated level 
 ̅ , that is, the production frontier limits output level    , then     can exceed the 
truncated benchmark level  ̅  for some product  , because     is smaller than the 
truncation level  ̅ , and  
   
   
 and     
   
 do not go to zero in the inequality show in equation 
(4.7).11 Simply stated, firms will adjust their mix in output space to maximize revenues 
                                                 
11 Note the exchange of   and  . 
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and generally some variation from the truncated benchmark production level may 
exist.12 
 Again, we use our two-output illustrative example from the dataset described in 
section 4.3.1. The two output variables are the number of issues and the number of 
receipts, and the two inputs are stocks and wages. The inverse demand functions for 
issues and receipts are    (     (   ))                        and 
   (     (   ))                       respectively. Table 4.2 reports the Nash 
equilibrium solution to the MCP (4.6) for different price sensitivity matrix  , all of 
which satisfy the WDD property. Once more a firm’s best strategy is to produce as close 
to the efficient frontier as possible for products with an insensitive inverse demand 
function implied by smaller values in the diagonal components of the   matrix shown in 
case 1. As     becomes larger the benchmark output level is truncated and approaches 
zero with respect to product  . In cases 2 the parameter       is larger than case 1, the 
output    decreases and output     increases to maximize revenue. Similar in case 3, 
      is increased relative to case 1 and the output    decreases. In case 4 the parameter 
      increases with respect to case 2, the solution shows output    decreases to the 
truncated benchmark level. Increasing       in cases 5 and 6, output    approaches zero 
even though the   matrices do not satisfy the symmetric condition. In cases 7 and 8 let 
             and the results indicate that the ratio of output levels    and    are 
influence not only by the ratio of       to      , but also by their absolute levels. 
                                                 
12 This result is illustrated in table 4.2, case 2, DC 5. 
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Table 4.2 Nash equilibrium in two-output production 
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Output                                                 
  
0.05 0.02 1 0.02 0.05 0.02 1 0.02 1.2 0.08 10 5 20 0.02 0.1 0.02 
0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 10 0.02 0.05 
DC1 53.3 32.9 3.6 58.7 53.3 1.3 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC2 49.2 34.9 3.6 58.5 49.2 1.4 4.3 22.9 0.2 58.5 0.0 58.5 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC3 61.7 28.7 3.6 58.7 61.7 1.1 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC4 70.0 24.5 3.6 58.7 70.0 1.0 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC5 32.5 43.3 3.7 55.1 32.5 1.7 4.3 22.9 0.2 55.1 0.0 55.1 0.2 0.2 32.5 34.6 
DC6 61.7 28.7 3.6 58.7 61.7 1.1 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC7 80.0 19.5 3.6 58.7 80.0 0.8 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC8 65.0 27.0 3.6 58.7 65.0 1.1 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC9 53.3 32.9 3.6 58.7 53.3 1.3 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC10 70.0 24.5 3.6 58.7 70.0 1.0 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC11 70.0 24.5 3.6 58.7 70.0 1.0 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC12 45.0 37.0 3.8 50.0 45.0 1.5 4.3 22.9 0.3 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC13 70.0 24.5 3.6 58.7 70.0 1.0 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC14 45.0 37.0 3.6 58.7 45.0 1.5 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC15 20.0 49.5 3.8 50.0 20.0 2.0 4.3 22.9 0.3 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.2 0.2 20.0 39.6 
DC16 53.3 32.9 3.6 58.7 53.3 1.3 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC17 80.0 19.5 3.6 58.7 80.0 0.8 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC18 61.7 28.7 3.6 58.7 61.7 1.1 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC19 45.0 37.0 3.6 58.7 45.0 1.5 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
DC20 61.7 28.7 3.6 58.7 61.7 1.1 4.3 22.9 0.1 60.9 0.0 61.0 0.2 0.2 43.0 30.4 
SUM 1148 616 72.2 1153 1148 24.7 86.1 459 3.0 1187 0.0 1189 4.8 4.8 826 621 
Price 30.3 2.4 4.8 2.4 42.1 2.4 4.8 2.4 1.4 2.4 <0.0 2.4 4.7 2.3 4.9 2.4 
 
 Note that case 6 in Table 4.2, the price of product    (issues) is less than 0, an 
unreasonable negative price, yet the revenue function is still equal to zero because 
     . Adding another constraint to restrict the price to be larger than zero will cause 
the quantity of product    selected to drop, which gives a worse outcome.
13 
                                                 
13 The intuition for case 6 can be built using the single-output case considering only product  
 
. The 
related problem of  negative demand in demand function is modified using the price mappings (described 
in Shubik and Levitan (1980), Soon, et al. (2009), and Farahat and Perakis (2010)). 
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4.4 Generalized Profit Maximization Model  
In our short-run profit models of oligopolistic output markets and a limited capacity 
input market, we only change the variable inputs, e.g., capital stock for production is 
fixed and employment or materials vary with demand (Marshall, 1920). Stigler (1939) 
argues that the quantitative variations of output can be described via the law of 
diminishing returns and marginal productivity theory when holding constant all but one 
of the productive factors and adjusting the quantity of the remaining factor. Thus, our 
generalized model treats fixed inputs and variable inputs separately.  
This section also looks at the case of variable input markets with limited capacity 
and oligopolistic output markets, assuming that the inverse supply function of inputs and 
the inverse demand function of output are linear (see section 4.3 and the appendix C). 
We formulate our generalized profit maximization model as equation (4.8): 
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where      is the data for fixed input   and      is the variable for variable input   of firm 
 .    ∑                  and    (    (  ))    
         ∑                
indicate the overall quantity and price of the inverse demand function of output product 
  in the market. Similarly, for variable input    the overall quantity     ∑         
   
         and the inverse supply function    
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∑      
 
         . Note that the objective function ignores the fixed input cost 
∑   
  (  
   (  )
 )   
 
  since it is a constant sunk cost. 
To verify the existence and uniqueness of a solution, the profit function should 
be strictly concave. Let    ∑ ∑    (    (  ))      ∑ ∑    
 
(  
   (  )
 )   
 
   be the 
profit function. That is, the revenue function ∑ ∑    (    (  ))      should be strictly 
concave and the variable cost function ∑ ∑    
 
(  
   (  )
 )   
 
   strictly convex. We 
have     
    
   
 (    (  ))         ∑             , and 
     
        
          
    . A negative definite Hessian matrix will imply a strictly concave revenue function. 
Thus, the necessary and sufficient conditions are       and the price sensitivity 
matrix   satisfies the WDD property, namely,     ∑        for all   . Also, we have 
    
    
     
  (  
   (  )
 )        
  ∑       
 
      , and 
     
    
     
               . 
A negative definite Hessian matrix will imply a strictly concave negative cost function. 
Similarly, the necessary and sufficient conditions are       and the price sensitivity 
matrix   satisfies the WDD property.14  
 
To solve for a Nash equilibrium associated with equation (4.8), the CP is built 
and the Lagrangian function defined as: 
  (       
                        ) 
                                                 
14 In a special case in which input markets are perfectly competitive      , the inverse supply function 
will be constant and the cost function becomes a linear function. This does not affect the optimality 
condition, i.e. the profit function is still a strictly concave function if the revenue function is strictly 
concave. 
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The MCP is:  
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The Nash equilibrium solution generated from MCP (4.9) exists and is unique when the 
price sensitivity matrices   and   satisfy the WDD property. See section 4.4.1 for a 
similar proof. 
In a perfectly competitive market, the profit efficient firms, i.e. achieving 
maximum profits (Farrell, 1957), must be allocatively efficient by using the least cost 
mix of inputs to produce the maximum revenue mix of outputs, and technically efficient 
by generating the most outputs with their level of inputs, (Färe, et al., 1994). In 
oligopolistic markets, however, profit maximization can be achieved without technical 
efficiency, i.e. rational inefficiency. We will continue to refer to the profit maximizing 
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production possibility as allocatively efficient because it is not possible to change either 
the input mix or the output mix to increase profits. MCP (4.9) generates an allocatively 
efficient Nash solution. 
 
Theorem 4.6: Given arbitrary price sensitivity matrices   and   that satisfy WDD, 
MCP (4.9) generates all allocatively efficient Nash solutions (               )   ̃. These 
solutions are on the frontier including the weakly efficient frontier15, but excluding the 
portion of the frontier associated with positive slacks and dual variables equal to zero on 
the input constraints. 
 
 Theorem 4.6 implies that the Nash equilibrium benchmark generated from MCP 
(4.9) exists on the production frontier using the same or fewer inputs than at least one 
anchor point, (Bougnol and Dulá, 2009).16 Based on theorem 4.5, if     becomes large, 
the production level will approach zero with respect to   and the Nash solution will be 
located on the weakly efficient portion of the production frontier which uses minimal 
input levels. In other words, if the price sensitivity to output is large enough, the Nash 
equilibrium benchmark suggests that a firm should operate on the weakly efficient 
portion of the frontier where more output can be generated using the same level of 
                                                 
15 Weakly efficient frontier is defined as the portion of the input (output) isoquant along which one of the 
inputs (outputs) can be reduced (expanded) while holding all other netputs constant and remaining on the 
isoquant; see Färe and Lovell (1978) for more details. 
16 Bougnol and Dulá (2009) propose a procedure to identify anchor points and show that if a point is an 
anchor point, then increasing an input or decreasing an output generates a new point on the free-
disposability portion of the production possibility set.  
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inputs. In this case, note that the profits are maximized by operating inefficiently, 
motivating the connection to rational inefficiency. 
The illustrative example of the generalized profit model also uses the dataset in 
section 4.3. The two output variables are the number of issues and the number of 
receipts, and the two variable inputs are stocks and wages. One fixed input is randomly 
generated from a Uniform [3,10] distribution. The inverse demand functions for issues 
and receipts are    
 (     (   ))                        and    
 (     (   ))  
                     respectively. The inverse supply functions for stocks and 
wages are    
  (   
   (   )
 )             
          
  and    
  (   
   (   )
 )     
        
          
  respectively. Table 4.3 reports the Nash equilibrium solution to MCP 
(4.9) for the price sensitivity matrices   and  , all of which satisfy the WDD property. 
Again, for outputs with insensitive inverse demand functions implied by smaller values 
in the diagonal components of the   matrix, a firm’s best strategy is to produce near the 
efficient frontier; as     becomes large, the production approaches zero with respect to   
as shown in case 4. Similarly on the input side, for inputs with sensitive inverse supply 
functions implied by larger values in the diagonal components of the   matrix, the best 
strategy is to use smaller input levels to produce on the weakly efficient frontier; as     
becomes smaller, the input level of the Nash equilibrium solution grows larger. 
However, the input level of the solution is always limited to the range of lower and 
upper bounds identified in theorem 6. Furthermore, the price sensitivity value   will 
affect the price of Nash solution significantly, cost will increase quickly and profits will 
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drop. Cases 1, 2 and 3 show that as       increases, costs also increase and producers 
have less incentive to produce. Cases 4 and 5 decrease the output level due to changes in 
the   matrix; in particular, case 5 illustrates rational inefficiency because firms hold 
back producing additional output in order to maximize profits. 
 
4.4.1 Existence and Uniqueness 
If a Nash equilibrium does not exist, there is no purpose in talking about its properties, 
identification, etc. Further, if multiple equilibria exist, it is not clear which might result 
in any particular case. In this section we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash 
equilibrium solution identified by the MCP. 
 
Theorem 4.7: MCP (4.9) generates a Nash equilibrium solution (         )   ̃.  
 
To get a unique Nash equilibrium, a strictly concave profit function is assumed. Given a 
convex production possibility set, theorem 4.8 states the uniqueness of the Nash 
equilibrium.  
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Table 4.3 Nash equilibrium in two-output two-variable-input production 
Case 1 2 3 4 5 
Variable                                                             
  or   
0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 1 0.02 0.05 0.02 1 0.02 0.05 0.02 
0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 1 0.02 0.04 0.02 10 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 1 0.02 0.04 
DC1 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 45.0 37.0 3.0 4.0 3.4 67.0 3.0 4.0 4.7 2.3 3.0 4.0 
DC2 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 55.0 32.0 3.2 5.2 45.0 37.0 2.4 4.0 3.8 50.0 2.2 3.3 4.7 2.3 2.2 3.3 
DC3 55.0 32.0 4.0 6.0 55.0 32.0 4.0 6.0 55.0 32.0 4.0 6.0 3.9 45.0 4.0 6.0 4.7 2.3 4.0 6.0 
DC4 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 65.0 27.0 4.4 6.4 45.0 37.0 2.8 4.0 3.6 58.5 2.7 3.8 4.7 2.3 2.7 3.8 
DC5 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 60.0 29.5 3.8 5.8 45.0 37.0 2.6 4.0 3.8 50.0 2.3 3.5 4.7 2.3 2.3 3.5 
DC6 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 45.0 37.0 3.0 4.0 3.4 67.0 3.0 4.0 4.7 2.3 3.0 4.0 
DC7 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 48.8 35.1 2.5 4.5 45.0 37.0 2.0 4.0 3.8 50.0 2.0 3.0 4.7 2.3 2.0 3.0 
DC8 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 65.0 27.0 4.4 6.4 45.0 37.0 2.8 4.0 3.6 58.5 2.7 3.8 4.7 2.3 2.7 3.8 
DC9 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 65.0 27.0 4.4 6.4 45.0 37.0 2.8 4.0 3.6 58.5 2.7 3.8 4.7 2.3 2.7 3.8 
DC10 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 45.0 37.0 3.0 4.0 3.4 67.0 3.0 4.0 4.7 2.3 3.0 4.0 
DC11 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 60.0 29.5 3.8 5.8 45.0 37.0 2.6 4.0 3.8 50.0 2.3 3.5 4.7 2.3 2.3 3.5 
DC12 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 48.8 35.1 2.5 4.5 45.0 37.0 2.0 4.0 3.8 50.0 2.0 3.0 4.7 2.3 2.0 3.0 
DC13 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 55.0 32.0 3.2 5.2 45.0 37.0 2.4 4.0 3.8 50.0 2.2 3.3 4.7 2.3 2.2 3.3 
DC14 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 45.0 37.0 3.0 4.0 3.4 67.0 3.0 4.0 4.7 2.3 3.0 4.0 
DC15 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 48.8 35.1 2.5 4.5 45.0 37.0 2.0 4.0 3.8 50.0 2.0 3.0 4.7 2.3 2.0 3.0 
DC16 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 65.0 27.0 4.4 6.4 45.0 37.0 2.8 4.0 3.6 58.5 2.7 3.8 4.7 2.3 2.7 3.8 
DC17 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 60.0 29.5 3.8 5.8 45.0 37.0 2.6 4.0 3.8 50.0 2.3 3.5 4.7 2.3 2.3 3.5 
DC18 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 48.8 35.1 2.5 4.5 45.0 37.0 2.0 4.0 3.8 50.0 2.0 3.0 4.7 2.3 2.0 3.0 
DC19 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 45.0 37.0 3.0 4.0 3.4 67.0 3.0 4.0 4.7 2.3 3.0 4.0 
DC20 70.0 24.5 5.0 7.0 48.8 35.1 2.5 4.5 45.0 37.0 2.0 4.0 3.8 50.0 2.0 3.0 4.7 2.3 2.0 3.0 
SUM 1385 498 99 139 1199 591 77 117 910 735 53 82 73 1114 51 73 94 46 51 73 
Price 20.8 2.4 57.7 37.5 28.2 2.4 56.2 148.2 39.8 2.4 54.3 851.1 4.8 4.0 54.0 33.9 4.8 2.4 54.0 33.9 
Revenue 29980 35257 37960 4782 558 
Cost 10933 21599 72653 5233 5233 
Profit 19047 13658 -34692 -451 -4675 
 
Theorem 4.8: If the profit function is a strictly concave function on (       )   ̃ that 
is continuous and differentiable and the price sensitivity matrices   and   satisfy the 
WDD property, then the Nash equilibrium solution found using MCP (4.9) is unique if a 
solution exists for the maximization problem. 
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4.4.2 Price Sensitivity and Returns to Scale 
It is necessary to understand the relationship between the price sensitivity matrices   and 
  and the returns to scale (RTS) properties of the Nash equilibrium benchmarks. To 
address RTS properties, we must first identify the “Most Productive Scale Size 
(MPSS)”. The production frontier is characterized by three regions: constant returns to 
scale (CRS), increasing returns to scale (IRS), and decreasing returns to scale (DRS). 
The MPSS can be identified for firm  ’s input and output mix using the input-oriented 
CRS DEA technique formulated in (4.10). If the sum of ∑            in the input-
oriented CRS DEA17 , we can identify such observations as operating at the MPSS 
(Banker, 1984):  
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  (4.10) 
Let       denote the set of observations having the MPSS property, one for each firm   
in the dataset, and let      and       be the Nash equilibrium solutions obtained from MCP 
(4.9). Using these additional observations as the reference set, optimization problem 
(4.11) can be used to identify the returns to scale property for each production plan in the 
Nash solution. 
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  . (4.11) 
                                                 
17 Note there are potential multiple optimal solutions. See Zhu (2000) for additional details. 
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For each Nash solution of firm  , if ∑  
      
    
       , firm   operates under 
increasing returns to scale; if ∑  
      
    
       , firm   operates under decreasing 
returns to scale; or if  ∑  
      
    
       , firm   operates under constant returns to 
scale.18The equation ∑  
      
    
      is termed the RTS index (RTSI).  
 For a one-input one-output production process, figure 4.4 depicts the true 
production function as a solid curve, the CRS estimated frontier as a straight dashed line, 
the VRS estimated frontier as a piece-wise linear bold dashed line, and the MPSS as 
Point B. In particular, based on theorem 4.6 the Nash equilibrium generated from MCP 
(4.9) should be located on the bold dashed lines.    and    are the upper and lower 
bounds for the variable input level as discussed below theorem 4.6.  
 
Corollary 4.2: Assume all input and output variables are normalized to eliminate unit 
dependence, and the price of outputs dominates the price of inputs to ensure a positive 
marginal profit. Given a production frontier including three portions: IRS, CRS, and 
DRS, the MCP (4.9) generates a Nash equilibrium solution that is characterized by DRS 
when the inverse demand and supply functions are less sensitive, or the Nash 
equilibrium is characterized by IRS when the inverse demand and supply functions are 
more sensitive.  
 
                                                 
18 In (4.9) note that both inputs and outputs are defined as adjustable; thus, all Nash equilibria are located 
on the production frontier. If this is not the case, for example if there are adjustment costs when changing 
input levels (Choi et al., 2006), then some equilibria may not be on the frontier as shown in figure 4.3. For 
these equilibria RTS are not defined because RTS is a frontier property.  In (4.11) if    is not equal to 1, 
then RTS may not defined for that production possibility; see for example Seiford and Zhu (1999) or Ray 
(2010). 
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Figure 4.4 Nash equilibrium on bold dashed lines 
 
 Extending the illustrative example in section 4.2, we use formulation (4.11) to 
identify the RTS property of the Nash equilibrium solution shown in table 4.3; DCs 3, 
10, 12, 15, and 19 are identified as operating at MPSS. Table 4.4 shows the RTS 
associated with the Nash solutions for cases 1 through 5 in table 4.3. Based on corollary 
4.2, the sensitivity of output and sensitivity of input are the two oppositional forces in 
terms of scale. Case 1 represents a baseline and the Nash solutions present CRS or DRS 
properties. The sensitivity parameter of the supply function in case 2 increases relative to 
case 1, which encourages firms to hold back on the consumption of inputs, i.e. more DCs 
operate at MPSS in case 2. If we further increase the sensitivity parameter of the supply 
function, all DCs operate at MPSS in case 3. Case 4 results in all firms operating at 
MPSS or IRS, by increasing the sensitivity parameter of the demand function and 
leaving the sensitivity parameter of the supply function parameter the same as in case 1. 
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Case 5 shows that all firms operate at IRS and on the weakly efficient portion of the 
frontier. This demonstrates the concept of rational inefficiency. 
 
Table 4.4 Returns to scale of Nash equilibrium 
Case 1 2 3 4 5 
 
                                                            
  or   
0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 1 0.02 0.05 0.02 1 0.02 0.05 0.02 
0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 1 0.02 0.04 0.02 10 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 1 0.02 0.04 
Returns to scale RTSI RTS RTSI RTS RTSI RTS RTSI RTS RTSI RTS 
DC1 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 0.104 I 
DC2 1.5 D 1 C 1 C 0.916 I 0.104 I 
DC3 1 C 1 C 1 C 0.685 I 0.104 I 
DC4 1.167 D 1 C 1 C 0.937 I 0.104 I 
DC5 1.333 D 1 C 1 C 0.873 I 0.104 I 
DC6 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 0.104 I 
DC7 1.556 D 1.084 D 1 C 1 C 0.104 I 
DC8 1.167 D 1 C 1 C 0.937 I 0.104 I 
DC9 1.167 D 1 C 1 C 0.937 I 0.104 I 
DC10 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 0.104 I 
DC11 1.333 D 1 C 1 C 0.873 I 0.104 I 
DC12 1.556 D 1.084 D 1 C 1 C 0.104 I 
DC13 1.5 D 1 C 1 C 0.916 I 0.104 I 
DC14 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 0.104 I 
DC15 1.556 D 1.084 D 1 C 1 C 0.104 I 
DC16 1.167 D 1 C 1 C 0.937 I 0.104 I 
DC17 1.333 D 1 C 1 C 0.873 I 0.104 I 
DC18 1.556 D 1.084 D 1 C 1 C 0.104 I 
DC19 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 0.104 I 
DC20 1.556 D 1.084 D 1 C 1 C 0.104 I 
Returns to Scale CRS or DRS CRS or DRS CRS CRS or IRS IRS 
* C, D and I indicate constant, decreasing, and increasing returns to scale respectively. 
 
4.4.3 Allocative Efficiency and Directional Distance Function 
The Nash equilibrium identified by using (4.9) is an allocatively efficient solution as 
shown in theorem 4.6. Zofio and Prieto (2006) suggest choosing the direction in the 
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direction distance function (DDF) to move towards the allocatively efficient point. We 
extend their suggestion to the case of oligopolistic markets and suggest that each firm 
should select the direction for improvement in the DDF to move towards its Nash 
equilibrium benchmark. 
The DDF as defined by Chambers et al. (1996; 1998) is the simultaneous 
contraction of inputs and expansion of outputs: 
 ⃗  ( 
         
 
   )          (         
 
      )      (4.12) 
where   is the distance measure and        are the direction vectors for variable inputs 
and outputs respectively. Recall that since we do not change the fixed inputs in the short 
run, no direction is associated with them. We estimate the DDF for firm   as: 
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.     (4.13) 
Because the method for selecting a direction (      ) is an open issue, the direction 
(    ) is usually chosen for simplicity. Alternatively, Frei and Harker (1999) determine 
the least-norm projection from an inefficient firm to the frontier, but this direction is 
non-proportional and is not unit-invariant. Färe et al. (2011) estimate an endogenous 
direction, but it is void of economic meaning. Therefore, we propose that firms’ 
direction for improvement move towards the allocatively efficient benchmark identified 
by the Nash equilibrium. Thus, the direction is firm-specific and can be calculated by 
following the equation for firm  : 
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where      and     are the benchmarks determined by the Nash equilibrium,     and    
are the vectors of the current variable input and output production, and ‖ ‖  is the 
Euclidean norm. This ratio imposes (      ) is a unit vector.19 
Extending the example in table 4.3, case 1, we calculate the direction of 
improvement associated with this example as shown in table 4.5. The results indicate 
that when trying to maximize overall economic efficiency20 using formulation (4.8) it is 
not necessary to contract the variable inputs and expand the outputs. To maintain higher 
price and profit maximization, firm   may achieve economic efficiency by changing its 
mix to become allocatively efficient. However, no firm takes a direction which increases 
all variable inputs and decreases all output levels as this would lead to a loss in profit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 The length of the directional vector influences the efficiency estimates in the DDF; the use of a unit 
vector has also been used in Fare et al. (2011). 
20 Economic efficiency is the product of allocative efficiency and technical efficiency, see for example 
Fried et al. (2008).  
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Table 4.5 Direction determination 
Case 1 
Direction (  
 
   ) 
            
DC1 0.0467 0.0467 0.7000 -0.7111 
DC2 0.0697 0.0697 0.6970 -0.7103 
DC3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0000 
DC4 -0.0445 0.0000 0.9785 0.2012 
DC5 0.0547 0.0710 0.8516 -0.5165 
DC6 0.0445 0.0222 0.9783 0.2012 
DC7 -0.0478 -0.0717 -0.2390 -0.9672 
DC8 0.0118 0.0118 0.8865 -0.4625 
DC9 0.0427 0.0427 0.5341 -0.8433 
DC10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0000 
DC11 0.0000 0.0000 0.5255 -0.8508 
DC12 0.1010 0.1010 0.8416 -0.5210 
DC13 0.0000 0.0000 0.9955 -0.0948 
DC14 0.0305 0.0914 0.9753 0.1988 
DC15 0.0532 0.0710 0.8875 -0.4522 
DC16 0.0617 0.0309 0.9878 0.1396 
DC17 -0.0503 -0.1006 0.0503 -0.9924 
DC18 0.0213 0.0213 0.9575 -0.2867 
DC19 0.0405 0.0607 0.5059 -0.8595 
DC20 0.0000 0.0265 0.3440 -0.9386 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
This study analyzes endogenous prices in productivity analysis. Given inverse demand 
and supply functions, a Nash equilibrium solution corresponding to profit maximization 
production plan within the production possibility set is identified using a mixed 
complementary problem (MCP). When the inverse demand and supply functions are 
constant functions, the standard analysis of efficiency assuming perfect competition and 
exogenous prices follows. For markets in which demand is heavily influence by the total 
supply quantity, firms seek to decrease their output levels and maintain higher product 
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prices to maximize profits. The proposed MCP model integrates oligopolistic market 
equilibrium and productivity analysis. We find that the resulting Nash equilibrium is an 
example of rational inefficiency.  
Deviating from standard economic analysis, we consider the production 
limitations estimated from observed data and interpret the Nash equilibrium as the 
benchmark, or the production plans each of the firms should work towards for more 
profitable production. Our work extends the efficiency literature on demand functions by 
considering multiple output production and allowing both outputs and variable inputs to 
be adjusted by the firm. Prior work primarily focused on individual firms decisions 
without consideration for the other firms in the market. 
The identification of a unique Nash equilibrium allows further insights to 
operational improvement strategies. We show the relationship between price sensitivity 
and returns to scale in the Nash equilibrium. Based on the concept of allocative 
efficiency, we conclude that the Nash equilibrium is a useful guide for determining 
direction in the directional distance function. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Summary 
The strategic position of productivity analysis in production planning is identified and a 
set of the new models to assess the effect of demand on productivity and efficiency 
measurement is investigated. 
 In chapter I, the functional position of productivity and efficiency analysis (PEA) 
within the production planning framework is defined. Performance benchmarking and 
production guidance are two services which PEA can provide. Furthermore, this study 
builds a bridge between PEA and demand management. 
 In chapter II, a two-dimensional efficiency decomposition (2DED) of 
profitability for a production system to account for the demand effect observed in 
productivity analysis is described. The first dimension identifies four components of 
efficiency: capacity design, demand generation, operations, and demand consumption, 
using Network Data Envelopment Analysis (Network DEA). The second dimension 
decomposes the efficiency measures and integrates them into a profitability efficiency 
framework. Thus, each component’s profitability change is analyzed based on technical 
efficiency change, scale efficiency change and allocative efficiency change. An 
empirical study based on data from 2006 to 2008 for the US airline industry finds that 
the regress of productivity is mainly caused by a demand fluctuation in 2007–2008 
rather than technical regression in production capabilities. 
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 In chapter III, a proactive DEA model to account for demand fluctuations while 
maximizing effective production is described. Demand fluctuations lead to variations in 
the output levels affecting technical efficiency measures. In the short-run, firms can 
adjust their variable resources to either increase production if demand increases or to 
reduce costs if demand decreases. The present study proposes a short-run capacity 
planning method, proactive DEA, that quantifies the effectiveness of the production 
system under demand uncertainty using a stochastic programming DEA (SPDEA) 
approach. This method estimates the expected value of effectiveness given the demand 
distribution. An empirical study of Japanese convenience stores is discussed to 
demonstrate the proposed model. The result shows that proactive SPDEA provides 
actionable advice regarding the level of variable inputs in uncertain demand 
environments. 
 In chapter IV, a Nash equilibrium in oligopolistic market is identified using an 
estimate of the production possibility set and an inverse demand function. The standard 
assumption in the efficiency literature that firms desire to produce on the production 
frontier may not hold in an oligopolistic market where the production decisions of all 
firms will determine the market price, i.e. an increase in a firm’s output level leads to a 
lower market clearing price and potentially-lower profits. This study identifies a Nash-
Cournot equilibrium and improvement targets which may not be on the production 
frontier. This behavior is referred to as rational inefficiency because the firm reduces its 
productivity levels in order to increase profits. For a general multiple input/output 
production process and allowing a firm to adjust its output levels and variable input 
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levels, the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium is proven. The 
relationship between the benchmark frontier, scale properties and allocative efficiency is 
discussed. When changes in quantity have a significant influence on price, more 
benchmark production plans are on the increasing returns to scale portion of the frontier. 
Additionally, a direction for improvement towards the allocatively efficient production 
plan is estimated, thus providing a solution to the direction selection issue in a 
directional distance analysis. 
 
5.2 Main Contributions 
This dissertation provides following contributions. 
1. Identifies the PEA function in production planning 
2. Develops a connection between PEA and demand management 
3. Proposes a hybrid system generalizing manufacturing and service systems 
4. Defines a two-dimensional efficiency decomposition of productivity 
5. Proposes a proactive DEA approach for addressing demand fluctuations 
6. Defines the truncated benchmark production function for effectiveness measure 
7. Identifies the source of rational inefficiency  
8. Develops the relationship between the price sensitivity of demand and an  
    allocatively efficient benchmarking production plan  
9. Determine the direction in the directional distance function analysis 
10. Conduct empirical studies in US airline, Japanese convenience store, and a set of  
      distribution center 
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5.3 Recommendations and Further Research 
In this research, a framework was constructed for productivity improvement and strategy 
identification. Some issues are recommended to improve this study. 
 In the network DEA study, in practice, the airline fleet is usually leased and thus 
a variable input, and employees are unionized are perhaps a fixed input. The truly fixed 
factors are the routes and the network structure. In addition, the airline study uses 
system-wide data and the demand effects in specific areas are not easy to interpreted. A 
study focusing on a specific route and city-pair would allow a detailed analysis of  the 
area/market level inefficiency. This focus could clarify the sources of inefficiency. 
 In the proactive DEA study, a single-variable-input and a single-output could be 
generalized to the multiple-input and multiple-output setting. This requires estimating a 
"directional" marginal product and extends the work of Podinovski and Førsund (2010). 
The demand for the various outputs could each be truncated and thus effectiveness 
would be defined in term of an aggregation. 
 In the rational inefficiency study, already addresses scale; however extend the 
concept to include scope issues is potentially interesting. Multiple products in different 
market structures may lead to a hybrid effect. In addition, classical production theory 
hypothesizes an S-shaped production function. Developing methods to estimate the Nash 
equilibria is a potentially challenging and interesting problem. The nonconvex 
production function may lead to multiple profit maximizing points. The additional 
information and economic criteria will need to be applied to select among the equilibria. 
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Further research should address the following issue. 
Noise consideration in PEA 
DEA is a nonparametric technique to estimate a production frontier without 
consideration noise. To improve the robustness of the analysis, Convex Nonparametric 
Least Squares (CNLS) and Stochastic non-smooth envelopment of data (StoNED) are 
two approaches to estimate a production function imposing only monotonicity and 
convexity on the function. For detail, see Hildreth (1954), Kuosmanen (2008), 
Kuosmanen and Johnson (2010), Kuosmanen and Kortelainen (2011), Johnson and 
Kuosmanen (2012), Lee et al. (2012).   
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPORTING MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER II 
 
Component profitability estimation by dual model 
The profitability represents the ratio equal to revenue by cost. First, the output and input 
factors are identified in each component respectively. Thus, their monetary value can be 
calculated for revenue gain and cost expenditure. Second, based on profitability, the 
profitability efficiency can be estimated and decomposed. The detail of profitability in 
each component is described below.  
 
Capacity Design Component 
 The revenue and cost are the monetary value of peak output and fixed input 
respectively. 
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Demand Generation Component 
The revenue and cost are the monetary value of expected demand and peak output 
respectively. 
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Operations Component 
 The revenue is the monetary value of actual output and the cost is the summation 
of the monetary value of variable input and expected demand respectively. 
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thq  actual output aqrsY . 
 
Demand Consumption Component 
 The revenue and cost are the monetary value of realized demand and actual 
output respectively. 
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Formulation of decomposition of profitability efficiency 
Profitability efficiency can be estimated by equation (A1). In particular, equation (A2) 
represents technical efficiency change, equation (A3) indicates scale efficiency change, 
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and (A4) represents allocative efficiency change. Each component takes the geometric 
mean of the input-oriented and output-oriented measures. 
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Here, the TE  and AE  follow the traditional definition of Fare et al. (1994) and Ray 
and Mukherjee (1996); however, the scale efficiency defined in Kuosmanen and 
Sipiläinen (2009) employs the dual perspective and characterizes the optimal scale size 
in terms of the profitability function. We use the dual approach because the traditional 
distance function will estimate different values under different assumptions regarding 
strong and weak disposability and congestion (McDonald, 1996). 
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Definition and raw data in US airline industry 
The data set of 15 US airline firms from 2006 to 2008 was primarily gathered from Air 
Carrier Financial Statistics and Air Carrier Traffic Statistics published by the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics at the Research and Innovative Technology Administration 
(RITA, 2009).  
Sources for inputs, demand, and output levels 
Aircraft fleet size (FS) is the average number of aircraft employed in a firm during 
a particular year. The make-up of the fleet for each firm is shown in AirSafe.com (2008).  
Fuel (FU) is the number of gallons consumed annually, estimated by fuel expenses 
over the average jet fuel cost per gallon. The fuel expenses and average jet fuel cost per 
gallon are found in the Transportation Statistics Annual Report 2008 published by the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS).  
Employee (EP) is the number of employees during the year, which includes flight 
shipping staff, pilots, flight attendants, and managers but not ground shipping drivers. 
The data of number of employees and salaries and benefits expenses are collected from 
individual annual financial reports, BTS and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and the related summary report shown in AirlineFinancials.com (2009).21 
Note that all demand and output measures come from Air Carrier Financial 
Statistics and Air Carrier Traffic Statistics. 
                                                 
21 The data of personnel structure of flight and ground shipping with respect to FedEx (Federal Express) 
and UPS (United Parcel Service) is estimated in FedEx official website (2010) and UPS official website 
(2010). 
  
Table A1 Raw data of US airline industry 2006-2008 
      Fixed input Variable input Peak Output Scheduled Demand Available Output Realized Demand 
      Aircraft Fuel Employee Passenger Freight Passenger Freight Passenger Freight Passenger Freight 
Firm No. Year Fleet Size 
price 
(106) 
Gals 
(106) price Units Wages 
Pasgr 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Ton 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Pasgr 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Ton 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Pasgr 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Ton 
-miles 
 (106) 
price 
Pasgr 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Ton 
-miles 
 (106) 
price 
AirTran A 2006 100 9.0  346  1.95 7415 52650 21363  0.13  959  0.54  13798  0.13  7  0.54  18984  0.13  852  0.54  13814  0.13  7  0.54  
Alaska B 2006 109 18.7  388  1.95 9307 82841 23263  0.13  1268  1.39  17814  0.13  64  1.39  23263  0.13  1268  1.39  17826  0.13  64  1.38  
American C 2006 800 24.2  2966  1.95 72757 85243 173940  0.13  13489  0.37  139392  0.13  2231  0.37  173940  0.13  13489  0.37  139451  0.13  2231  0.37  
American Eagle D 2006 85 40.8  317  1.95 13000 85243 15590  0.23  713  1.31  8420  0.23  0  1.31  11298  0.23  517  1.31  8420  0.23  0  1.31  
Continental E 2006 418 16.8  1556  1.95 39363 71895 104546  0.12  3568  0.39  76251  0.12  1006  0.39  93512  0.12  3191  0.39  76319  0.12  1006  0.39  
Delta Air Lines F 2006 1072 15.3  2215  1.95 45562 90602 173940  0.12  12984  0.39  98769  0.12  1239  0.39  125100  0.12  9338  0.39  98909  0.12  1239  0.39  
ExpressJet G 2006 78 2.9  116  1.95 6800 56864 13199  0.16  567  0.94  10296  0.16  1  0.94  13199  0.16  567  0.94  10298  0.16  1  0.94  
Federal Express H 2006 717 12.9  1670  1.95 122116 56709 0  N/A 16476  1.23  0  N/A 10426  1.23  0  N/A 16476  1.23  0  N/A 10543  1.22  
JetBlue Airways I 2006 116 26.4  403  1.95 9272 59642 28581  0.10  1112  0.49  23310  0.10  14  0.49  28581  0.10  1112  0.49  23310  0.10  14  0.49  
Northwest J 2006 523 19.9  1736  1.95 30729 86628 118763  0.12  10190  0.42  72588  0.12  2268  0.42  85582  0.12  7343  0.42  72690  0.12  2269  0.42  
SkyWest K 2006 132 10.3  518  1.95 8792 76656 31681  0.19  1539  1.11  9497  0.19  0  1.11  11954  0.19  581  1.11  9497  0.19  0  1.11  
Southwest L 2006 506 23.2  1096  1.95 32167 94880 126682  0.13  7870  0.78  67691  0.13  171  0.78  92662  0.13  5756  0.78  67782  0.13  171  0.78  
United M 2006 570 16.0  2474  1.95 55027 77507 142780  0.12  10969  0.37  117247  0.12  2048  0.37  142780  0.12  10969  0.37  117471  0.12  2048  0.37  
UPS N 2006 468 23.9  1362  1.95 176150 58683 0  N/A 10772  0.70  0  N/A 6262  0.70  0  N/A 10545  0.70  0  N/A 6270  0.70  
US Airways O 2006 386 4.2  1291  1.95 34462 60647 96497  0.14  6690  0.44  37357  0.14  279  0.44  47754  0.14  3311  0.44  37366  0.14  279  0.44  
AirTran A 2007 108 11.8  384  2.09 8304 54408 25343  0.13  992  0.55  17233  0.13  6  0.55  22680  0.13  888  0.55  17252  0.13  6  0.55  
Alaska B 2007 112 22.2  353  2.09 9680 79277 24197  0.13  1349  1.53  18446  0.13  58  1.53  24197  0.13  1349  1.53  18456  0.13  58  1.52  
American C 2007 798 23.9  2876  2.09 71818 85382 173669  0.13  13138  0.39  138417  0.13  2129  0.39  169856  0.13  12850  0.39  138448  0.13  2129  0.39  
American Eagle D 2007 86 40.5  315  2.09 13000 85382 15972  0.24  732  1.53  8340  0.24  0  1.53  11211  0.24  514  1.53  8340  0.24  0  1.53  
Continental E 2007 424 17.1  1605  2.09 40948 75046 106055  0.13  3650  0.43  81380  0.13  971  0.43  99061  0.13  3409  0.43  81428  0.13  972  0.43  
Delta Air Lines F 2007 912 9.8  2241  2.09 47286 88589 173940  0.12  12773  0.42  103279  0.12  1128  0.42  127323  0.12  9350  0.42  103450  0.12  1128  0.42  
ExpressJet G 2007 86 2.9  155  2.09 7500 58342 15885  0.16  741  1.02  10182  0.16  1  1.02  13729  0.16  640  1.02  10206  0.16  1  1.02  
Federal Express H 2007 715 14.6  1690  2.09 133258 56800 0  N/A 17189  1.23  0  N/A 10809  1.23  0  N/A 17189  1.23  0  N/A 10965  1.23  
JetBlue Airways I 2007 139 24.9  463  2.09 9713 66715 34367  0.10  1507  0.66  25722  0.10  16  0.66  32148  0.10  1410  0.66  25722  0.10  16  0.66  
Northwest J 2007 410 18.1  1616  2.09 29619 86701 94203  0.13  7747  0.41  72907  0.13  2059  0.41  86123  0.13  7082  0.41  73023  0.13  2067  0.41  
SkyWest K 2007 135 11.7  508  2.09 10249 70929 31507  0.18  1702  1.11  11564  0.18  0  1.11  14923  0.18  806  1.11  11564  0.18  0  1.11  
Southwest L 2007 523 24.8  1287  2.09 33680 95398 130958  0.12  7901  0.95  73493  0.12  136  0.95  103274  0.12  6231  0.95  73640  0.12  136  0.95  
United M 2007 581 16.4  2394  2.09 55160 77175 143368  0.13  11116  0.38  117376  0.13  2012  0.38  141838  0.13  10998  0.38  117399  0.13  2012  0.38  
UPS N 2007 489 24.4  1423  2.09 185300 74641 0  N/A 11539  0.70  0  N/A 6792  0.70  0  N/A 11539  0.70  0  N/A 6802  0.70  
US Airways O 2007 409 5.8  1141  2.09 34256 67200 102282  0.14  6368  0.44  43547  0.14  282  0.44  54427  0.14  3388  0.44  43567  0.14  282  0.44  
AirTran A 2008 109 11.7  390  3.06 8259 57501 25748  0.13  943  0.56  18745  0.13  6  0.56  23756  0.13  870  0.56  18789  0.13  6  0.56  
Alaska B 2008 115 25.0  380  3.06 9628 78781 25032  0.14  1407  1.76  18698  0.14  56  1.76  24183  0.14  1359  1.76  18715  0.14  57  1.76  
American C 2008 767 21.4  2665  3.06 70923 85219 169470  0.14  12905  0.43  131724  0.14  2014  0.43  163483  0.14  12449  0.43  131755  0.14  2014  0.43  
American Eagle D 2008 78 39.9  281  3.06 12000 85219 11564  0.30  567  1.98  7383  0.30  0  1.98  10370  0.30  509  1.98  7383  0.30  0  1.98  
Continental E 2008 461 18.6  1603  3.06 40630 70145 115362  0.14  4339  0.47  80428  0.14  950  0.47  99047  0.14  3726  0.47  80495  0.14  951  0.47  
Delta Air Lines F 2008 979 9.8  2068  3.06 47420 101265 173940  0.13  12460  0.48  105568  0.13  1217  0.48  128635  0.13  9214  0.48  105698  0.13  1217  0.48  
ExpressJet G 2008 77 2.9  75  3.06 6700 59335 11962  0.14  536  0.90  9088  0.14  1  0.90  11962  0.14  536  0.90  9144  0.14  1  0.90  
144 
  
Table A1 Raw data of US airline industry 2006-2008 (Cont.) 
      Fixed input Variable input Peak Output Scheduled Demand Available Output Realized Demand 
      Aircraft Fuel Employee Passenger Freight Passenger Freight Passenger Freight Passenger Freight 
Firm No. Year Fleet Size 
price 
(106) 
Gals 
(106) price Units Wages 
Pasgr 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Ton 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Pasgr 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Ton 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Pasgr 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Ton 
-miles 
 (106) 
price 
Pasgr 
-miles 
(106) 
price 
Ton 
-miles 
 (106) 
price 
Federal Express H 2008 723 15.0  1502  3.06 140000 55882 0  N/A 17189  1.37  0  N/A 10423  1.37  0  N/A 17152  1.37  0  N/A 10591  1.37  
JetBlue Airways I 2008 153 24.2  457  3.06 10177 68193 37888  0.12  1708  0.60  26069  0.12  26  0.60  32436  0.12  1462  0.60  26069  0.12  26  0.60  
Northwest J 2008 455 17.4  1716  3.06 29124 92776 113091  0.13  8545  0.46  71199  0.13  1636  0.46  83862  0.13  6337  0.46  71646  0.13  1643  0.46  
SkyWest K 2008 137 12.1  399  3.06 8987 80571 32196  0.18  1728  1.21  11156  0.18  0  1.21  14618  0.18  785  1.21  11156  0.18  0  1.21  
Southwest L 2008 547 25.2  1213  3.06 34680 96309 136995  0.14  9070  1.05  72320  0.14  138  1.05  99636  0.14  6597  1.05  72410  0.14  138  1.05  
United M 2008 560 15.5  2524  3.06 51536 83670 135480  0.13  10928  0.44  109804  0.13  1921  0.44  135480  0.13  10928  0.44  110062  0.13  1921  0.44  
UPS N 2008 500 25.3  1351  3.06 186000 61181 0  N/A 11966  0.82  0  N/A 6863  0.82  0  N/A 11966  0.82  0  N/A 6866  0.82  
US Airways O 2008 423 6.8  1299  3.06 32683 68262 105804  0.13  6080  0.48  60532  0.13  300  0.48  74106  0.13  4258  0.48  60567  0.13  300  0.48  
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Table A2 Technical, scale, allocative, profitability efficiency decomposition 
   Production System Design Generation Operations Consumption 
Firm Index Year ITE OTE ISE OSE IAE OAE ρE ITE OTE ISE OSE IAE OAE ρE ITE OTE ISE OSE IAE OAE ρE ITE OTE ISE OSE IAE OAE ρE ITE OTE ISE OSE IAE OAE ρE 
AirTran Airways A 2006 0.97 0.90 0.71 0.63 0.79 0.98 0.55 0.94 0.89 0.73 0.78 1.00 0.98 0.68 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.93 1.00 0.98 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.86 0.95 1.00 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.93 1.00 0.98 0.82 
Alaska Airlines B 2006 0.89 0.82 0.65 0.72 0.96 0.94 0.55 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.94 0.94 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.85 0.94 0.99 0.84 0.94 0.94 0.86 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.74 
American Airlines C 2006 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.89 
American Eagle  D 2006 0.92 0.60 0.42 0.56 0.84 0.96 0.32 0.92 0.72 0.51 0.65 1.00 0.99 0.46 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.64 0.86 1.00 0.64 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.80 
Continental E 2006 0.81 0.85 0.96 0.88 0.94 0.98 0.73 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.99 1.00 0.90 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Delta Air Lines F 2006 0.95 0.96 0.86 0.53 0.60 0.98 0.49 0.47 0.72 0.99 0.65 1.00 0.99 0.46 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.99 1.00 0.89 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.86 
ExpressJet airlines G 2006 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.66 1.00 1.00 0.66 1.00 1.00 0.58 0.58 1.00 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.85 
Federal Express H 2006 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
JetBlue Airways I 2006 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.78 0.95 0.97 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.83 0.94 1.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.92 
Northwest Airlines J 2006 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.66 0.68 1.00 0.66 0.75 0.72 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.82 0.92 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.98 1.00 0.95 
SkyWest Airlines K 2006 0.77 0.45 0.54 0.64 0.66 0.96 0.27 0.59 0.38 0.54 0.86 1.00 0.99 0.32 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.62 0.78 1.00 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.85 
Southwest Airline L 2006 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.73 0.75 0.88 0.56 0.73 0.73 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.69 0.88 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.89 0.88 0.74 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.89 0.88 0.74 
United Airlines M 2006 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.80 0.98 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.86 0.97 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.91 
United Parcel Service N 2006 0.88 0.86 0.99 0.73 0.72 1.00 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.93 
US Airways O 2006 0.45 0.46 0.92 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.40 0.53 0.49 0.91 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.48 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.86 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.76 0.78 0.97 0.72 0.94 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.85 
AirTran Airways A 2007 0.94 0.88 0.75 0.72 0.87 0.97 0.62 0.94 0.89 0.78 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.82 0.92 1.00 0.82 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.87 
Alaska Airlines B 2007 0.88 0.82 0.64 0.74 0.97 0.90 0.55 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.93 0.93 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.86 0.96 1.00 0.86 0.93 0.93 0.85 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.72 
American Airlines C 2007 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.70 0.96 1.00 0.70 0.96 0.98 0.88 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.84 0.99 1.00 0.84 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.90 
American Eagle  D 2007 0.91 0.58 0.41 0.58 0.84 0.93 0.31 0.91 0.71 0.50 0.65 1.00 0.99 0.45 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.63 0.88 1.00 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.79 
Continental E 2007 0.78 0.84 0.96 0.90 0.99 0.98 0.74 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.99 1.00 0.89 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.76 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Delta Air Lines F 2007 0.96 0.97 0.85 0.62 0.72 0.98 0.59 0.56 0.73 0.99 0.76 1.00 0.99 0.55 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.86 0.95 1.00 0.86 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.88 
ExpressJet airlines G 2007 0.91 0.80 0.65 0.72 0.95 0.98 0.56 0.94 0.86 0.59 0.65 1.00 0.99 0.56 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.86 1.00 0.99 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.94 0.93 0.84 0.86 1.00 0.99 0.79 
Federal Express H 2007 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
JetBlue Airways I 2007 0.99 0.98 0.79 0.75 0.88 0.93 0.68 0.94 0.94 0.85 0.86 1.00 0.98 0.79 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.95 0.98 0.93 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.85 0.94 1.00 0.85 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.95 0.98 0.93 0.86 
Northwest Airlines J 2007 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.79 0.79 1.00 0.77 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.83 0.91 1.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.95 
SkyWest Airlines K 2007 0.68 0.42 0.60 0.81 0.76 0.92 0.31 0.65 0.47 0.61 0.86 1.00 0.98 0.40 0.96 0.96 0.85 0.87 0.96 0.95 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.67 0.78 1.00 0.67 0.96 0.96 0.85 0.87 0.97 0.95 0.79 
Southwest Airline L 2007 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.74 0.77 0.87 0.55 0.79 0.79 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.73 0.85 0.86 0.93 0.93 0.88 0.87 0.69 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.86 0.92 0.93 0.88 0.87 0.69 
United Airlines M 2007 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.79 0.95 1.00 0.78 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.84 0.97 1.00 0.84 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.91 
United Parcel Service N 2007 0.88 0.86 0.98 0.72 0.72 1.00 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.65 0.92 1.00 0.65 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.92 
US Airways O 2007 0.54 0.55 0.92 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.47 0.54 0.53 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.51 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.97 0.84 0.86 0.99 0.74 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.89 
AirTran Airways A 2008 0.98 0.97 0.81 0.70 0.82 0.97 0.66 0.95 0.92 0.79 0.83 1.00 0.99 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.99 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.79 0.87 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.99 1.00 0.91 
Alaska Airlines B 2008 0.87 0.79 0.62 0.71 0.93 0.89 0.50 0.98 0.97 0.74 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.73 0.94 0.94 0.84 0.90 0.89 0.83 0.70 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.83 0.88 0.99 0.82 0.94 0.94 0.84 0.90 0.89 0.84 0.70 
American Airlines C 2008 0.98 0.99 0.76 0.70 0.93 1.00 0.69 0.94 0.96 0.90 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.98 0.99 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.84 0.99 1.00 0.84 0.98 0.99 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.89 
American Eagle  D 2008 0.99 0.65 0.38 0.48 0.79 0.96 0.30 0.99 0.90 0.47 0.58 1.00 0.90 0.47 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.67 0.86 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.74 1.00 1.00 0.74 
Continental E 2008 0.77 0.84 0.96 0.85 0.95 0.98 0.70 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.99 1.00 0.90 0.77 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.88 0.89 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.77 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 
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Table A2 Technical, scale, allocative, profitability efficiency decomposition (Cont.) 
   Production System Design Generation Operations Consumption 
Firm Index Year ITE OTE ISE OSE IAE OAE ρE ITE OTE ISE OSE IAE OAE ρE ITE OTE ISE OSE IAE OAE ρE ITE OTE ISE OSE IAE OAE ρE ITE OTE ISE OSE IAE OAE ρE 
Delta Air Lines F 2008 0.99 0.99 0.84 0.63 0.74 0.98 0.61 0.52 0.74 0.98 0.71 1.00 0.98 0.52 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.86 0.94 1.00 0.86 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.89 
ExpressJet airlines G 2008 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.53 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.81 0.99 1.00 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.82 
Federal Express H 2008 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.97 1.00 0.93 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 
JetBlue Airways I 2008 0.97 0.97 0.84 0.73 0.82 0.94 0.67 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.89 1.00 0.98 0.75 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.94 0.88 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.85 0.92 1.00 0.85 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.88 
Northwest Airlines J 2008 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.72 0.72 0.99 0.68 0.78 0.76 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.81 0.85 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.95 
SkyWest Airlines K 2008 0.77 0.49 0.64 0.71 0.67 0.93 0.33 0.64 0.46 0.61 0.85 1.00 0.99 0.39 0.93 0.93 0.85 0.87 0.97 0.95 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.69 0.77 1.00 0.69 0.95 0.95 0.85 0.87 0.97 0.95 0.78 
Southwest Airline L 2008 0.85 0.87 0.83 0.72 0.76 0.86 0.54 0.73 0.73 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.69 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.86 0.85 0.69 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.87 0.86 0.69 
United Airlines M 2008 0.96 0.98 0.84 0.75 0.90 1.00 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.91 0.98 0.99 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.84 0.97 1.00 0.84 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.91 0.98 0.99 0.88 
United Parcel Service N 2008 0.83 0.81 0.99 0.79 0.78 1.00 0.64 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.72 0.96 1.00 0.72 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.90 
US Airways O 2008 0.71 0.72 0.93 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.62 0.70 0.70 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.95 0.66 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.99 0.93 0.92 0.98 0.79 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.90 
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Profitability efficiency change in airline firms 
Table A3 2DED of airline firms 
      Production Design Generation Operations Consumption 
Firm # Year 
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
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
 
T
 
S
 
A
 

 
T
 
S
 
A
 
AirTran 
Airways 
A 
06-07 1.12 0.97 1.10 1.04 1.08 1.00 1.07 1.01 1.06 1.05 1.01 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.97 0.99 1.06 1.05 1.01 1.00 
07-08 1.07 1.07 1.03 0.97 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.05 0.99 1.01 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.05 1.05 0.99 1.01 
GM 1.09 1.02 1.06 1.00 1.05 1.01 1.04 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.05 1.05 1.00 1.00 
Alaska 
Airlines 
B 
06-07 0.99 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.98 
07-08 0.92 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.98 1.01 0.99 0.98 
GM 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.98 
American 
Airlines 
C 
06-07 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.97 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 
07-08 0.99 0.98 1.02 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.02 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 
GM 0.99 0.99 1.01 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00 
American 
Eagle 
Airlines 
D 
06-07 0.95 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.01 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 
07-08 0.96 1.11 0.88 0.99 1.03 1.18 0.91 0.95 0.94 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.07 0.99 0.94 1.00 0.94 1.00 
GM 0.96 1.04 0.94 0.99 1.00 1.07 0.95 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.03 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.96 1.00 
Continental E 
06-07 1.02 0.98 1.01 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
07-08 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.92 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 
GM 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 
Delta 
Air Lines 
F 
06-07 1.19 1.01 1.08 1.09 1.19 1.10 1.08 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.02 1.02 1.00 0.99 
07-08 1.03 1.02 0.99 1.02 0.94 0.98 0.96 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.00 
GM 1.11 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.04 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.00 
ExpressJet 
Airlines 
G 
06-07 0.84 0.85 1.03 0.96 0.95 0.90 1.06 1.00 0.92 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.93 1.00 1.00 
07-08 1.28 1.17 1.05 1.04 0.96 1.11 0.86 1.00 1.03 1.07 0.96 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.03 1.07 0.96 1.00 
GM 1.04 1.00 1.04 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.03 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00 
Federal 
Express 
H 
06-07 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
07-08 0.96 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 
GM 0.98 0.98 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 
JetBlue 
Airways 
I 
06-07 0.90 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.94 0.94 1.01 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.97 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.97 
07-08 0.99 0.99 1.02 0.97 0.94 0.92 1.03 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.02 0.98 1.03 1.00 1.01 1.01 
GM 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.93 1.02 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 
Northwest 
Airlines 
J 
06-07 1.16 0.97 1.10 1.08 1.27 1.25 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.98 
07-08 0.89 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.89 0.84 1.02 1.03 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.97 1.02 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 
GM 1.02 0.98 1.02 1.02 1.06 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.99 0.99 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.01 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 
SkyWest 
Airlines 
K 
06-07 1.13 0.91 1.19 1.05 1.24 1.17 1.06 1.00 0.94 0.96 1.02 0.96 1.08 1.00 1.08 1.00 0.94 0.96 1.02 0.96 
07-08 1.05 1.16 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.04 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 
GM 1.09 1.02 1.07 1.00 1.10 1.07 1.03 1.00 0.95 0.96 1.01 0.98 1.06 1.00 1.06 1.00 0.96 0.97 1.01 0.98 
Southwest 
Airline 
L 
06-07 0.98 0.97 0.99 1.01 1.06 1.08 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.98 
07-08 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.92 1.02 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.00 0.99 
GM 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 
United 
Airlines 
M 
06-07 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
07-08 0.93 0.97 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.99 
GM 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 
United 
Parcel 
Service  
N 
06-07 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.01 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.03 0.96 0.99 0.98 1.02 1.00 
07-08 1.04 0.95 1.05 1.04 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.11 1.00 1.09 1.02 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 
GM 1.02 0.97 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.97 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.06 0.99 0.98 0.97 1.01 1.00 
US 
Airways 
O 
06-07 1.18 1.21 1.00 0.98 1.06 1.04 1.02 0.99 1.04 1.03 1.00 1.01 1.04 0.92 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.00 1.01 
07-08 1.30 1.31 1.00 0.99 1.29 1.31 0.99 0.99 1.02 1.02 1.00 0.99 1.07 0.98 1.07 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.00 
GM 1.24 1.26 1.00 0.99 1.17 1.17 1.01 0.99 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.05 0.95 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.01 
Airline 
Industry 
 
 
 
06-07 1.035 0.999 1.024 1.012 1.052 1.039 1.014 0.998 0.995 0.998 1.003 0.994 0.990 0.993 0.999 0.999 0.996 0.999 1.003 0.994 
07-08 0.996 1.015 0.994 0.987 0.989 0.990 0.999 1.001 0.985 0.992 0.998 0.994 1.009 0.998 1.014 0.997 0.988 0.993 0.998 0.997 
GM 1.015 1.007 1.009 0.999 1.020 1.014 1.007 0.999 0.990 0.995 1.000 0.994 1.000 0.995 1.007 0.998 0.992 0.996 1.001 0.995 
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Table A4 2006-2008 change of production system in airline firms 
Firm Firm E  TE  SE  AE  
AirTran Airways A 1.091 1.021 1.063 1.005 
Alaska Airlines B 0.953 0.986 0.986 0.980 
American Airlines C 0.985 0.991 1.013 0.982 
American Eagle Airlines D 0.959 1.037 0.938 0.985 
Continental E 0.980 0.985 0.992 1.003 
Delta Air Lines F 1.109 1.018 1.037 1.051 
ExpressJet Airlines G 1.041 1.000 1.041 1.000 
Federal Express H 0.982 0.983 1.005 0.993 
JetBlue Airways I 0.945 0.986 0.999 0.959 
Northwest Airlines J 1.017 0.978 1.024 1.016 
SkyWest Airlines K 1.091 1.023 1.071 0.996 
Southwest Airline L 0.974 0.987 0.992 0.995 
United Airlines M 0.957 0.984 0.992 0.980 
United Parcel Service N 1.015 0.973 1.022 1.021 
US Airways O 1.243 1.260 0.999 0.987 
Industry (Avg) 1.015 1.007 1.009 0.999 
Max 1.243 1.260 1.071 1.051 
Min 0.945 0.973 0.938 0.959 
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Firm distribution of efficiency change 
 
Figure A1 Firm distribution of TE  and AE  
 
 
Figure A2 Firm distribution of SE  and AE  
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APPENDIX B 
MODEL CONVEXIFICATION FOR CHAPTER III 
 
The terms 
qsu , 
V
jsv , jrst  and qsw  will be replaced by 
qsue
 , 
V
jsve

, jrste   and qswe  respectively; 
specifically, 
qsqs uu ln , 
V
js
V
js vv ln
 , 
jrsjrs tt ln and qsqs ww ln , and constraints 
qsuln , 
V
jsv

ln , 0ln  jrst  and qswln  are added to restrict the variables, 
where   is a smaller positive value. Note in this study 1q  for single output case. 
Then, let the nonlinear term qrsqrs
u
bze qs 11 
 , it  can be convexified using the following 
constraints. 
qzMebzMe qrs
u
qrsqrs
u qsqs 

  ,)11(1)11(  (3.18.1) 
qMzbMz qrsqrsqrs    ,111  (3.18.2) 
Similarly, other nonlinear terms can be transformed, qjrsjrsqrs azz 1221  , 
qrsqrsqrs azz 1331  , qjrsqrsjrsqrs azzz 123321  , qjrsjrs
u
bze qs 22 
 , qjrsjrsqrs
u
bzze qs 1221 
 , 
qrsqrsqrs
u
bzze qs 1331 
  , qjrsqrsjrsqrs
u
bzzze qs 123321 
 , qjrsqrs
tu
gze jrsqs 11 
 , 
qjrsjrs
tu
gze jrsqs 22 
 , qjrsjrsqrs
tu
gzze jrsqs 1221 
 , qjrsqrsqrs
tu
gzze jrsqs 1331 
 , 
qjrsqrsjrsqrs
tu
gzzze jrsqs 123321 
 . 
 
Finally, the model (3.9.1)-(3.9.17) can be reformulated as an solvable equivalent 
geometric programming with exponential-based convex functions (3.19.1)-(3.19.43). 
  
152 
  
j
jrsjrs
E
rs ddM )(Min      (3.19.1) 
s
q
qrs
w
j
V
jrjr
tv
j
V
jrjr
v
j
V
jr
v
i
F
ir
F
is
s
q
qrs
w
j
V
jrjr
tV
jrjr
v
j
V
jr
v
i
F
ir
F
is
s
q
qrs
w
j
jrs
V
jr
v
i
F
ir
F
is
E
rs
vDeXReXReXeXv
vDeXReXReXeXv
vDedXeXvts
qsjrs
V
js
V
js
V
js
qsjrs
V
js
V
js
qs
V
js
0
0
0
2               
)2(               
)(     ..













 (3.19.2) 
 
  
  










 
 
 

 
  























































q
u
q
qrsqrsqrs
u
q j
qrsqrs
V
jrjr
t
jrs
V
qjr
u
qrsqrs
q j
V
jrjr
tV
qjr
u
qrsqrs
q j
V
jrjrjrs
V
qjr
u
qrsqrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjr
u
q j
qrsqrs
V
jrjr
t
jrs
V
qjr
u
qrsqrs
q j
V
jrjrjrs
V
qjr
u
q
qrsqrsqr
u
q j
qrs
V
jrjr
t
jrs
V
qjr
u
qrs
q j
V
jrjr
tV
qjr
u
qrs
q j
V
jrjrjrs
V
qjr
u
qrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjr
u
q j
qrs
V
jrjr
t
jrs
V
qjr
u
qrs
q j
V
jrjrjrs
V
qjr
u
q
qrsqr
u
q j
V
jrjr
t
jrs
V
qjr
u
q j
V
jrjr
tV
qjr
u
q j
V
jrjrjrs
V
qjr
u
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjr
u
q j
V
jrjr
t
jrs
V
qjr
u
q j
V
jrjrjrs
V
qjr
u
q
qr
u
q
u
q
qrsqrsqrs
u
q
qrsqrs
j
V
jrjr
tV
jrjrjrs
V
qjrjrs
V
qjr
u
q
qrsqrsqr
u
q j
qrs
V
jrjr
tV
jrjrjrs
V
qjrjrs
V
qjr
u
q
qrsqr
u
q j
V
jrjr
tV
jrjrjrs
V
qjrjrs
V
qjr
u
q
qr
u
q
u
q
qrsqrsqrs
u
q
qrsqrs
u
q
qrsqrsqrs
u
q
qrsqrs
j
jrs
V
qjr
u
q
qrsqrsqr
u
q
qrsqrs
u
q j
qrsjrs
V
qjr
u
q
qrsqr
u
q j
jrs
V
qjr
u
q
qr
u
qrsqrsqrsqrsqrs
j
jrs
V
qjrqrqrsqrs
j
jrs
V
qjrqr
q
u
qrsqrsqrsqrsqrsqrsqrsqrsqrs
q
u
qrs
c
qrsqrsqrsqrs
q
u
q
E
qrs
u
qsqsjrsqsjrsqs
qs
qsjrsqs
qsqs
jrsqsjrsqs
qs
qsjrsqsqs
qsjrsqsjrsqs
qs
qsjrsqsqsqs
qsqsjrsqsqs
jrsqsqs
jrsqsqs
qsqsqs
qsqsqsqs
qsqsqsqs
qs
qs
qsqs
ezzDezzXRezezzXRee
zzXRze
zzXRezzXReze
zzXRzezzYe
zXRezezXRee
zXRze
zXRezXRezezXRze
zYeXRezeXRee
XRze
XReXRezeXRzeYe
ezzDezzXReXRzzezzYe
zXReXRzzezYe
XReXRzzeYe
ezzDezDe
zzDezzdezzYezDe
zdezYedeYe
zzDzDdYDzdYe
zzDzDyDzye
zyDzyeye



















1321322132
132
131322
13213
12212
12
112212
1222
2
222
13213)2)()21(2(13
1)2)()21(2(1
)2)()21(2(
131
1313131
11
1)]31(3))[(()11)((
1)]31(3)[()11(
1)11()(        
 
  
153 


















q
u
q
qrsqrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q
qrqrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q
qrqrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjr
tu
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjr
u
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q j
V
jrjr
V
qjrqjrs
q
qr
u
qs
jrsqs
qsqs
eDbXRgXRgXRb
XRbXRgXRbYb
XRgXRgXRb
XRbXRgXRb
YbXRgXReXRb
XReXRgXRbYe






1322123213123
13212312313
2122112
121212
12222
222
 (3.19.3) 
rkvYeXeXv s
q
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qzMebzMe qrs
u
qrsqrs
u qsqs 

  ,)11(1)11(  (3.19.6) 
qMzbMz qrsqrsqrs    ,111  (3.19.7) 
qjzMebzMe jrs
u
qjrsjrs
u qsqs 

,  ,)21(2)21(  (3.19.8) 
qjMzbMz jrsqjrsjrs  ,  ,222  (3.19.9) 
qjaMebaMe qjrs
u
qjrsqjrs
u qsqs 

,  ,)121(12)121(  (3.19.10) 
qjMabMa qjrsqjrsqjrs  ,  ,121212  (3.19.11) 
qjzMzazMz jrsqrsqjrsjrsqrs  ,  ,)21(112)21(1  (3.19.12) 
qjMzaMz jrsqjrsjrs  ,  ,2122  (3.19.13) 
qaMebaMe qrs
u
qrsqrs
u qsqs 

  ,)131(13)131(  (3.19.14) 
qMabMa qrsqrsqrs    ,131313  (3.19.15) 
qzMzazMz qrsqrsqrsqrsqrs    ,)31(113)31(1  (3.19.16) 
qMzaMz qrsqrsqrs    ,3133  (3.19.17) 
qjaMebaMe qjrs
u
qjrsqjrs
u qsqs 

,  ,)1231(123)1231(  (3.19.18) 
qjMabMa qjrsqjrsqjrs  ,  ,123123123  (3.19.19) 
qjzMaazMa qrsqjrsqjrsqrsqjrs  ,  ,)31(12123)31(12  (3.19.20) 
qjMzaMz qrsqjrsqrs  ,  ,31233  (3.19.21) 
qjzMegzMe qrs
tu
qjrsqrs
tu jrsqsjrsqs 

,  ,)11(1)11(  (3.19.22) 
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qjMzgMz qrsqjrsqrs  ,  ,111  (3.19.23) 
qjzMegzMe jrs
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qjrsjrs
tu jrsqsjrsqs 

,  ,)21(2)21(  (3.19.24) 
qjMzgMz jrsqjrsjrs  ,  ,222  (3.19.25) 
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,  ,)121(12)121(  (3.19.26) 
qjMagMa qjrsqjrsqjrs  ,  ,121212  (3.19.27) 
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qjrsqrs
tu jrsqsjrsqs 

,  ,)131(13)131(  (3.19.28) 
qjMagMa qrsqjrsqrs  ,  ,131313  (3.19.29) 
qjaMegaMe qjrs
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qjrsqjrs
tu jrsqsjrsqs 
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,  ,)1231(123)1231(  (3.19.30) 
qjMagMa qjrsqjrsqjrs  ,  ,123123123  (3.19.31) 
 
Similar to the term  

q
E
qrs
u
ye qs )(   and equations (3.19.3)-(3.19.31), we can give 
exponential-based formulation of  

q
E
qrs
w
ye qs )(   and add new variables and 
constraints to handle constraint 1)()(  

q
E
qrs
w
q
E
qrs
u
yeye qsqs  . 
qMzDyD qrsqrsqrsqrs    ,3)(  (3.19.32) 
qzMDyD qrsqrsqrsqrs    ),31()(  (3.19.33) 
qz qrs    },1,0{3  (3.19.34) 
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jzMd jrsjrs    ,)21(         (3.19.38) 
jddd jrsjrsjrs 
   ,         (3.19.39) 
jXReXRd Vjrjr
tV
jrjrjrs
jrs 

  ,2  (3.19.40) 
qwu qsqs    ,ln  ,ln  , and jtv jrs
V
js 

  ,0ln  ,ln   (3.19.41) 
  qjzzz qrsjrsqrs    ,  ,1,03,2,1         (3.19.42) 
jivdd Fisjrsjrs 
 ,  ,0,,         (3.19.43) 
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Miscellaneous 
The minimum function ),min( qrsqrsqrs
c
qrs DDyy   in constraint (3.9.6) can be 
transformed into (3.17.3)-(3.17.8). 
qzDzDw
zDzDyy
qrsqrsqrsqrsqrs
qrsqrsqrsqrsqrs
c
qrs


  ),31(31       
)31(3)(
 (3.17.3) 
qMzDyD qrsqrsqrsqrs    ,3)(  (3.17.4) 
qzMDyD qrsqrsqrsqrs    ),31()(  (3.17.5) 
qz qrs    },1,0{3  (3.17.6) 
qzMywzMy qrsqrsqrsqrsqrs    ,)31(1)31(  (3.17.7) 
qMzwMz qrsqrsqrs    ,313  (3.17.8) 
 
Then, constraint (3.9.6) can be linearized further as follows. 
 
qwzDwy
zyDzyy
qrsqrsqrsqrsqrs
qrs
c
qrsqrsqrsqrs
E
qrs


  ,312       
1)11(
 (3.17.9) 
qzMywzMy qrsqrsqrsqrsqrs    ,)11(2)11(  (3.17.10) 
qMzwMz qrsqrsqrs    ,121  (3.17.11) 
qzMywzMy qrs
c
qrsqrsqrs
c
qrs    ,)11(3)11(  (3.17.12) 
qMzwMz qrsqrsqrs    ,131  (3.17.13) 
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APPENDIX C 
SUPPORTING DISCUSSIONS FOR CHAPTER IV 
 
Instrumental Variables 
The inverse demand function in an oligopolistic market depends on the output levels of 
all firms.  However, in some cases other factors influence the price. Three cases are 
discussed below. In the body of the paper we assume the simplest case, (1) estimating 
the inverse demand function with no omitted variables,             , and 
 (    )   ,     (     ) i.i.d. and a regression model using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and  (        )        . However, if there exist omitted variables    
which affect price   , such that                   where     (     )  
alternative cases need to be considered.22 In case (2), OLS can still provide consistent 
estimates when  (    )   ,  (    )    and the quantity variable    is uncorrelated 
with the omitted variable, i.e.  (   )   . Thus, the regression generates  (      
  )    
     , where          (  ) . In case (3), if    is correlated with the 
omitted variable  (   )   , let          , which results in  (    )   .  
Case 3 is termed endogeneity in econometrics; OLS provides inconsistent, 
biased, and inefficient estimates for the   parameters of interest (Greene, 2011). To 
address this issue, we use an instrumental variable    that is highly correlated with    
but independent of   and   , specifically   (    )   ,  (    )   . The regression 
                                                 
22 The omitted variable could be the price or quantity of substitute products or other contextual factors that 
could affect the price of output q. 
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model can be rewritten as                 , and OLS can provide consistent 
estimates and  (        )         . As described in section 3.1, our paper focuses 
on an inverse demand function expressed and estimated by a linear function  ( )  
     , where    is the intercept corresponding to case 1. However, if endogeneity 
exists in the inverse demand model, we can identify instrumental variables using the 
methods described in Goldberger (1972), Morgan (1990), and Angrist and Krueger 
(2001). Note that when output quantity changes, we assume a change in supply curve 
rather than a change in quantity supplied.  
 
Weak, Moderate, and Strong Dominance Properties 
Lemma 4.3: In the two-output product case, if matrix   satisfies MDD and symmetric 
properties, then matrix   satisfies SDD. 
 
Proof: If matrix   satisfies MDD and symmetric properties, it will spontaneously lead to 
the transitivity property, which implies that the main effect of each product dominates 
the minor effect of the other products, i.e. the SDD property. 
 
Lemma 4.4: If price sensitivity matrix   satisfies the SDD property, then solving MCP 
(4.5) generates a solution such that       and   (    (  ))    where  (       )  
 ̃. 
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Proof:   (    (  ))         ∑                 , that is   (    (  ))  
       ∑          . If              , then   (    (  ))    and the revenue 
function is nonnegative. The case                 will not happen because, 
given   (    (  ))            ∑          the increase of revenue through the 
increase of price   (    (  ))    cannot exceed the decrease of revenue through the 
increase of price   (    (  ))    when     becomes smaller and smaller and       
since price   (    (  ))  is not sensitive with respect to     by symmetric   and 
        for all  . Thus, the preferred solution for revenue maximization problem is 
     . Similar to the impossible case                , by the SDD property 
we have   (    (  ))    which will cause       to maximize revenue. If     
           , then we have   (    (  ))   . Similar to lemma 4.2, we have 
solution           to maximize the revenue function ∑   (    (  ))      . 
Therefore, the case             will not happen. Moreover, if price sensitivity 
matrix   is symmetric and satisfies the WDD property, and         for all q, then, as 
lemma 4.3, solving MCP (4.5) will automatically generate       and   (   (  ))    
where  (       )   ̃. 
 Lemma 4.4 shows a case of SDD of sensitivity matrix  . The WDD or MDD 
properties are not enough to ensure       in MCP (4.5). That is, if   is not symmetric 
or violates MDD, then for some      a Nash equilibrium solution may set       . We 
illustrate this in two cases below.  
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Case 1: If price sensitivity matrix   satisfies MDD but not symmetry and we know that 
if        , then  (    (  ))         ∑                 . We have     
  (   (  )) ∑               
   
 
  
        ∑          ∑               
   
. Finally,     
  
 
    
 
∑       
 
 ∑
   
    
      ∑
   
    
    
    
    
   . Thus,     might be less than zero 
and   (    (  ))    for the revenue maximization problem as         and     
 . 
 
Case 2: If price sensitivity matrix   satisfies WDD and symmetric properties, in an 
extreme case, if for one product  , we  have    
   
    , this notation means the ratio 
approaches 1 from the left-hand side. We know     
  (   (  )) ∑               
   
 
  
        ∑          ∑               
   
. Then,     
  
 
    
 
∑       
 
 
∑      
 
 
∑       
 
 
    
    
. Thus,     might be less than zero and   (    (  ))    for the revenue 
maximization problem since     and     are large, and         and      .  
 
Therefore, to ensure       from formulation (4.5), the SDD property provides 
a sufficient condition based on lemma 4. If matrix   satisfies SDD and given an extreme 
case, for all  ,    ( )   ( ) 
   
    this notation means the ratio approaches 0 from the 
right-hand side. If we know     
  (   (  )) ∑               
   
, then we can obtain an 
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estimate of     
  
     ∑        ∑          ∑               
    
 
  
     ∑            
    
   
for the revenue maximization problem. 
 
Cost minimization case 
In the case of a single fixed input and a single variable input and a given output level, 
figure C1 illustrates the Nash equilibrium solution obtained by minimizing costs. Each 
firm attempts to adjust its variable input to reach the isoquant, holding a fixed input 
constant in the short run.  
 
Figure C1 Adjusted variable input in Nash equilibrium 
 
We construct a multi-input cost model to identify a Nash equilibrium solution using 
MCP. The result shows that the Nash equilibrium solution is on the production frontier 
regardless of the   matrix selected. In particular, to formulate the MCP with multiple 
variable inputs, first we define the Lagrangian function as: 
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  (   
                       )   ∑ ∑   
  (  
   (  )
 )   
 
   ∑ ∑     (      
∑        )  ∑ ∑      (∑        
     
  )  ∑ ∑      (∑        
     
  )  
∑    (∑       ) .  
Then the resulting MCP problem is:  
  
   
    
  (   
  (  
   (  )
 )        
  ∑       
 
        )     
             
  
   
    
 (∑          ∑        
 
  ∑        
 
     )                 
  (    ∑        )                      (4.15) 
  (∑        
     
 )                  
  (∑        
     
 )                  
  (∑       )        
 
Theorem 4.9: In the cost minimization case a Nash equilibrium generated from MCP 
(4.15) exists on the production frontier, given an arbitrary   matrix with all nonnegative 
components satisfying WDD. 
 
Proof: Proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium is similar to theorem 4.7. The Nash 
equilibrium generated from MCP will stay on the production frontier, given an arbitrary 
  matrix satisfying WDD. If an equilibrium output vector exists and        , then it 
must satisfy the first order condition of MCP. From the complementary condition, we 
have the following first order condition: 
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  (  
   (  )
 )        
  ∑      
 
   
                
which can be expressed in matrix notation as: 
    
 
          
              
where   is a matrix with (         ) and each vector     (           ) .   is a vector 
(     )  with K elements.    
 
 is a price vector with elements   
  
 
.     is a vector of 
the Lagrangian multiplier with elements     . If     is the solution obtained from the 
first order condition, we need to show that    
 
(  
    (  )
  )    
  
 
      
   
∑      
  
      for all  . We express this equation in the matrix notation    
 
      . 
Obviously, the first order condition gives    
 
           
         if    
 
 
  and   have nonnegative elements. This implies that it is necessary to set (∑          
   
 )    in terms of MCP; the upper bound of input level is characterized by the least 
value at the free disposability hull of inputs and the lower bound is the input level 
described by the free disposability hull of outputs shown in theorem 6. Because 
(∑        
     
 )   , that is, for cost minimization, the whole quantity of supply 
market would be minimized to reach a lower price at the inverse supply function, a 
firm’s best strategy is to reduce its input level and to produce on the production frontier. 
 
Generalized profit model as revenue maximization case 
In a special case of the revenue model, we assume that the output level directly follows 
the variable input, namely, the level of variable input determines and controls the level 
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of output. For example, in the semiconductor manufacturing industry raw silicon wafers 
are released into the production line to generate the actual die output. If the yield is 
100%, the output level is a linear function of the variable input level. Assuming a 
constant unit cost of the variable input, we formulate the profit maximization model as:  
          
{
 
 ∑ ∑   
 (    (  ))     
 ∑ ∑   
  (    (  ))     
||
∑                     
∑        
     
          
∑              
              }
 
 
   (4.16) 
where    
 
(    (  )) becomes a constant and presents a unit cost of variable input 
   
      , and   is a coefficient to change the units to a linear function. Intuitively, 
model (4.16) is quite similar to formulation (4.4), the revenue maximization model. The 
profit function ∑ ∑ [   (    (  ))     
 
(    (  ))]      is a concave function because 
  
  (    (  )) is a constant and    
 
(    (  ))    is a linear function. Thus, a Nash 
equilibrium exists and is unique. See sections 4.3 and 4.4 in the body of the paper. 
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APPENDIX D 
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER IV 
 
Lemma 4.1: Let output levels be decision variables denoted by     as output   of firm   
and      ; further, let input levels be decision variables denoted by     as input   of 
firm         , and (       )   ̃. Define    (   )    as a concave function of     and 
assume that either the inverse demand function    (   ) is a non-increasing or a convex 
function of    . Thus, for each  (  )   , where   (  )  ∑       ,     (    
 (  ) )    is a concave function of     for      . Similarly, let    (     (  ) )    be 
a convex function of     for      , where   (  )  ∑        and    (   ) is an inverse 
supply function. Further, if either    (   ) is strictly decreasing or is strictly convex, 
then    (     (  ) )    is a strictly concave function on the nonnegative       and 
∑   
 (     (  ) )     ∑   
 (     (  ) )     is a concave function on (       )  
 ̃. 
 
Proof: Murphy et al. (1982) prove the single output product case that when      and 
 (  )   , the revenue function      (    (  ))   is a concave function of    for 
     on the nonnegative real line since 
    
   
   . In our special case of Murphy et al. 
proven in their lemma 1, the production possibility set (   ) is a convex set and the 
boundary is a piece-wise linear concave function which characterizes a production 
function with diminishing returns. Thus,    (     (  ) )    is a concave function of 
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    for       and (       )   ̃  since, given fixed input levels, firm   can expand 
output only by increasing    . Similarly, we can prove a convex cost function of     
input resource    (     (  ) )    and concave profit function ∑    (     
 (  ) )    ∑   
 (     (  ) )    . 
 
Theorem 4.1: If the profit function of firm  ,   (       )  ∑    (  )     
∑   
 (  )     is concave with respect to (       ) and continuously differentiable, where 
   ∑      and    ∑     , then (     )   ̃ is a Nash-Cournot oligopolistic market 
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the set of VI 〈 ((     )) (   )  (     )〉    
 (   )   ̃ . That is, 
∑   (( 
    ))((     )  (  
    
 ))        (     )   ̃, 
where  
  ((   ))  (      (   )       (   )),       (   )  (
   (   )
    
   
   (   )
    
) and 
     (   )  (
   (   )
    
   
   (   )
    
). 
 
Proof: To simplify the proof, we first focus on revenue function with a single output. If 
the revenue function  ( )   is concave with respect to    and continuously 
differentiable, then (     )   ̃ is a Nash-Cournot oligopolistic market equilibrium if 
and only if it satisfies the set of VI 〈 (  )     〉     (      )   ̃  . That is,  
∑   ( 
 )(     
 )        (      )   ̃    (  )    (  )       (  ) . Since the 
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revenue function  ( )   is a continuously differentiable function and concave with 
respect to   , for a fixed  , the Nash equilibrium condition  (     (  )
 )  
  
 (    (  )
 )    ,  (      )   ̃  is equivalent to the variational inequality problem 
  ( 
 )(     
 )   , that is, 〈  (  )       〉     (      )   ̃. Then, summing over 
all firms   generates 〈 (  )     〉     (      )   ̃   . This result can be 
extended to prove the VI of the profit function. 
 
Theorem 4.2: Consider an oligopoly with   firms, with an inverse demand function 
  ( )  that is strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable in  , and an inverse 
supply function   ( )  that is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable in  . 
Since lemma 1 shows that the profit function   (     ) is concave and        , then 
 (     )  ((  
    
 ) (  
    
 )   (  
    
 )) is a Nash equilibrium solution if and only if 
     ( 
    )    and      ( 
    )           
  
 [     ( 
    )]    and    [     ( 
    )]          
where (       )   ̃. 
 
Proof: We derive the formulas above based on the KKT conditions. Note that the KKT 
conditions are both necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique global optimum 
since the model maximizes a strictly concave profit function over a convex polyhedral 
set (the production possibility set). The detail of existence and uniqueness of a Nash 
equilibrium is addressed in section 4.4 of the paper. 
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Lemma 4.2 : A Nash solution to MCP problem (4.3)  will satisfy      and  ( )   .  
 
Proof:  ( )           , that is  ( )      since      . If     , then 
 ( )    and the revenue function is nonnegative. If      and  ( )   , a firm’s 
best strategy to maximize the revenue function is to make     .  The case      and 
 ( )    will not happen because if ( )    , then there exists at least one firm 
generating          such that  ( )         . However, to maximize its 
revenue, firm   prefers to produce     . In other words,  ( )          if 
    . In addition, if   is a large positive number,    can be very small but positive to 
ensure a positive revenue function. Thus, any solution to this MCP (3) model enforces 
that    and  ( ) are nonnegative. 
 
Theorem 4.3: If  ( )          and α is a small enough positive parameter, the 
Nash equilibrium solution is for all firms to produce on the production frontier. 
 
Proof: In MCP,    
   
 ( ( )         )      ; where α is small enough, then 
 ( )           . In the extreme case,    , then  ( )          . By 
MCP,   (   ∑       )          , which gives    ∑         . Once 
again, a firm’s best strategy is to produce on the production frontier. 
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Theorem 4.4: If  ( )          and α is a large enough positive parameter, the 
MCP will lead to a benchmark output level with      ̅ close to zero, where   ̅ defines 
a truncated output level. 
 
Proof: Since         from lemma 4.2 and    is a constant, then   
 
 
 , meaning 
that a larger   will result in a smaller  . In the MCP,   (   ∑       )      
    . If   is small, then (   ∑       )   , i.e.      . In other words, we can 
increase α until no firm would choose to produce on the production frontier in a Nash 
equilibrium solution, and then all         . Proving this results in a truncated 
benchmark output level and requires us to show that if α increases, then    decreases and 
approaches zero. Since       and we know      by lemma 4.2,  ( )        in 
the MCP and    
 ( )
 
. In addition,    
 ( )
 
 
    ∑      
  
. If there are only two firms 
in the market,    
( 
 
 ⁄ )   
 
 and    
( 
 
 ⁄ )   
 
, then       
  
  
. This constant  
 
  
 
identifies the truncation output level for production. If there are   firms in the market, 
   
    ∑      
  
 and    
(
  
 
) (   )(
  
  
) (
   
 
)   (
   
 
)∑      
 
, then ∑       
 
   
(    (
  
 
)  (   ) (
  
  
)  (
   
 
)   )  
 
   
((
   
 
)    (
  
  
) (   )) . We 
replace ∑       in equation   , thus    
    ∑      
  
 
  
 
 
(   )  
(   ) 
  
   
   
 
  
(   ) 
. Therefore, 
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for   firms    
  
(   ) 
   ̅ and this constant   ̅ identifies the benchmark output level. 
As α goes to infinity,    
  
(   ) 
  . 
 
Theorem 4.5: If the price sensitivity matrix   satisfies WDD but is not necessarily 
symmetric, then the MCP (4.6) generates (       )   ̃  where     will approach the 
efficient frontier for small enough values of    ;      ̅   is the truncated benchmark 
output level that approaches zero as     approaches infinity. 
 
Proof: This is similar to theorems 4.3 and 4.4. We know    
   
   (    (  ))         
∑                  . If the     value is small enough and we consider a special 
case      , and the    matrix is diagonally dominant, then     (    (  ))      
   . Referring to the MCP,   (    ∑        )                , meaning 
    ∑          , or a firm’s best strategy is to produce on the production frontier 
except for the portion associated with positive slacks and dual variables equal to zero on 
the output constraints since increasing output does not affect the price reduction. On the 
other hand, if the     value is large enough,   (    (  ))            
∑            and     is a constant, then    
  
  ∑         
   
. As     becomes larger, 
   approaches zero. Referring to the MCP,   (    ∑        )                . 
If    is small, then (    ∑        )    and        . In other words, we can 
increase     until no firm would choose to produce on the production frontier in a Nash 
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equilibrium solution, and then all            . To show this result, as    increases, 
then    , the truncated output level becomes smaller and approaches zero. Since 
  (    (  ))         ∑                 , and we know        and 
     , thus   (    (  ))         ∑             in MCP (4.6) and       
  
     ∑        ∑          ∑          
    
. For the two-output products example,       
  
 
    
 
∑       
 
 
   
    
   
   
    
    and      
  
 
    
 
∑       
 
 
   
    
   
   
    
   ; 
replacing     in equation     gives     (  
          
 
       
)
  
[(
  
 
    
 
   
    
  
 
    
)  
(
 
 
 
   
 
       
)∑        
   
    
   
   
    
∑       ] . Also,        ∑        finally 
gives     (  
           
     
 
       
)
  
[(
  
 
    
 
(       )  
 
       
)  (
 
 
 
   
 
       
 
      
       
)∑        (
   
    
 
   
    
 
   
    
)∑       ] . Based on WDD,     (
  
 
    
)  
(
 
 
)∑        (
   
    
)∑       . This result shows that     is a function of     and     , 
not a variable of index  . Thus,     is limited by a truncated level  ̅   for all firms, since 
for all firms   the same equation applies as does     for revenue maximization. Similar 
equation can be derived for    . In addition, as     approaches infinity     
 ∑       
 
. 
That is,      ̅   should be equal to zero. We can extend this result to outputs of more 
than two. Therefore, the truncation point approaches zero as     becomes large. 
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Corollary 4.1: If the price sensitivity matrix   satisfies the MDD property and     
       , then the solution to the MCP (4.6) will satisfy              . 
 
Proof:  Theorem 4.5 proves Corollary 4.1. 
 
Theorem 4.6: Given arbitrary price sensitivity matrices   and   that satisfy WDD, 
MCP (4.9) generates all allocatively efficient Nash solutions (               )   ̃. These 
solutions are on the frontier including the weakly efficient frontier, but excluding the 
portion of the frontier associated with positive slacks and dual variables equal to zero on 
the input constraints. 
 
Proof: Based on theorem 4.5, if      , then        because there is no free lunch 
axiom in production theory (Färe et al., 1985). According to formulation (4.11) 
   
  (  
   (  )
 )        
  ∑       
 
          , that is,    
 
(  
   (  )
 )  
      
  ∑       
 
        . Consider that      ,   
  
 
   and the   matrix is 
diagonally dominant; then       . Referring to MCP (4.9),   (∑              )  
              , which gives ∑                . Based on theorem 5 we know that 
     might/might not be equal to zero for all     according to the price sensitivity 
matrix  , i.e. equation     ∑          . Thus, a firm’s best strategy is to adjust its 
variable input and output levels approaching the production frontier. The solution 
becomes allocatively efficient. Further, ∑                 implies that the slacks of 
  
172 
the input constraints are equal to zero and the feasible region of the Nash solution is the 
production possibility set  ̃ excluding the region for which the input level is larger than 
the least value at the free disposability hull of the inputs. This exception of the free 
disposability hull of inputs implies an upper bound of adjustable input level. Note that 
the points on the free disposability hull of inputs, except the anchor points, have positive 
slacks and dual variables equal to zero on the inputs’ constraints. Therefore, all Nash 
equilibrium solutions (               ) belong to  ̃ excluding the input level larger than the 
anchor point at the free disposability hull of inputs. 
 
Theorem 4.7: MCP (4.9) generates a Nash equilibrium solution (         )   ̃. 
 
Proof: If an equilibrium output vector exists and              , it must satisfy the 
first order condition of MCP (4.9). The complementary condition gives the following 
first order condition on the output side: 
  (    (  ))         ∑       
   
                
This condition can be expressed in matrix notation as: 
                         
where   is a matrix with (       ) and each vector    (         ) .   is a vector 
(     )  with K elements.     is a price vector with elements   
  .     is a vector of 
the Lagrangian multiplier with elements     . If    is the solution obtained from the 
first order condition, we need to show that    (     (  ) )    
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∑      
 
      for all  . This equation can be expressed in matrix notation as    
    . Obviously, the first order condition gives                     if 
  
    for all   by lemma 4.2. 
Similar to the first order condition on the variable input side 
    
 
          
              
where    is a matrix with (         ) and each vector     (           ) .    
 
 is a 
price vector with elements   
  
 
.     is a vector of the Lagrangian multiplier with 
elements     . If     is the solution obtained from the first order condition, we need to 
show that    
 
(  
    (  )
  )    
  
 
      
   ∑      
  
      for all  . This equation 
can be expressed in matrix notation as    
 
     . Obviously, the first order condition 
gives               
 
        if        for all   by the estimated 
production possibility set  ̃ describing a positive lower bound of input level. Therefore, 
if an equilibrium vector exists, it must equal (      ). 
To show that (      )  is indeed an equilibrium vector, for any nonnegative vector 
(    ̂   ̂)   ̃ where (    ̂   ̂)  (         ), we consider (    ̂   ̂) in which all 
the elements are equal to (         ) except for some        columns. We need to 
show that  
∑∑  
 ( ̂   ̂(  )) ̂  
  
 ∑∑  
  ( ̂ 
   ̂(  )
 ) ̂  
 
  
 ∑∑   
 (  
   (  )
 )   
 
 
 
 ∑∑  
  (  
    (  )
  )   
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for all  . Since    is a strictly concave function under concavity and differentiability 
assumptions for the maximization problem, and (      )  satisfies the first order 
condition and the KKT condition, then (      ) must be a global optimum, i.e. the 
complementary condition provides a Nash equilibrium 
solution: ∑ ∑    ( ̂   ̂(  )) ̂     ∑ ∑    
 
( ̂ 
   ̂(  )
 ) ̂  
 
   
∑ ∑   
 (  
   (  )
 )   
 
   ∑ ∑   
  (  
    (  )
  )   
  
   for all   and (    ̂   ̂)   ̃. 
 
Theorem 4.8: If the profit function is a strictly concave function on (       )   ̃ that 
is continuous and differentiable and the price sensitivity matrices   and   satisfy the 
WDD property, then the Nash equilibrium solution found using MCP (4.9) is unique if a 
solution exists for the maximization problem. 
 
Proof: To prove the uniqueness, let two vectors (    ̂   ̂) and (         )   ̃  be 
solutions and  (    ̂   ̂)  (         ) satisfy the variational inequality: 
∑   (( 
        ))  ((  
    
     
 )  (  
    
     
 ))        (  
    
     
 )   ̃   (4.17) 
∑   (( 
   ̂   ̂))  ((  
    
     
 )  (  
   ̂ 
   ̂ ))        (  
    
     
 )   ̃  (4.18) 
Substituting  ̂    ̂  for          in (4.17) and          for          in (4.18) and adding the 
resulting inequalities gives 
∑ (  (( 
        ))    (( 
   ̂   ̂)))  ((  
   ̂ 
   ̂ )  (  
    
     
 )  0 
However, this inequality does not satisfy the definition of strict monotonicity. 
Thus,  ̂     ,  ̂     and the solution is unique. 
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Corollary 4.2: Assume all input and output variables are normalized to eliminate unit 
dependence, and the price of outputs dominates the price of inputs to ensure a positive 
marginal profit. Given a production frontier including three portions: IRS, CRS, and 
DRS, the MCP (4.9) generates a Nash equilibrium solution that is characterized by DRS 
when the inverse demand and supply functions are less sensitive, or the Nash 
equilibrium is characterized by IRS when the inverse demand and supply functions are 
more sensitive.  
 
Proof: Intuitively, for one-variable-input one-output production process if the inverse 
demand and supply functions are less sensitive, this is illustrated in a special case where 
both price sensitivity matrix   and   are equal to zero; the profit function    can be 
written as maximizing            
 
  . Let     denote the optimal value of profit 
function. Thus, we can express the function     
     
 
  
   
 , where  
  
 
   
 indicates the 
slope of profit function. Given the price of outputs dominating the price of inputs, in a 
special case the slope  
  
 
   
   , the optimal solution of profit maximization problem 
will show the flat profit line tangent to the production possibility set. Since  
  
 
   
   , a 
firm would like to generate a Nash solution on the DRS frontier for profit maximization 
based on theorems 4.5 and 4.6, i.e., in extreme case, the input level of the Nash solution 
has to be on the upper bound defined by the least value of the free disposability hull of 
inputs (see firm A in figure 4.4). DRS is associated with the insensitive inverse demand 
and supply function. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium solution generated from MCP (4.9) 
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presents the DRS with respect to MPSS and  ∑  
      
    
      ∑    
    
  ∑    
 
   . 
Similarly, we can show that the Nash solutions present the IRS when more sensitive 
inverse demand and supply functions occur, i.e., a profit function with larger slope. The 
result can be extended to the multiple-input multiple-output case. 
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